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Abstract
With the advent of various access technologies and increasing number of applications, a set of 
challenges concerning efficient delivery of ubiquitous services to heterogeneous users and devices 
have been posed. Mobile IP protocol can be used to enable roaming across different access 
technologies. One of the important challenges in Mobile IP is security. The service delivery 
should be secured and efficient, which implicates that security should be integrated with mobility 
management (MM), Quality-of-Service (QoS) to minimise the negative impact of security 
mechanisms. It is proposed in the thesis an architectural framework, which uses Hierarchical 
Mobile IPv6 (HMlPv6) protocols interworking with Authentication, Authorization, Accounting 
(AAA) framework. The concept of Enhanced Node (EN) is introduced in the framework. The EN 
is empowered with intelligence to integrate security, MM and QoS. The focal point of the work is 
to address security challenges based on the framework and to evaluate the impact of security 
mechanisms on the mobile networks in terms of extra signalling load introduced.
Three security mechanisms are proposed in the thesis, according to the handover domains. For 
handover across two access networks, an enhanced AAA solution is proposed to provide the 
mobile node authenticated network access. It establishes keys between serving access network 
and target access network for the purpose of securing context transfer. Also keys are established 
between mobile node and the target access network for future use after mobile node (MN) roams 
to the target access network. For micro-mobility handover within one EN domain, an enhanced 
key management scheme is proposed to generate a bunch of handover keys for all of the access 
routers (AR) within one EN domain instead of generating key every single time the mobile node 
changes the AR in the previous mechanism. The enhanced key management scheme reduces the 
handover disruption time introduced by security. For fast handovers within one EN domain 
(micro-mobility handover) and across EN domains (macro-mobility handover), the security 
mechanism is proposed to secure the fast handover between ARs/enhanced nodes. The fast 
handover key is established between previous AR/EN and new AR/EN, thus, the fast handover 
registration messages between ARs/ENs can be secured. More importantly, the context transfer 
messages between previous EN and new EN for the purpose of prompting “smooth handover”, 
can be protected using the fast handover keys. The performance of three proposed solutions is 
evaluated using analytical models. Signalling cost is the main parameter to be evaluated. 
Discussions on advantage and disadvantage of each proposed mechanisms are also provided at the 
end of chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively.
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Chapter 1
1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Delivering ubiquitous services to various mobile users through heterogeneous networks is a 
major objective in the next generation mobile networks. However, the delivery of ubiquitous 
services today poses many challenges for the operator. Among various issues, there are three key 
factors which draw to the attention of many researchers world widely: Mobility Management 
(MM), Quality-of-Service (QoS) and security. The service delivery should be efficient and secure. 
Therefore, the need for secured and seamless fast handovers and the support for the integration of 
security, QoS and mobility management become parts of the essential issues.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) made a great effort to propose mobility protocols 
to enable moving end users and moving networks. Mobile lPv4/v6 protocols and their variations 
are proposed by IETF to provide the mobile device continuous connectivity while roaming from 
one network to another. Mobile IP protocols have been implemented in wired and wireless 
environment where end users need to move across multiple subnets or roam between overlapping 
wireless systems, such as Wimax, WLAN, etc. Mobile IP support is also used within CDMA2000 
and other cellular systems to provide seamless IP mobility between different packet data serving 
node (PDSN) domains. Although, Mobile IP is widely proposed to be a wise solution to provide 
routing services to mobile node that constantly changes its point of attachment to the network, 
there are many other challenges apart from mobility management. Security and QoS are two of 
the major ones. In order to deliver the seiwice in a secured and efficient manner, the integration of 
mobility, security and QoS becomes essential. As research endeavours to improve Mobile lPv4/v6 
protocol to achieve better handover performance, in terms of fast, smooth and seamless 
handovers, it is important that security/QoS mechanism has minimal impact on the handover 
performance. Thus, providing security solution in Mobile IP requires not only good security 
design, but also integration with Mobile IP protocol to minimise the overhead, such as extra 
signalling and delay.
Variations of Mobile IP protocols have been proposed to improve the performance of Mobile 
IPv6 protocol, such as Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMlPv6), Fast handover Mobile IPv6
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(FMIPv6), etc. The research work in the thesis is based on HMlPv6 and FMlPv6 protocols, which 
will be explained in detail in Chapter 2. There are many security issues existing in Mobile IP 
which can be summarized as below,
Authentication/Authorization: The mobile user needs to be authenticated for the network 
access and to be authorised for the services.
Efficient key management with minimal overhead: scalable and efficient key management 
mechanism is essential. With keys/keying materials delivered/established, the mobile IP 
registration procedure can be secured. And more importantly, the key management scheme 
should not have too much negative impact on the performance of Mobile IP protocols. 
Anti-replay/Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: Among various attacks, replay and DoS 
attacks are of the most-mentioned ones, which deserve special attention. More explanation 
of attacks will be provided in section 3.3.
Targeting at solving some of the security issues for HMlPv6 and FMlPv6 based networks, three 
different security mechanisms are proposed in the thesis. More details regarding the proposed 
solutions are explained in section 1.2.
1.2 Research Objectives
In order to enhance the handover performance, HMlPv6 and FMlPv6 are proposed by IETF. 
HMlPv6 provides micro-mobility management enhancement for Mobile IPv6 networks. And 
FMlPv6 mainly focus on fast handover mechanism. According to handover types, the mobility 
domains can be classified to three categories as shown in Figure 1.1:
N etw ork
L e v e l
(C h a n te r  -U doWlity 
agent _ilobility 
agent _
ilobilityM acrun iob ility  
Lev el 
(C h a p te r  6)
Access AccessAceess AeccssAccess
M icrom obility  
Level 
(C h a p te r  5, 6) MobileNode
Figure 1.1 Mobile IP: mobility domains
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Micro-mobility ; secure HMIPv6 mobility signalling (in chapter 5) and fast handover 
signalling (in chapter 6) for handovers within one mobility agent domain
IP micro mobility usually refers to the mobile communication architecture which is primarily 
designed to complement the IETF macro-mobility management protocol ‘Mobile IP’. IP micro 
mobility protocols handle intra-domain (within one mobility agent) mobility of mobile users, 
without interacting with Mobile IP-enabled Internet to enhance quality of real-time 
communications, by effectively reducing delay, network overhead and packet loss during handoff. 
Mobile user performs handover within one mobility agent, as shown in Figure 1.1. The 
registration procedure is localized within the mobility agent, without the need to traverse the 
Mobile IP-enabled Internet. Since the registration is performed between the mobile node and the 
local mobility agent, the registration signalling need to be properly secured. Therefore, the key 
management mechanism to distribute keys/keying materials between mobility agent, access router 
and mobile node is required. The key management scheme for securing micro-mobility in 
HMIPv6 based networks is proposed in chapter 5.
Macro-mobility; secure fast handover signalling for handovers across mobility agent 
domains (chapter 6)
As opposed to micro-mobility, macro mobility is to handle inter-domain (across mobility agent 
domains) mobility of mobile users. Mobile IP defines means of providing and managing macro­
mobility. However, it introduces large handover latency, packet loss and service degradation. 
Thus, the fast handover mechanism is introduced to enhance macro-mobility performance, by 
reducing the handover latency and packet loss rate. The mechanism of context transfer, for 
instance, QoS context, between neighbouring nodes enhances smooth handover performance 
which potentially mitigates the degradation of service. It is defined here that the macro-mobility is 
the mobility level between mobility agent domains within one access network, as shown in Figure 
1.1. Thus, providing fast handover mechanism between neighbouring mobility agents are 
necessary. Meanwhile, the security mechanism to secure the fast handover procedure between 
mobility agents is required. In the fast handover mechanism, not only registration procedure but 
also the context transfer/packet forwarding between neighbouring nodes (access router or mobility 
agent) needs to be secured. Thus, introducing security mechanism to protect registration/context 
transfer becomes necessary. The mechanism for securing fast handovers in both of micro-mobility 
and macro-mobility scenarios is proposed in chapter 6.
Network-mobility: authentication of the mobile node, establishing trust between serving 
and target access networks, distributing security credentials in target access network 
(chapter 4)
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The network-mobility, as shown in Figure l.l, defines the handover between two access 
networks. It is actually a special scenario of macro-mobility. And the reason why I separate the 
macro-mobility between mobility agents and macro-mobility between access networks it that they 
differ from security point of view, although they look similar from mobility registration 
perspective. When the mobile node (MN) enters a new access network, it is important that the 
authentication is performed. And it is also essential that security credentials are distributed in the 
new access network for future use. Thus, authenticated access control mechanism, which is 
proposed in chapter 4, is crucial for the network-mobility level.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organized as follow.
Chapter 2 explains Mobile IPv6 protocol in detail, focusing on the location update procedures. 
Variations of Mobile IPv6, namely HMIPv6, FMIPv6 and the integration of them, are also 
explained. Other micro-mobility protocols, such as Cellular IP and HAWAII, are mentioned in the 
end of this chapter and a comparison of common micro-mobility protocols is given. The security 
techniques and concepts to be used later in the proposed solutions are also explained. A literature 
survey on Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) framework and protocols is 
given, and some initial work on the integration of AAA with Mobile IP is introduced.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the network architectural framework which the design is based 
on. The concept of enhanced node, which integmtes security, QoS and mobility management, is 
introduced. Security threat analysis and security design requirements are provided, based on the 
framework.
Chapter 4 proposes an enhanced AAA solution for authenticated access control, which can be 
applied for the handover across different access networks (network level mobility shown in Figure 
1.1). The proposed mechanism authenticates the mobile node and also establishes security 
associations between serving and target access networlcs and between the mobile node and target 
access networks. The detailed signalling and extensions to Mobile IP and AAA messages are 
provided. The performance of proposed mechanism is evaluated using analytical models (fluid 
flow model and random walk model) against the traditional Mobile 1 P/AAA solution. The 
signalling overhead introduced by the proposed mechanism is evaluated. The advantage and 
disadvantage of the proposed solution against the traditional Mobile IP/AAA solution are 
analyzed.
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Chapter 5 proposes an enhanced key management scheme for securing micro-mobility 
handovers in HMIPv6 based networks. The proposed solution provides an efficient key 
management scheme by generating a bunch of session keys at one time for all of the access 
routers within one mobility agent domain. Signalling details and extensions to Mobile IP and 
AAA messages are explained. The performance of the proposed solution is evaluated using fluid 
flow and random walk mobility models against the previous mechanism, which generates the 
session key every time the mobile node performs handovers between access routers. Signalling 
cost is the main parameter that has been simulated. An analysis of the advantage and disadvantage 
of the proposed solution against the previous mechanism is provided.
Chapter 6 focuses on security mechanism for fast handovers. It is proposed a solution to secure 
fast handovers in HMIPv6 based networks. The fast handover here includes micro-mobility level 
handover, where fast handover is performed between neighbouring access routers, and macro­
mobility level handover, where fast handover is performed between neighbouring mobility agents. 
The proposed solution establishes fast handover keys between previous and new access 
routers/mobility agents, for the purpose of securing fast handover registration signalling or/and 
context transfer messages. The performance is evaluated on the parameters of signalling cost 
introduced by the proposed security mechanism. The total signalling cost with security 
mechanism enabled is compared to the signalling cost of standard HMIPv6 fast handover 
protocol.
Finally chapter 7 concludes the thesis by highlighting the outcomes derived from the work and 
suggests possible directions for future work.
1.4 Main Contributions
The following contributions have been made in this thesis:
1. An enhanced AAA solution for the authenticated access control
The solution is proposed in chapter 4 to secure handovers between different access networks. And 
it basically enhances the traditional Mobile IP/AAA solution, by providing the mobile MN 
authenticated access and establishing the security associations in the target access network at the 
same time. The procedure is performed before the mobile node connects to the target access 
network, thus, it also mitigates the extra delay introduced by security mechanism.
2. An enhanced key management scheme for securing micro-mobility handovers
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The solution is proposed in chapter 5 to secure micro-mobility handovers. It is to establish session 
keys between mobile node, access router and mobility agent to secure the registration messages 
exchanged between them. Previously, the session key is generated every time the mobile node 
changes its point of attachment to the network (access router). The proposed mechanism enhances 
previous solution by generating a bunch of session keys at one time for all of the access routers 
within one mobility agent domain, when the mobile node first enters this mobility agent domain. 
Thus, the handover delay introduced by seciu'ity mechanism is reduced for any future micro­
mobility handovers within this particular mobility agent domain.
3. A solution to secure fast handover in HMIPv6 based networks
The solution is proposed in chapter 6 to secure fast handovers in HMIPv6 based networks. It is 
basically to establish handover keys between neighbouring access routers/mobility agents, for the 
purpose of securing registration/context transfer messages. The solution is applied for both of the 
micro-mobility fast handovers between access routers and the macro-mobility fast handovers 
between mobility agents.
The integration of HMIPv6 and FMIPv6 protocols is also investigated. The FMlPv6 standard is 
proposed by IETF for the fast handover between access routers. However, in order to integrate 
fast handover with HMIPv6, it is even more important that the fast handover between mobility 
agents can be applied. As the global location update for handover between mobility agents in 
HMIPv6 can cause even more noticeable delay and packet loss, than handover within mobility 
agent domain where the location update is localized without the necessity for global update. It is 
specified in the thesis in section 2.1.2.4 and section 6.4.3 how the integration of fast handover and 
HMIPv6 works.
4. Integration of security, mobility management and QoS, making use of the enlianced node 
concept, based on the proposed architectural framework
With the intelligence of enhanced node, the integration of security, mobility management and 
QoS becomes possible. The integration of security and mobility management can minimise the 
negative effect of security mechanism on the mobility protocols, in terms of introducing less 
handover latency or signalling overhead. The integration of security and QoS suggests here that 
important QoS messages can be secured, for instance, the QoS context transfer between 
neighbouring access routers/mobility agents to allow for smooth handover performance.
5. Specify the extensions to standard Mobile IP messages and propose new AAA commands
To enable proposed security solutions, extensions to Mobile IP messages and introduction of new 
AAA commands with defined set of Attribute-Value-Pairs (AVP) are required. In many of the
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previous Mobile IP/AAA solutions, the details of message extension are not clarified. However, it 
is specified in each of the three solutions proposed in the thesis, the extension or modifications to 
Mobile IP messages. New AAA commands with defined A VPs are also specified, if the AAA 
messages are required.
6. Analytical model to simulate the signalling overhead of proposed security mechanisms
Some work has been carried out to evaluate the signalling overhead introduced by Mobile IP 
registration procedures, using analytical models. However, not much has been done to evaluate 
the signalling overhead introduced by security mechanisms. The analytical models have been used 
in the thesis to quantify the registration signalling cost of HMIPv6, FMIPv6 and the integration of 
them. Also, the signalling cost of proposed security mechanisms and some of the previous 
solutions are also evaluated. Thus, by comparison of signalling overhead, the advantage and 
disadvantage of the proposed security mechanism can be concluded.
Also, more accurate parameters are used in the analytical modelling. In previous work of 
evaluating signalling cost of registration messages in Mobile IP protocol and its variations using 
analytical models, the size of messages are not differentiated. For example, it is assumed that the 
size of binding update message is equal to that of binding acknowledgement message, in order to 
simplify the parameters in the model. However, more accurate parameters are used in my 
modelling process. 1 specify different message with its own size.
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2 Mobility Management and Security 
Mechanisms in Next Generation Mobile 
Networks
2.1 Mobility Management in Next Generation Mobile Networks
2.1.1 Ubiquitous Services over Next Generation Heterogeneous Network
A heterogeneous network is a network connecting computers and other end devices with 
different operating systems and protocols. In wireless networks, heterogeneous network is often 
referred to the network using several access technologies. For example, a wireless network which 
provides the internet service to an end user through a wireless Local Area Network (LAN) and 
maintains the connectivity when the user is switched to a GSM network. Ubiquitous access and 
services is one of the essential issues in the next generation heterogeneous networks. With the 
development of Bluetooth, WiFi, WiMax and Ultra-Wideband (UWB) access technologies, the 
dream of ubiquitous access has come closer to reality. That is why ubiquitous and pervasive 
services represent a major future revenue stream and meanwhile poses many practical challenges 
for seivice providers, telecommunication operators and pervasive technology manufacturers [1].
The barriers to delivery of ubiquitous services arise from the desire to deliver a wide mix of 
service to users with diverse device capabilities via multiple heterogeneous networks, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. When an end user wants to access data from a remote server using one or more 
network technologies, several issues arise from this scenario. For example, the nature of the data 
to be retrieved must be assessed (service/content perspective), the capabilities to deliver services 
with desired security and Quality-of-Sei*vice (QoS) level (network perspective) and the adaptation 
of the content/service to the user’s pei'vasive environment (user perspective). In order to 
accelerate commercialisation of ubiquitous services, targeted innovations should be aimed at
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removing the barriers to deployment and adoption from three perspectives -  user, network and 
content/service providers.
The key barrier to accessing ubiquitous services from the network perspective arises from the 
need to manage delivery of multiple services within different security and QoS environments 
through multiple heterogeneous networks. It is therefore essential that different delivery networks 
should be empowered to operate in a cooperative manner. The presence of intelligence and inter­
connection among intelligent entities in such networks poses particular challenges. To address 
these challenges, an innovative network support sub-layer, which integrates security, mobility and 
QoS mechanisms, is proposed in [1]. Integration, in this context, incorporates both horizontal 
integration between the various service concepts that exist in the disparate networks, and vertical 
integration, where the support of security, mobility and QoS in the various participating networks 
is a key factor in end-to-end performance.
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Figure 2.1 M ultiple choices at different aspects for Ubiquitous Services | l  j
A network support sub-layer is defined in [1] to facilitate the co-operation among 
heterogeneous networks to support pervasive services, in a seamless, efficient and secured 
manner. The concept of network support sub-layer is proposed to integrate security, QoS and 
mobility management. The nodes with the network support sub-layer are referred to as enhanced 
nodes, which will be explained in detail in chapter 3. These networks are expected to use different 
security, mobility and QoS mechanisms. This makes co-operation among them a very complex 
technical issue. Since only a few enhanced nodes (enhanced nodes of each access networks) 
interact with each other, the proposed architecture will simplify the required functions and 
interaction mechanisms. There are two aspects for this approach. The first is to design a common 
network support sub-layer to integrate security, mobility and QoS functions efficiently. The 
second is to find out efficient mechanisms that enable the enhanced nodes with this common sub­
layer in different access networks to interact with each other.
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However, much research has recently been undertaken in proposing and designing security, 
mobility and QoS mechanisms based on the IP paradigm. In all of this work, different design 
approaches have been considered for each such mechanism in isolation, without considering their 
inherent interactions. When integrated into one network, they either do not work or, at least, do 
not work as well as expected. For example within the 1ST BRAIN [2] and MIND [3] projects, 
such mechanisms were designed and optimized separately but once put together, the overall 
performance was not as expected. The lesson learned from such research was to design them 
using the same approach and simultaneously with a common signalling protocol. Integration of 
security, mobility and QoS mechanisms within one network is necessary if efficient delivery of 
pervasive services is to become feasible for the network operator.
Security, mobility and QoS mechanisms are all beneficial in providing the features required to 
support their individual functions, but inevitably this leads to the network operation being pieced 
together in an ad-hoc manner, with no integration. Furthermore, there is no overall vision of how 
they can work together, to provide a single platform to enhance the network operations. Therefore 
it makes sense to adopt a common design approach for all these mechanisms using a common 
platform and, if possible, with one common signalling protocol for the network sub-layer.
The nodes with the sub-layer are referred to as enhanced nodes. It is located in a small number 
of nodes in the network, such as gateway, anchor point, etc. Within such a framework, translation 
of security, mobility and QoS will be required. A common representation of such mechanisms 
will be used in signalling between enhanced nodes to support this (horizontal integration). The 
enhanced nodes will operate within the constraints of their access networks, such as the ability to 
perform security related functionalities, to control routing and traffic flow, with the aim of 
meeting the desired end-to-end performance criteria (vertical integration). The use of such 
selected nodes in a heterogeneous network comprising security/mobility/QoS aware and unaware 
access networks potentially allows existing telecommunication networks to be enhanced, without 
the additional delays associated with network standardization, through selective upgrades of a 
limited number of network nodes.
The other part of this task is to come up with efficient mechanisms that enable the enhanced 
nodes with this common network sub-layer in different access networks to interact with each 
other. It is also essential to define a common inter-access signalling protocol for communication 
among the enhanced nodes in different access networks.
The Mobile IPv6 protocol is Just as suitable for mobility across homogeneous media as for 
mobility across heterogeneous media. For example. Mobile IPv6 facilitates node movement from 
one Ethernet segment to another as well as it facilitates node movement from an Ethernet segment
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to a wireless LAN cell, with the mobile node's IP address remaining unchanged in spite of such 
movement [4].
2.1.2 Mobile IP Protocols
Mobile IP is an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard protocol that is designed to 
allow mobile end users to roam away from its home network while maintaining a permanent IP 
address. Thus, location independent routing of IP datagram is realized using Mobile IP. There are 
two versions of Mobile IP protocols: Mobile IPv4 [5] and Mobile IPv6 [4]. And several variations 
are introduced based on Mobile IP protocols, such as Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) [6], 
Fast handover for Mobile IPv6 (FMIPv6) [7] and Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) [8].
2.1.2.1 Mobile IPv6
To allow the nodes to remain connected while moving in the IPv6 Internet, Mobile IPv6 
(MIPv6) is proposed by IETF. The node can be always reached by its home address when it is in 
its home network. But packets destined to the node would not be able to reach it while the node is 
roaming away from its home network. Therefore, the mobility support for IPv6 node is needed to 
continue the communication no matter where the node is. MIPv6 allows an IPv6 node to move 
from one link to another with home address remaining the same. Packets destined to the node can 
be routed using its home address regardless of its current point of attachment. Therefore, 
continuous communication is achieved while the node is roaming in the visited network.
Home Network
Hom e Address
Foreign Network 
(Visited Network). move
Care-of-Address (CoA)
Figure 2.2 Mobile IPv6 Domain
Figure 2.2 shows a typical Mobile IPv6 domain. When the Mobile Node (MN) moves from its
home network to a foreign network, it obtains a new Care-of-Address (CoA), which provides
information about the MN’s current location. The MN then performs a Binding Update (BU) to its
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Home Agent (HA), therefore the CoA is registered at HA. The HA creates a binding between the 
MN’s home address and CoA and also sends a Binding Acknowledgement (BA) to MN. When 
the registration procedure is finished, the HA intercepts packets destined to the MN if a 
Correspondent Node (CN), whether mobile or stationary, wants to communicate with the MN. 
The HA then tunnels all packets from the CN to the MN using the MN's CoA. When the MN 
answers the CN, it may tunnel all its packets through the HA to the CN. Alternatively, it can use 
its current CoA to perform a BU to the CN and communicate with the CN directly after that. This 
process is called route optimization. Route optimization solves the problem of triangle routing, 
which is introduced by MIPv6’s requirement to route packets destined for the MN through its 
home network. Route optimization is essential for the efficient operation of MIPv6, because it 
avoids congestion in the HA and also greatly reduces latency for communication and traffic load 
across the entire Internet [4].
MIPv6 has many same features with MIPv4, but it also provides many other improvements [4]. 
Some of the improvements are listed as follows,
MIPv4 deploys special router “Foreign Agent (FA)” in the foreign network. While MIPv6 
operates in the visited network without any particular support from special routers.
MIPv6 supports route optimization, which greatly enhances the performance of Mobile IP 
routing. It is expected that route optimization can be applied on a global scale between any of 
the MN and the CN.
In MIPv6, most packets destined to a MN while it is away from the home network are sent 
using an IPv6 routing header rather than IP encapsulation. It reduces the amount of overhead 
compared to MIPv4.
2.1.2.2 Hierarchical Mobile IPv6
In MIPv6, in order to maintain the connectivity between MN and CN, MN needs to sends BU 
to its HA and all of the CNs every time it changes point of attachment. The frequent location 
updates inevitably result in large handover disruption time and heavy network overhead. In order 
to eliminate the additional delays in the time-crucial handoff procedures and reduce the mobility 
signalling load on the external Internet, HMIPv6 is proposed to introduce extensions to IPv6 
neighbour discovery and MIPv6 protocol. A local anchor point, called “Mobility Anchor Point 
(MAP)” is proposed in HMIPv6. MAP basically offers an anchor point for the MN to localize the 
mobility signalling, so that MIPv6 is beneficial from reduced network overhead with external 
networks.
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MAP can be placed at any level in a hierarchical network. It provides localized mobility 
management by limiting the amount of mobility signalling out of its local domain in the following 
ways,
- MN sends a BU message to MAP rather than HA and CNs, when it enters a MAP domain. 
Since Global location update to HA is always a time-consuming procedure, with HA located 
far away from the visited network, the mobility signalling in HMIPv6 are considerably 
reduced.
- In MIPv6, MN sends BU to its HA and all of the CNs when it moves from one link to another, 
to maintain the connection. While, MN only needs to send one BU to its current MAP before 
the packets can be re-routed from its HA and the CNs. MAP is technically the local HA to the 
MN.
MAP not only help to improve the handover rate, but also can reduce the amount of signalling 
related to mobility. The goal in a domain oriented mobility management schemes like HMIPv6 is 
to limit the signalling messages locally within the region. That is due to the fact that BU are sent 
from MN directly to MAP rather than HA, meaning that MN’s exact position is hidden from the 
upper layer nodes. Thus the signalling messages in macro level get reduced as long as the MN 
stays in a specific region. In such a sti'ucture the MN has two CoAs: LCoA and RCoA. The MN 
registers the obtained address from its serving AR with its cuiTent MAP. This address is called 
“On-Link CoA” (LCoA), also referred to as local CoA. The MAP binds the LCoA with its own 
address which is called “Regional CoA” (RCoA). The source address of outgoing packets from 
the MN to the outer domain carries the MAP’s address. Therefore, the peer nodes just deal with 
the MAP and the incoming packets are addressed to the MAP as well. Then, MAP distributes the 
packets among the visiting MNs of its domain, according to its binding table [9].
Figure 2.3 shows a typical HMIPv6 domain and gives an example of the use of MAP in a 
foreign network. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, there are two MAPs coving the network domain and 
each of the MAP domains consists of several ARs. MAP can provide seamless handover as MN 
moves from ARl to AR2. Upon arrival in a foreign network, MN discovers the global address of 
the serving MAP (RCoA). The address is stored in the all of ARs in the MAP domain, and MN 
can be notified through router advertisement (RA) message. The process of discovering serving 
MAP and its related information is called “MAP discovery”. The MAP discovery also takes place 
as MN moves from MAPI domain to MAP2 domain to notify the MN the change of serving 
MAP. The RA can be used to detect movement and inform the MN whether it has changed the 
MAP domain, through a MAP option. If the MN is still within the same MAP domain, it will 
receive the same MAP option in RA from the AR. If the MN moves across MAP domains, the
13
Chapter 2. Mobility Management and Security Mechanisms in Next Generation Mobile Networks
advertised MAP address would change. And upon detecting the change in MAP option, MN 
performs BU to the new MAP. The MN first registers with new MAP by sending it a BU 
containing its home address and LCoA. The home address used in the BU is the RCoA of MAP. 
The serving MAP stores the information in its binding cache and forwards packets received from 
HA or CNs to MN according to the information in the binding cache.
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Figure 2.3 Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 Domain
2.1.2.3 Fast Handover for Mobile IPv6
During a handover in MlPv6, there is a period when MN can not either receive or send any 
packets from its HA or CNs because of the protocol operations. The handover disruption time 
usually results from the MIPv6 operations, such as new CoA configuration, BU, especially the 
global BU to HA which is always far away from MN’s current location. For the time-sensitive 
data, such as voice over IP (VoIP) service, large handover latency is not tolerable and it is 
essential that the MN can continuously send and receive packets while performing location 
updates. Therefore, FMIPv6 is proposed to reduce the handover latency. It enables the MN to 
send packets as soon as it detects a new subnet link and to receive packets as soon as its 
attachment to a new AR.
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Figure 2.4 FM IPv6 Scenario
Figure 2.4 shows a simple scenario for FMIPv6. The MN is moving from the previous AR 
(PAR) to the new AR (NAR). In FMlPv6, even though a MN moves into a new domain, before it 
registers its New CoA (NCoA) to the HA/CN, packets sent from the HA/CN are delivered to the 
PAR first. Then they are tunnelled to the NAR by the PAR and finally arrive at the MN. Once the 
MN completes the registration of its NCoA to the HA/CN, packets will arrive at the MN directly 
via the NAR [10].
It is defined in [7] two types of fast handover, namely predictive fast handover and reactive fast 
handover. And there are also two kind of handover mode; MN initiated handover and network 
initiated handover. The basic operations of the MN initiated fast handover in predictive mode are 
shown in Figure 2.5 and can be explained as follows [7].
MN Previous AR (PAR)
New AR 
(NAR)
RtSolPr ^
PrRtAdv
FBU ^ HI ^
^ HAck
^  FBA  
Disconnect from PAR
Connect to NAR
Forward Packets ^
FN A
Deliver Packets
Figure 2.5 Predictive Fast Handover Signalling |7 |
In a MN initiated handover, the MN sends an Router Solicitation for Proxy Advertisement 
(RtSolPr) to its previous AR (PAR) requesting information for a potential handover. PAR sends a
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Proxy Router Advertisement (PrRtAdv) message as response. PrRtAdv contains information of 
the NAR, which includes AR's L2 address, AR's IP address and subnet prefix.
With AR information provided in the PrRtAdv message, the MN obtains a prospective New 
CoA (NCoA) which is the CoA valid on the New AR (NAR)’s subnet and sends an Fast BU 
(FBU) message to the PAR. FBU basically instructs PAR to tunnel packet towards NAR by 
binding Previous CoA (PCoA) to NCoA. Sending FBU message via PAR’s link is recommended, 
however, FBU is sent via the NAR’s link in reactive fast handover mode. In reactive mode, it is 
therefore essential that the NCoA used in FBU does not conflict with an address already in use by 
other MN on the same link.
Before sending a Fast BA (FBA) message to the MN as a response, PAR exchanges Handover 
Initiation (HI) and Handover Acknowledgement (HAck) messages with NAR. The exchange of 
HI and HAck messages is to determine whether the NCoA is valid. If NCoA is already in use in 
NAR’s link, the NCoA is not valid and NAR will propose another NCoA, which will be 
transmitted to PAR in the HAck message.
PAR sends the FBA message to MN in response to FBU. The MN will be notified of the NCoA 
in FBA message, if there is a NCoA assigned by the NAR. And MN must use the assigned NCoA 
upon its attachment to the NAR.
In predictive mode, FBA is transmitted via the PAR’s link, therefore, the packet tunnelling 
between PAR and NAR is possibly already in progress when MN handovers to the NAR. Upon 
MN’s attachment to the NAR, MN sends a Fast Neighbour Advertisement (FNA) to the NAR 
immediately to announce the attachment, and to confirm the use of NCoA when the MN has not 
received a FBA message. Thus, the NAR can forward previously buffered and arriving packets to 
MN right away.
The difference between predictive fast handover and reactive fast handover is whether an 
FBU message is sent through PAR’s linlc or not. The case in which the MN sends an FBU from 
NAR's link is reactive fast handover. The reactive handover also includes the scenario in which an 
FBU has been sent from PAR's link but an FBA has not been received before MN attaches to the 
NAR.
The handover can also be initiated by the network. In a network initiated handover, PAR 
sends an unsolicited PrRtAdv message containing the information of the NAR when the handover 
is about to be performed. The unsolicited PrRtAdv allows the network to inform the MN about 
geographically adjacent ARs without the MN’s attempt to request the information. Upon 
receiving unsolicited PrRtAdv message, the MN configures a NCoA to be used in NAR’s link, 
and sends a FBU message to PAR. Before receiving the FBU from MN, the PAR continues to
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deliver packets to the MN via the PAR’s link. The network initiated handover can be used in 
some wireless technologies, as the handover control might reside in the network [7].
2.1.2.4 Integration of HMIPv6 and FMIPv6
Handover within One MAP Domain
HMIPv6 and FMlPv6 can be integrated to further enhance the fast handover and reduce the 
signalling overhead. It is proposed in [6] and [10] the mechanism to integrate HMIPv6 with 
FMIPv6 for mobility within one MAP domain.
The functionality of FMIPv6 procedure remains the same, although, the anchor point is moved 
from the PAR to MAP. Therefore, HI/HAck exchanges occur between the MAP and NAR in 
order to check the validity of NCoA. If NAR confirms that the NCoA is valid, a temporary tunnel 
is established.
The predictive mode of fast handover is considered. Upon receiving PrRtAdv message from 
PAR, MN discovers whether it is still in the same MAP domain by checking MAP address in the 
MAP address option. If the MAP address is the same as the address MN previously registers to, 
MN assumes that it is moving within one MAP domain. Therefore, the MN constructs NCoA 
using the NAR’s information, which is obtained from PrRtAdv message. The MN then sends 
FBU message to PAR, and the PAR forwards it to MAP. Having received FBU message, the 
MAP starts HI/HAck message exchanges with the NAR. Once Hl/HAck exchanges are done, 
MAP assumes that the fast handover procedure is completed. Therefore, MAP sends a flush 
message [10] to the PAR to inform that its binding cache is about to be updated with NCoA. The 
MAP also sends the FBA message to NAR after the binding cache is updated. By then, MAP 
tunnels all the packets to MN using NCoA through NAR link. Having received the flush message 
from the MAP, the PAR starts to tunnel buffered packets by encapsulating the packets with NCoA 
as the destination address. When MN moves to NAR, it sends a FNA message to the NAR, asking 
the NAR to send packets. Packets arriving at the MN can be classified into two types: the packets 
sent along MAP -> PAR ->NAR path with PCoA as the destination address and the packets sent 
along MAP -> NAR path with NCoA as the destination address.
Handover between MAP Domains
During the handover process between MAPs the location update needs to be sent to the CN 
and the HA. The global location update is time-consuming, as home network and CNs could be 
far away from the visited network. In order to minimise the handover disruption time, fast 
handover needs to be implemented. During the handoff, the RCoA obtained from the mobility
17
Chapter 2. Mobility Management and Security Mechanisms in Next Generation Mobile Networks
agent changes and the packets that the CN transmits to the MN need to be re-addressed to the new 
RCoA of the new MAP. The handover happens between MAPs as shown in Figure 2.6 [11].
Packets from CN that is 
addressed to PMAP are  re­
directed to NMAP. It ensures 
the minimum delay during the 
global location update
r
E xterna l N etw ork
G a te w a y
Previous
A ccess  N etw ork/
CN starts to transmit packets 
to NMAP after receiving 
location update from MN. CN 
also stops transmitting 
packets to PMAP
Global BU
Handover
Figure 2.6 Fast Handover between MAPs Scenario |1 Ij
During the handover period the packets arriving at Previous MAP (PMAP) are stored and 
buffered packets are redirected to New MAP (NMAP) after the fast handover registration is 
completed. This procedure is clearly illustrated in Figure 2.6. The MN associates itself with 
NMAP and obtains a new RCoA. In turn the MN then performs a global location update to its HA 
and CNs, which could result in large delays and packet loss. With fast handover enabled, packets 
generated by CNs will still be arriving at the MN’s old location (PMAP) during this handover 
period. To minimise the loss in packets, the PMAP redirects the packets it receives from the CN 
to the new location of the MN (NMAP). In turn NMAP tunnels these packets to the MN. The 
packets finally arrive at the new LCoA associated with the NAR that is geographically adjacent to 
PAR on the boundary of the PMAP domain. This will allow for a smooth inter-MAP handover as 
it allows the MN to continue to receive packets while updating its HA and, potentially, CN. To 
make the fast handover possible, the new location of the MN (address of NMAP) needs to be 
temporarily registered with the PMAP, also the PMAP needs be configured to forward packets to 
the NMAP. This can be done by the fast handover registration. Therefore the maximum delay 
experienced is the time it notify its PMAP about its new location. This delay can be minimised if 
the MAPs have prior knowledge of the surrounding MAPs as well as location information of the 
MN. Fast handover minimise the delays even further and provide stable QoS during handovers 
[II].
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Figure 2.7 shows the signalling involved in inter-MAP domains fast handover. Depending on 
whether a FBA message is received or not on the PMAP’s link, there are two modes of operations, 
namely the predictive mode and the reactive mode. Predictive mode is considered here. After the 
information for a potential handover is exchanged between MN and PAR through RtSolPr and 
PrRtAdv messages, the handover is triggered. The MN obtains the address of NMAP from MAP 
address option in PrRtAdv message and it also constructs the new LCoA to be used in the NAR’s 
link. Then the MN initiates a FBU to the PMAP, instructing it to buffer the packets to MN with 
previous LCoA as the destination address. The PMAP and NMAP also exchange information 
through HI/HAck messages to negotiate with each other regarding the MN’s handover. This 
includes validating the new LCoA that MN has constructed, with the help of NAR. Having 
received HAck message from NMAP, the PMAP sends a FBA message to MN and NMAP as the 
response to FBU. The fast handover registration is completed by now. Afterwards, the packets 
addressed to MN’s previous location can be tunnelled from the PMAP to the NMAP. After the 
global location update finishes, the packets from CNs can be delivered to MN through NMAP’s 
link as defined in HMIPv6 specification.
MN Previous MAP New MAP
FBU < >Exchange Info
(HI/HAck)
 ^ FBAck 
»— Disconnect
FBAck
'— Connect Forward Packets^
deliver Packets ^
Predictive Mode
Figure 2.7 Signalling for Fast Handover between M APs [12]
Figure 2.8 gives an overview scenario of HMIPv6/FMIPv6 integration. It is cleared illustrated 
in the figure the packet redirection for fast handover with one MAP domain and between 
neighbouring MAPs.
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Figure 2.8 Integration o f HMIPv6 and FMIPv6
Context transfer is performed between neighbouring ARs or neighbouring MAPs sometimes, 
such as the QoS context transfer between subnets to allow for stable QoS during and after 
handovers. Context transfer is being worked on in the IETF “Seamoby” working group [13].
2.1.3 Other Micro-mobility Protocols
Apart from HMIPv6, there are other existing IP micro-mobility protocols. Cellular IP and 
HAWAII are two examples.
Cellular IP was proposed by Columbia University and Ericsson in [14]. It allows routing IP 
datagrams to mobile host, and also provides support for local mobility, handoff and paging 
technique. Location management and handoff support are integrated with routing in Cellular IP 
networks. To minimise the control signalling, regular data packets transmitted by the mobile hosts 
are also used to refresh location information of the host. Cellular IP is intended to be used on the 
local level, such as in a campus or the metropolitan area network (MAN). It can also interwork 
with Mobile IP to provide support for wide area mobility, which is mobility between local cellular 
IP networks.
HAWAII was proposed by Lucent Bell Labs in [15]. HAWAII is a domain-based protocol for 
supporting mobility. Unlike Cellular IP, HAWAII does not replace IP but work above IP. Each 
station within the HAWAII network must not only act as an IP router but also support specific 
mobility functions. It uses path setup schemes which install host-based forwarding entries in 
particular routers to support intra-domain mobility. And it also interworks with mobile IP to
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provide inter-domain macro-mobility. The path setup schemes reduce mobility related disruption 
and also reduce the mobility related updates by operating locally. In HAWAII, mobile host can 
retain the network address while moving within one domain, which simplifies the QoS support.
A comparison of MIPv6, HMIPv6, Cellular IP and HAWAII is provided in Table 2.1.
MIPv6 HMIPv6 HAWAII Cellular IP
Global
Connectivity
V V V V
AAA and security V l^ X X
Stable point of 
attachment
X X X X
Real-time traffic 
management
X X X X
QoS support X X X X
Dynamic address 
allocation
V X X X
Protocol layers L3 L3 L3 L3
Paging support X X V V
Location Update Datagram
tunneling
Update message Update message Data packet
Route optimization Mobility binding X X X
Mobility
management
Global Micro/global Macro/global Micro/Macro
Handoff control Soft based Soft anticipated 
handoff
Path setup 
schemes
Hard and soft
Signalling
overhead
High Micro: low 
Global: high
Low Low
Latency High Micro: low 
Global: high
Low Low
Table 2.1 Comparison o f M obile IP and other micro-mobility protocols [16]
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2.2 Security Mechanisms for Mobile IP Networks
2.2.1 Security Techniques
The basic concepts of security techniques are introduced in the following section.
2.2.1.1 Concepts of Encryption/Decryption and algorithms
In cryptography, encryption means the process of transforming information (often referred to as 
plaintext) into encrypted information (referred to as ciphertext), using a key. Decryption is the 
reverse process, transforming ciphertext into plaintext. A cryptographic key is a parameter used in 
conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm to perform the encryption/decryption process. Some 
of the key management terminologies used in the thesis are explained below,
- Keying material: the information required to establish keys or trust relationship. In most cases, 
it refers to the data needed to derive the key rather than the key itself.
- Master key: the key used to derive other keying material or key. It might potentially be a
symmetric key.
- Nonce: a non-repeating value, such as a pseudorandom number, which is used only once for a
particular purpose, such as key derivation, anti-replay protection, etc.
- Key encrypting key (KEK): a key that is used for encryption/decryption of other keys. Key
encryption is used to protect the key during transmission or storage. The key used in 
enciyption is called KEK, and the key being encrypted is called the enciypted key. KEK is 
usually used in symmetric key encryption method [17].
The cryptographic algorithm is classified by National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) document [18] as follows:
- Hash algorithm: A cryptographic hash function is a procedure that takes an arbitrary block of 
data and returns a fixed-size ciyptographic hash value. Any change to the input data would 
result in different hash value. There are two most widely adopted hash functions: SHA-1 
which has an output size of 160 bits and MD5 which has an output size of 128 bits.
- Symmetric key algorithm: Symmetric key algorithm uses a single key to encrypt/decrypt data, 
and the key is a secret only shared between two network entities. Thus, symmetric keys are 
used as pairwise keys between two entities involved. For encryption purpose, there are two 
types of algorithms commonly used: American Encryption Standard (AES) and Triple Data 
Encryption Standard (3DES). A standard DES encryption key is 56 bits long. DES encryption 
is no longer considered strong enough for high security applications, as a distributed
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computing project managed to crack a DES key in 22 hours and 15 minutes. It believed to be 
practically secure in the form of 3DES, which applies DES cipher algorithm three times. As 
DES’s successor, AES keys can be 128, 192 or 256 bits long. Most commonly the 128 bit key 
length is used.
- Asymmetric key algorithm: Asymmetric key algorithm is also referred to as public key 
algorithms. In public key cryptography, two parties have two keys each: a private key that only 
the owner has, and a public key that is distributed to the other paity. Encryption is usually done 
with the receiver’s public key, so that only the receiver can decrypt the message using its 
private key. RSA (which stands for Rivest, Shamir and Adleman who defined it) is a widely 
used algorithm for public key cryptography.
2.2.1.2 Security Association
In Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) [19], SA is strictly defined in [20]. IPSec SA is a data 
structure that includes a specified set of information as well as the implementation details, such as 
what mode to use. To establish IPSec SA means that two network entities have agreed to use 
IPSec to secure the communication between them, and also agreed on more details, such as what 
protocol to use (Authentication Header (AH) protocol and/or Encapsulating security payload 
(ESP) protocol), what cryptographic transform to use, etc [17].
However, the terra “security association” (SA) has been used in many other contexts. In a loose 
definition, it is the establishment of shared security information between two network entities to 
secure communication between them. It is a group of security parameters, such as cryptographic 
keys, lifetime of these keys, etc., to provide secure connection. Compared to the strict definition 
in IPSec protocol suite, the use of SA in other application could cause confusions. Therefore, the 
term “trust relationship” is used in this thesis instead.
2.2.1.3 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
In cryptography, a message authentication code (MAC) is a short piece of information which is 
used to authenticate a message. A MAC algorithm, also referred to as a keyed hash function, takes 
a secret key and a message to be authenticated as input, and produces a MAC value as output. The 
MAC value protects the massage’s integrity and authenticity, by allowing the receiver to verify 
any changes to the message content using the same secret key.
A framework, called HMAC (hash-based MAC) [21], was developed by IETF. It is a specific 
mechanism for calculating a MAC involving a cryptographic hash function and a secret key. Any 
iterative ciyptographic hash function, such as MD5 or SHA-1, may be used in the calculation of
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HMAC, and the MAC algorithm is termed as HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHAl accordingly. 
HMAC calculation can be explained as [17],
HMAC = H  i^Key 0 outer pad, H  (Key 0 inner pad, Message^^
where, H is the hash algorithm used; Key is the secret key shared between the sender and receiver 
of the message; Outer pad and inner pad are the padding applied to the original message, and they 
are constant values which have the same length as input data.
The sender of a message simply appends HMAC value to the message as.
Message, HMAC (Key, Message)
and sends it to the receiver. HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 produce an output value of length 16 
bytes and 20 bytes respectively. It is recommended in HMAC specification that the length of key 
used to calculate HMAC should be at least as long as the output value of the hash function, in 
order to maintain the strength for the HMAC procedure.
HMAC can also provide anti-replay protection by adding a nonce in the calculation,
HMAC (Key, Message, Nonce)
A replay attack means an adversaiy trying to record a message and replay it at a later stage. The 
nonce is a value that is used only once and it ensures the receiver that the message is not a 
replayed version of previous message.
2.2.2 Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) Architecture 
and Protocols
AAA, which is defined in [22], refers to Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting.
Authentication, in general, is the process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a system 
entity. An authentication process consists of two steps: identification step which is to present an 
identifier to the security system and verification step which is to generate authentication result 
that corroborates the binding between the entity and the identifier. Much work has been done in 
authentication for Mobile IP [23] [24]. Authentication in AAA solution basically involves 
validating the end users’ identity prior to granting them network access. This process relies on the 
fact that the end user possesses a unique piece of information, such as a username/password 
combination, a secret key shared with the network, biometric data (like fingerprints) that serves as 
identification credentials, etc. The AAA server compares the authentication data presented by the
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user with the data stored in its database. If the credentials match, the user is granted network 
access [25].
Authorization is the procedure of checking whether a system entity has the right or permission 
to access a particular system resource. To authorize means to grant such a right or permission. 
Authorization in AAA solution defines what rights and services the end user is allowed once 
network access is granted. It might include providing an IP address, making decision on which 
applications are available to the user, and so on. Authentication and authorization are usually 
performed together in an AAA enabled environment [25].
Accounting (the third “ A” ) provides the methodology for collecting information about the end 
user’s resource consumption, which can then be used for the purpose of billing, auditing, and 
capacity planning [25].
The fundamental components of an AAA solution are illustrated in Figure 2,9. The AAA server 
is attached to the network and acts as a central repository for storing and distributing AAA related 
information. There might be multiple servers located in different domains of the network, and the 
servers can communicate with each other through AAA protocol. The network access server 
(NAS) is an entity that acts as the point of entry into the network. It can be a router, a terminal 
server, etc. AAA solution can be summarized in the following steps [25];
- End user connects to NAS requesting access to the network.
- NAS, as an AAA client, collects and forwards the end user’s credentials to the AAA server 
through the network.
- AAA server processes the credentials and returns either an accept or reject response, and other 
relevant data to the AAA client.
- NAS notifies the end user whether access is granted or not for the specified resources.
End User
____NAS____ 
ÂÀÀ Client
AAA Server
Figure 2.9 Fundamental Components o f  AAA Architecture
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The most widely used AAA protocols are Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service 
(RADIUS) and DIAMETER, which interestingly is not an acronym. They are introduced in 
following sections respectively.
2.2.2.1 RADIUS protocol
RADIUS is a well-known and widely deployed AAA protocol, which is the acronym for 
Remote Access Dial-In User Service. It was proposed in 1990s by Lucent to provide 
authentication and accounting services to the NAS devices. RADIUS working group was set up 
by IETF in 1996 to standardize the protocol's basic functions and message formats in [26] to 
provide authentication and authorization. The AAA working group in IETF also developed some 
successor protocols for improvements that better address other issues that are not covered in [26]. 
It was defined in [27] the use of RADIUS to deliver accounting information. Improvements are 
made in [28], [29] and [30] for additional extensions.
Some of the key features of RADIUS protocol are summarized below [28],
- Attribute/value pairs (AVP). RADIUS protocol carries AAA information encoded in variable 
length “Attribute-Length-Value” 3-tuples, which are called attributes or AVPs. New attribute 
values can be added without disturbing existing implementations of the protocol. Common 
examples of attributes include User-Name, User-Password, Framed-lP-Address (IP address for 
end user), and so on. A list of attributes supported by RADIUS is specified in [28].
- Flexible authentication methods. RADIUS can support multiple authentication mechanisms to 
authenticate the end user, such as Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) and Challenge 
Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP).
- Client/sei'ver based operation model. A RADIUS client resides on the NAS and communicates 
with a RADIUS server. The client requests and the server processes and responses. 
Additionally, a RADIUS server may serve as a proxy client for another RADIUS or 
authentication server.
- Network security. All communications between a RADIUS client and server are authenticated 
using a shared secret key which is never sent over the network. In addition, if user password is 
contained in RADIUS message, it is encrypted to prevent hackers from gaining it by snooping 
the network.
2.2.2.2 DIAMETER protocol
RADIUS was originally designed for small network devices supporting just a few end-users 
requiring simple server-based authentication. With the development of network access
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technologies, it is necessary to provide AAA services for hundreds and thousands of concurrent 
end users accessing network services using a variety of technologies. This is beginning to place a 
burden on the functional capabilities of the existing AAA protocols. RADIUS also reserved some 
extensibility for new demands that can be anticipated. It kept being modified and amended for a 
great number of new requirements. Thus, RADIUS is exhausted by thousands of patches and is 
struggling keeping up with the environment. So it is time for developing a new AAA protocol 
with new structure to replace the RADIUS. Therefore, the IETF made the effort to develop a next- 
generation AAA protocol: DIAMETER.
It is defined in [31] DIAMETER basic elements. DIAMETER is a lightweight, peer-based 
AAA protocol designed to offer a scalable foundation for introducing new policy and AAA 
services over existing PPP and emerging (such as mobile IP) network technologies. It employs 
many of the RADIUS mechanisms, such as encoded AVPs, and proxy server support. DIAMTER 
also attempts to correct limitations inherent in the RADIUS protocol. Qualitative changes occur 
from RADIUS to DIAMETER. Some of the improvements are listed as follows,
- RADIUS attribute value cannot exceed 255 bytes, which may be too small in some 
applications, and a RADIUS component can only have 255 messages outstanding before an 
acknowledgment is required. For a NAS dealing with thousands of individual connections 
requiring AAA services, such limitations can result in disruption in services. While, Diameter 
supports a much larger attribute-value length and incorporates a reliable, window-based 
transport that permits a DIAMETER sei*ver to transmit as many messages as the NAS can 
handle.
- A RADIUS sei-ver cannot send unsolicited commands to a client. This makes it difficult to 
applications such as instructing the client to perform a specific accounting function, 
distributing useful information to the client, re-authentication on demand across heterogeneous 
deployment, etc. Support for sei'ver-initiated messages is mandatory in DIAMETER.
- DIAMTER also employs an improved retransmission and fail-over scheme that provides 
improved network resilience over the relatively primitive and slow technique used by 
RADIUS. DIAMETER fail-over mechanisms are defined in [32]. A pending queue for eveiy 
peer is maintained at a DIAMETER element. Upon receiving a response message, the request 
is then removed from the queue [17].
- DIAMETER is backward compatible with RADIUS. Although DIAMETER does not share a 
common message format with RADIUS, efforts have been made to deploy the two protocols in 
the same network. The translation would need to happen through gateways to enable 
interaction between DIAMETER devices and legacy RADIUS devices.
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2.2.2.3 Integration of AAA and Mobile IP
Necessity o f AAA in Mobile IP
AAA protocols enhance Mobile IP application in the following aspects,
- Mobile IP protocols allows a MN to change its point of attachment to the Internet, although it 
does not provide any specific support for mobility across different administrative domains, 
which limits the application of Mobile IP in a large-scale deployment. AAA protocols, such as 
Diameter, enable MN to roam and obtain authenticated and authorized service in foreign 
domains [33].
- Mobile IP base specifications do not provide details about authentications and establishment of 
trust relationship between network elements, while AAA infrastructure brings the advantages 
of authentication and key management services.
- Mobile IP provides routing mechanisms for the MN’s traffic as it roams across different 
networks, and AAA infrastructure makes sure that no business or trust agreements between the 
networks are violated and the security and integrity of the networks are not compromised as a 
result of the roaming [ 17].
Efforts have been made by researchers [34] and IETF Mobile IP working group/AAA working 
group to integrate MIP with AAA infrastructure. And the requirements of deploying AAA in 
Mobile IP networks are defined in [35]. DIAMTER extensions for MlPv4 [36] and DIAMETER 
support for MlPv6 [37], [38] have also been specified by IETF. This allows a MlPv4/MlPv6 node 
to receive continuous services from its service providers and also allows DIAMETER servers to 
authenticate, authorize and collect accounting information for the MlPv4/MlPv6 nodes.
AAA model in Mobile IP
Foreign Domain Home Domain
Clienta
/  AAAF server
Attendant
: AAAH serverh - J  I
Figure 2.10 AAA Model in Mobile IP |33|
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Figure 2.10 illustrates a basic AAA model for Mobile IP application. There are two AAA 
servers located in home domain and visited domain, namely AAA server in Foreign domain 
(AAAF server) which provide local access to AAA infrastructure, and AAA server in Home 
domain (AAAH server) which is able to authenticate and authorize each of its clients.
When a client belonging to its home domain roams to a foreign domain, it requests local 
network resources. Before access to the resources is permitted, an attendant (such as AR) in the 
foreign domain asks the client to provide credentials that can be authenticated. The attendant 
forwards the request to AAAF server. These credentials may be something AAAF can understand, 
but in most cases they are assigned by, and understood only by AAAH. If AAAF server does not 
have enough information to carry out the verification for the credentials locally, it has to consult 
the external authority (the AAAH server), to verify the client's credentials. And once AAAH 
verifies the credentials, the local authority AAAF will notify the attendant about the successful 
negotiation. The attendant can then provide the requested resources to the client [33]. In many 
typical cases, the credentials are the information provided by a client to the AAA server in a 
message authentication code (MAC) constructed using a secret shared between the client and 
AAAH. The authorization depends only upon secure authentication of the credentials.
Modification to the basic model is required to support and utilize Local Security Associations 
(LSA). LSA was introduced by IETF in [39]. After a successful initial authentication of the 
mobile user through AAAH server, LSA allows the local domain (foreign network) to 
authenticate the user and perform key distribution without involvement of any external authority, 
such as AAAH server. Therefore, LSA optimizes AAA procedures in terms of reducing signalling 
load between network domains and delay caused by security signalling between network domains. 
There is no need for the requests to traverse the wide-area Internet that is likely to separate the 
AAAF and the AAAH, thus the latency introduced by security can be reduced. With LSA 
supported, AAA can easily provide services such as, user re-registration, user re-authentication, 
key distribution/refreshment, etc [33].
In order to allow MIPv4/v6 nodes to receive secured services from foreign domains, some of 
the applications need to be supported by DIAMETER. The DIAMETER Mobile IP application 
will allow:
- Local/remote network access control
- AAA server acts as a tiusted third party allowing authentication of the mobile users and key 
distribution.
- LSA establishment between MN and the attendant
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- Establishment of security association (SA) and distribution of keys or keying materials
between entities (either MN, Mobile IP agents, or AAA entities)
- Secured transport of mobility signalling messages with the help of established SAs
The support for AAA in MIPv6 and MIPv4 is quite different when inter-domain deployment is 
considered. In MIPv4, FA can serve as an attendant to manage mobility and AAA functions on 
behalf of MN in foreign network. While MIPv6 does not have the equivalent of a FA and does not 
offer any mechanism by which the foreign network can authenticate and authorize the end user. 
HMIPv6 introduces MAP which is naturally an anchor point for mobility management functions, 
as well as access control and authentication of mobile users [40]. Thus, MAP would be an 
attendant providing the interface between client and foreign networks in the AAA infrastructure.
2.2.2.4 IPSec Interaction with AAA Protocols
Introduction to IPSec
Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) provides layer-3 security. This means that all IP packets can 
be protected, irrespective of the upper layer protocol being carried in the packet payloads, and that 
no re-engineering of applications is required in order to take advantage of the security provided by 
IPSec. The security services offered by IPSec include access control, connectionless integrity, 
data origin authentication, detection and rejection of replays, confidentiality via encryption, and 
limited traffic flow confidentiality. These are all delivered using symmetric key techniques. The 
IPSec protocols also support automated key management, with key exchange protocols using both 
symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic techniques [41].
IPSec protocols can be deployed in two modes: tunnel mode and transport mode. In tunnel 
mode cryptographic protection is provided for entire IP packets. In essence, a whole packet plus 
security field is treated as the new payload of an outer IP packet, with its own header, called the 
outer header. The original (inner) IP packet is to be encapsulated within the outer IP packet. In 
tunnel mode, IPSec processing is typically performed at security gateways on behalf of endpoint 
hosts. The use of gateways means that hosts need not be IPSec-aware, but that security is 
provided from gateway-to-gateway rather than in an end-to-end fashion. By contrast, in transport 
mode, the header of the original packet itself is preserved, some security fields are inserted, and 
the payload together with some header fields undergo ciyptographic processing. Transport mode 
is typically used when end-to-end security services are needed, and provides protection mostly for 
the packet payload [41].
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There are two main IPSec protocols which specify the actual cryptographic processing applied 
to packets. They are Authentication Header (AH) protocol [42] and Encapsulating Security 
Payload (ESP) protocol [43]. AH provides integrity protection, data origin authentication and 
anti-replay services for packets through the application of MAC algorithms and the inclusion of 
sequence numbers in packets. ESP provides similar services to AH, although the coverage of 
integrity protection is more limited. In addition, ESP also provides confidentiality and traffic flow 
confidentiality services through symmetric key encryption and variable length padding of packets 
[41].
IPSec Usage in DIAMETER Protocol
All Diameter implementations must support IPSec ESP protocol in transport mode with 
encryption and authentication algorithms to provide per-packet authentication, integrity protection 
and confidentiality, and also must support the relay protection mechanisms of IPSec [31].
It is also recommended in [31] that Diameter implementations must support Internet Key 
Exchange (IKE) [44] for peer authentication, negotiation of security associations and key 
management. As an important member of IPSec protocol suite, IKE Protocol provides the method 
for SA negotiation and associated cryptographic parameter establishment. The latest version of 
IKE, named IKEv2, provides a flexible set of methods for authentication and establishment of 
keys and other parameters, supporting both asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic methods 
[41]. Diameter implementations must support peer authentication using a pre-shared key and may 
also support certificate-based authentication using digital signatures [31].
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Chapter 3
3 Architectural Framework
3.1 Introduction to the Framework
Figure 3.1 illustrates the architectural framework which the work is based on. Two IP-based 
access networks with the similar infrastructure are presented. Within each of the networks, the 
MN is moving between ARs. The MN’s home network needs to be involved when home 
registration or authentication is performed. Also, more than one Enhanced Node (EN) is located 
within one access network and they communicate with each other through signalling, including 
signalling within one access network and between access networks. AAA infrastructure is 
deployed in the framework, with AAAH server located in MN’s home network and AAAF sei*ver 
located in each of the foreign network. The AAAF server, which is located close to the ENs to 
help delivering secured services to the MN. It is also assumed that one gateway (GW) is located 
in each access network as an interface with the external IP networks. The architecture assumes a 
loose coupling between the networks involved where the access networks are connected through 
the core IP network and any interaction between the access networks has to go through the core IP 
network [45].
The aim of this IP network is to deploy QoS, security and Mobility Management (MM) 
mechanisms in order to provide enhanced services to users. However these mechanisms have 
interactions with each other and the performance of one is affected by the working of the others. 
One of the major issues to be addressed is providing satisfactory security and QoS during 
handovers. Many mechanisms have been proposed to solve this issue and the EN can play a vital 
role in this scenario. Also, from security point of view, the EN assists in providing MN the 
authenticated and authorized access control when it moves across access networks with the help 
of AAA servers. Another major area is in routing and traffic fiow within the access network. The 
traffic flow within an access network with HMIPv6 micro-mobility architecture would flow 
through MAPs in the network creating bottlenecks and high congestions. Hence regulating traffic 
flow and avoiding such bottlenecks are vital for efficient performance of the access network. The
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ENs can greatly improve the performance of existing mechanisms and provide solutions to many 
of the cross issues [46].
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Figure 3.1 Architectural Framework
3.2 Enhanced Node
In this section, the architecture of Enhanced Node (EN) and framework of the EN describing its 
components and functionalities are presented.
The concept of network support sub-layer, which integrates security, QoS and Mobility 
Management as shown in Figure 3.2, is proposed in [1]. The nodes with the network support sub­
layer are referred to as ENs.
Security, QoS, MM (Mobile IP)
Network Layer
Link Layer
Figure 3.2 Network Support Sub layer
The network support sub-layer is located in a small number of ENs in a network. The EN can 
be an access router, gateway, anchor point (MAP in HMlPv6), etc. Such selected ENs can be used 
in the heterogeneous networks comprising security/QoS/MM aware and unaware access networks
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[1], With a couple of network entities upgraded into ENs, integration of security, QoS and 
mobility management can be achieved.
The primary functionality of the EN is to gather security, QoS and mobility information from 
various parts of the access network and across heterogeneous networks and share this information 
when required by different entities. As a result this will enhance the performance of existing 
network mechanisms and assist the translation of mechanisms between heterogeneous networks.
Mobility Management
Radio Resource Management
Security
Quality of Service
Figure 3.3 Architecture o f  the enhanced node [46]
The EN is constituted of four major components namely: Security, QoS, mobility management 
(MM), radio resource management (RRM) and signalling as shown in Figure 3.3. These 
components interact with each other and consider the cross issues rather than operating 
individually. This is illustrated in the figure thiough the double headed arrows between the 
components [46]. Each of the components will be explained in detail in the following sections.
3.2.1 Security Component
The security component of the EN plays a vital role in delivering the secured ubiquitous 
services either within one access network or across heterogeneous access networks. Figure 3.4 
shows the interactions between the security entity of the EN and the other entities of the network. 
The dotted lines illustrate the security services provided through the EN. As a security entity, it 
connects to the AAA servers and the AR. It provides the mobile end users with the authenticated 
and authorized access control. And it can also help in the process of securing the MN’s 
handover/fast handover procedures.
Before a MN can be granted the network access, it should be authenticated and authorized. The 
access control scheme interacts with AAA infrastructure to provide the MN authenticated network 
access. The EN, connecting with both of the AR and the AAA servers, can interact with relevant
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AAA entities to perform the AAA procedures on behalf of the MN. Before a MN performs 
handover between ARs, it needs to be authenticated for the handover and the handover signallings 
need to be secured using handover keys. In this case, the EN consults with the local AAA server 
for authentication and key generation/distribution. The EN can be in charge of the security 
services throughout the networks, in terms of performing authentication and key generation 
process by interacting with the AAA framework.
Enhanced Node 
(Security)
Authenticated
Access AAA Servers
Secured
Handover Access Routers
Figure 3.4 Security functionalities o f enhanced node [46j
3.2.2 Mobility Management Component
The mobility component of the EN provides the ability to manage the functions relating to 
mobility management within access network and across access networks. Mobile IP protocol is 
used to provide the mobility management functions. This entity can function as the MAP of 
HMIPv6, but can also enhance the existing mobility management mechanisms. It does this by 
providing them with additional information required to take optimal decisions regarding mobility 
within and more specifically across access networks [45]. For example, choose the optimal 
location and number of ENs to be placed in one network. The mobility entity will interact with 
other entities involved in providing mobility to MN as shown in Figure 3.5.
M obility Agents 
(M AP)A ccess Routers M obile NodesA ccess Points
Enhanced N ode 
(M obility  
M m agem ent)
&
Figure 3.5 Mobility entity’s interaction with other entities |45|
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3.2.3 QoS Component
The QoS component of the EN plays a vital role in terms of providing QoS throughout the 
network and across heterogeneous networks. This entity provides a virtual link between access 
networks to share information regarding resources and other QoS parameters. Per-flow based QoS 
architecture like IntServ with resource reservations can benefit with the additional knowledge of 
the network in providing optimal resource reservations and minimizing blocking probability. 
Reestablishing traffic flows after handover can also be enhanced by this entity. With the greater 
overview knowledge of the network, traffic flows can be optimally redirected to the new 
destination minimizing delays. This entity will also work closely with routing in the network 
identifying the paths with the required QoS. Traffic flow and congestion management also come 
under this entity. Figure 3.6 shows some of the possible interactions between the QoS entity of the 
EN and the other entities of the network. The dotted lines designate non-physical entities such as 
traffic shaping, congestion control, traffic flow management etc [45].
QoS Routing/Congestion 
 Management_____
Enhanced Node 
(QoS)
Traffic Shaping/ 
Call Admission
Resource Manager/ 
Bandwidth BrokerMobile Nodes
Figure 3.6 QoS entity’s interaction with other entities |45 |
3.2.4 Radio Resource Management and Signalling Components
The RRM entity provides the framework for managing radio resources during handovers. A 
typical scenario is during the occurrence of a handover, in which the EN could help identify the 
access point (AP) with the necessary radio resources for the MN to connect. This would not be 
possible without having a higher level of intelligence within the network [45].
The signalling entity plays an important part. This entity enables the EN to gather information 
and share information through signalling each other and other entities. Integration of security, 
QoS and MM within one network using a common signalling approach is necessary if efficient 
delivery of pei"vasive services is to become feasible for the network operator [45].
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3.3 Security Threats and Requirements
In this section, the general security threats arising from the architectural framework are 
described, followed by the corresponding security requirements. Threat analysis is important as it 
allow us to identify the appropriate security requirements, and to subsequently propose security 
solutions.
3.3.1 Security Threat Analysis
As defined in [47], network security threats are typically divided into passive and active threats, 
which are then subdivided into other types of threats. Passive threat is a threat in which an 
unauthorized party gains access to an asset, but does not modify its content, such as 
eavesdropping. While in an active threat, an adversary makes modifications to a message, data 
stream, or file. Active threats include masquerading, replay, message modification, and denial-of 
service (DoS) threats [25].
Based on the architectural framework presented in section 3.1, I am aiming to solve the 
following threats:
- Eavesdropping. The adversary may monitor transmissions for message content at the network 
level. For example, when a MN is communicating with a CN, an adversary could eavesdrop to 
the conversation and learn some useful data such as the MN’s address, even when the 
meaningful data are enciypted.
- Masquerading. The adversary may impersonate as an authorized user and thereby gain certain 
unauthorized privileges. This includes the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack. For example, 
an adversary could impersonate as a legitimate MN to access the network and to perform 
handover.
- Message modification. The adversary may alter a legitimate message in an unauthorized 
manner by deleting, adding to, changing, or reordering it. For example, an adversary could 
modify the important signalling messages, such as binding update, handover key request 
message, etc, if they are not properly protected.
- Replay. The adversary may monitor transmissions (passive threat) and retransmit messages as 
a legitimate user. Therefore, if a malicious entity in the network captures these messages, it 
can retransmit them to request the services that only the legitimate user is allowed to use. For 
example, an adversary can replay an access request message that carries a token only the 
legitimate user has, and gain access to the network.
- Denial-of-Service (DoS). An entity fails to perform its proper function or acts in a way that
prevents other entities from performing their functions. The adversary may prevent, or prohibit
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the normal use of communication facilities. For example, an adversary could repeat the QoS- 
conditionalised binding updates in a path to book out all the available resources so that the 
path will run out of resources for any legitimate requests.
It should be noted that many of the threats mentioned above are related to each other.
Therefore, the realisation of one threat may possibly lead to the realisation of one or more other
threats.
3.3.2 Security Requirements
Based on the security threats presented in section 3.3.1, a set of general and specific security
requirements are derived in this section.
3.3.2.1 General Security Requirements
The general security requirements are listed below,
- Network Access Control. Access control makes sure that the unauthorized users are denied 
network access, while the legitimate users are granted the network access that they are 
authorized to use. The MN needs to be authenticated and authorized before it can enter the 
access network.
- Authentication/Authorization. Authentication is the process of verifying an identity claimed by 
or for a system entity, and authorization is to grant the right to access certain resources. They 
can be performed together within the AAA infrastructure. The MN needs to be authenticated 
and authorized for the services it requests, such as the handover.
- Integrity. It is to ensure that data have not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an unauthorized 
or accidental manner. MAC is usually used to protect the integrity of a particular message, 
such as handover key request message to the server.
- Confidentiality. It is the property that information is not made available or disclosed to any 
unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes. Confidentiality should be applied to any 
important signalling messages. Encryption is a common method to assure the data 
confidentiality.
- Anti-replay. Anti-replay is to prevent the replay attack by stopping an intercepted message to 
be sent to the recipient multiple times by an adversary. A timestamp based anti-replay method 
is widely adopted. The sender includes a best estimate of the time in its message, and receiver 
only accepts messages for which the timestamp is within a reasonable tolerance. Thus, 
recording and retransmitting an old message is not possible for an adversary.
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- Availability/Prevention of DoS. Availability ensures that network resources/services, such as 
bandwidth, are always available. It can also prevent the adversary from disturbing or misusing 
the network services leading to a DoS attack. The MN needs to be authenticated before 
sending out the QoS-conditionalised binding update to make sure it is not an adversaiy trying 
to reserve the resources.
3.3.2.2 Specific Security Requirements
Apart from the general security requirements, some specific security requirements are also
derived based on the framework.
- Protection of the handover signalling. It is required to secure signalling involved in the 
handover procedures, such as the binding updates. So that the adversary can not by any means 
gain or even modify useful information by listening to the handover conversation.
- Support of efficient handovers. It is necessary that the security mechanisms have minimal 
negative effect on the registration and handover procedures. Therefore, the integration of 
security and mobility management is required.
- Integration of security and QoS. It is required to secure important QoS signalling, such as 
QoS-conditionalised BU, and context transfer messages.
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Chapter 4
4 An Enhanced Solution for the 
Authenticated and Authorized Access 
Control
4.1 Previous work
In order to allow roaming in foreign networks, MN needs to register with its home network and 
CNs by sending BUs to the HA and all of the CNs it communicates with. Even with the 
introduction of MAP, the global location update still occurs eveiy time MN changes MAP 
domain, and of course when MN enters a new foreign network. One round-trip-time (RRT) is 
needed to update the HA and this can be done simultaneously while the MN is updating the CNs. 
Before a MN can be granted the network access, the visited network should perform a security 
check, such as Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) on the MN. Therefore, the 
MN should identify itself by interacting with the AAA server in its home network. This is called 
the AAA solution and it is a time consuming process.
The multiple round trip delays required for Mobile IP registration and AAA solution can 
disrupt active connections. Minimizing this additional delay in the time-critical handover period 
will significantly improve the performance of Mobile IP protocols. In order to speed up the 
roaming between different access networks, the registration and AAA solution must be improved. 
There are several publications in this area. It was proposed in [40] an AAA solution for 
authenticated access for IPv6 supported mobility based on HMIPv6. The authentication request 
message is piggybacked with the Mobile IP registration request message, thus, the RRT required 
for authentication and registration is reduced. However, it does not specify the AAA messages to 
transmit the authentication request in AAA infrastructure, and further research needs to done on 
how the AAA infrastructure could be used to establish SAs between MN and subnets they are 
visiting. So that when MN performs handover between subnets within one access network, no 
signalling between the visited and home domain are needed for authentication purpose. It was
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proposed in [48] the concept of shadow registration to reduce the AAA solution cost. Its variants 
were also proposed in [49] [50] [51] [52] for Mobile IP. The key idea of shadow registration is to 
establish an SA in the neighbouring ARs a priori anticipating a possible handoff when the MN 
registers to the given subnet. Thus, when a MN performs handover to a neighbouring subnet, the 
AAA solution is processed locally within that subnet without traversing the wide Internet to the 
MN’s AAAH server in the home network [53]. It was also proposed in [53] a dynamic shadow 
registration scheme which can be applied to HMIPv6 network. However, no work has yet 
specified how the SA is established between MN and the visited network using AAA 
infrastructure. Also, the shadow registration scheme is proposed for handoffs between different 
ARs or between different mobility agents (such as MAP) within one access network, obviously 
more work needs to be done to propose a faster AAA solution for handover across access 
networks.
In this section, it is proposed an enhanced AAA solution for inter access networks handover. It 
provides mobile users with authenticated and authorized access control, and also specifies the SA 
establishment for securing the future Mobile IP signalling. In order to minimise the negative 
effect of AAA solution on the handover procedure, the authentication request is performed in a 
handover preparation phase before the MN actually attaches to the new access network.
4.2 AAA Architecture and Trust Model
4.2.1 AAA Architecture and Functionalities
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, there are two AAA servers: the AAA server in Foreign network 
(AAAF) and the AAA server in Home network (AAAH). Ideally, the EN should act as AAA 
client. The AAA client can initiate the AAA request on behalf of the MN, and it also presents the 
MN’s credential to the AAA servers, who can use the information to make a decision. If the EN 
does not have the ability to function as AAA client, it at least should be able to initiate the 
authentication request message. The minimum required functionality of EN is conversion or at 
least encapsulation of Mobile IP messages into AAA messages, and vice versa.
In a HMIPv6 network, the EN, with the MAP functionality, can be utilized to perform access
control on MNs and interact with AAA infrastructure. The AAAF server interacts with AAAH
server in performing the AAA process to authenticate the MN. In order to eliminate the large
signalling overhead and handover latency introduced by traversing the wide Internet between
visited network and home network, it is desired that the AAAF server can have the MN’s security
credentials which can be used to verify whether a MN is allowed the network access. In this way,
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the AAAF server can speed up the authenticated handoff process. In order to further enhance the 
handover process, it is proposed in the shadow registration concept [53] another AAA server in 
the visited network, namely AAAL server. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, Local AAA server (AAAL 
server) is located in the AR domain. The AAAF could pass the MN’s security credentials to the 
AAAL servers. Therefore, with extension of the AAA hierarchy (shown in dotted line in Figure 
4.1), the AAA solution can be localized within the AR, even without the need to go back to the 
AAAF server in the EN domain.
AAAH
server HA
AAAF
server
EN
AAAL ^  
server (L AR
IPossibleExtension
Figure 4.1 AAA Hierarchy
In the AAA/Mobile IP integrated application, the AAA infrastructure needs to provide the
following functions,
- Authenticate/Authorize the MN to access the network
- Establish SAs which can be used to secure the relevant Mobile IP signalling in the future
And in order to provide these functions, the following issues need to be solved,
- Mobile IP protocol should be extended to be able to liaise with AAA servers for the task of 
authenticating the MN
- Mobile IP protocol should be able to request the AAA servers to generate the SAs and keys for 
MN and Mobile IP agents. And the SAs and keys are generated for the purpose of securing 
future Mobile IP signalling and other important signalling, such as QoS related messages.
- Mobile IP protocol should have relevant authentication extensions to carry authentication 
request and key generation request.
- AAA protocol, such as DIAMETER, should be able to interact with Mobile IP agents. And 
new A VPs need to be defined to carry Mobile IP related request in AAA infrastructure.
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In the proposed AAA solution, one more AAA server is required and it is co-located with the 
enhanced node (AAAF server). The AAAL server is acting as the AAA server in the subnet, 
connecting to the ARs. Under the new AAA hierarchy, the MN’s credentials can be distributed by 
the AAAH server to all of the AAA servers in the access networks, including the AAA servers of 
the enhanced nodes and the AAAL servers. Therefore, there is no need to traverse the AAAF 
server and the AAAH server every time when authentication and authorization are required. 
When the MN moves within one enhanced node domain, across the enhanced node domains, or 
even across the access networks, the handover latency can be reduced. Both of the micromobility 
and macromobility handoff performance’ can be greatly improved by the new AAA hierarchy.
4.2.2 Trust Model for AAA/Mobile IP Application
Trust relationship (SAs) needs to be established for Mobile IP based on relationships provided 
by the AAA infrastructure. A trust model depends on several factors, such as network topology, 
administration policy of the network that the MN is about to connect with, etc. It is explained, in 
this section, the trust model based on a generic HMlPv6 network topology. It is assumed that the 
MN is trying to connect to a foreign network that belongs to a different administrative domain 
from the domain the MN is currently connecting with, and obviously, the target foreign network is 
separated from the MN’s home network.
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Figure 4.2 Trust model for AAA-HM IP integration
It is illustrated in Figure 4.2 the trust model for AAA-HMIP integration. The trust model 
includes the network entities involved in the signalling and illustrates the trust relationships 
existing between these elements. The target foreign network is served by a local AAA server 
(AAAF server), while the MN’s home network is served by an AAAH server. The concept of SA 
here, denotes the security context between two network elements which defines keys, algorithms
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used to perform security functionality related to AAA-MIP procedures. As shown in Figure 4.2, 
there are three types of SAs involved in AAA-HMIP integration procedure: pre-shared SA, AAA 
SA and Mobility SA. They will be explained in the following sections.
4.2.2.1 Pre-shared Security Association
Pre-shared SA is the SA that provides security for the AAA procedures when AAA is 
integrated with MIP protocols. Pre-shared SAs must exist prior to Mobile IP registration. As 
shown in Figure 4.2 (solid arrow), they are shared between HA and AAAH server, AAAH server 
and AAAF server, AAAF server and EN. It is assumed that both of EN and HA have a pre-shared 
trust relationship with the AAA server in its domain. In other words, pre-shared SAs exist 
between EN and AAAF server (EN-AAAF SA), and between HA and AAAH server (HA-AAAH 
SA). The pre-shared SA also exists between AAAH server and AAAF sei*ver (AAAF-AAAH SA). 
It ensures that both of AAAH server and AAAF server can trust the integrity of the messages 
transmitted between them, and the keying materials can also be transmitted between the two 
entities in a secured manner. Since AAAH server and AAAF server are located in different 
domains, the existed SA between them implies that these two domains must have either a direct 
trust relationship or trust established through brokers.
4.2.2.2 AAA Security Association
AAA SA, as shown by solid arrow in Figure 4.2, is the pre-shared SA between the MN and its 
AAAH server. It can be regarded as a special piece of pre-shared SA, as it is especially important 
for the authenticated and authorized access control. Since the MN shares an SA with AAAH 
server, the AAAH server can verify the MN’s credentials for the purpose of authentication and 
authorization. The AAAH server can also help both of MN and mobility agents to obtain required 
trust relationships, which would be used in the future.
It is assumed that each MN subscribed to a network service provider is given an identity or a set 
of credentials that can be verified by the AAA server within the domain. The credentials are the 
information that can be used to perform security functions, such as authentication, key generation, 
etc. In the application of AAA-MIP integration, the MN’s credentials are usually referred to as a 
key or the keying materials that can be used to derive the key. This particular key shared between 
MN and AAAH server is the essential component of the AAA SA. And the key is assumed to be a 
symmetric key in MIP specifications. In the occasions that the credentials assigned to the MN is 
public key based certificates, a symmetric key needs to be derived from the certificate.
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4.2.2.3 Mobility Security Association
It is defined in [54] the term of mobility security association, which refers to the SA that the 
MN establishes with mobility agents, such as MAP, HA, etc. Unlike the pre-shared SA, mobility 
SA does not exist prior to Mobile IP registration. After the mobility SAs are established, the MN 
and mobility agents can authenticate the mobile IP control signalling, such as registration request, 
registration reply, etc.
It is specified in [54] the derivation of mobility SAs making use of an AAA SA in Mobile IPv4. 
A mobility SA in the specification is a simple connection that can be used to authenticate MIPv4 
control traffic between a MN and HA and/or between a MN and FA. This mobility SA is 
identified by the two end points. Take the mobility SA between a MN and its HA for example, it 
can be identified by attributes, such as a MN IP address, a HA IP address, and a security 
parameter index (SPI).
Similarly, mobility SAs are also required in the AAA-HMIPv6 integrated application. As 
shown in Figure 4.2 (dotted arrow), mobility SAs aie also required between a MN and the 
mobility agents in HMIPv6, such as EN, which has the functionality of MAP, and HA. The main 
purpose of these mobility SAs is not to provide secured connections for large volumes of Mobile 
IP traffic between the MN and the corresponding mobility agents. These SAs are only applicable 
for the Mobile IP control signalling, such as authentication of Mobile IP registration request and 
response messages. Based on the fact that the control messages take place less frequently and only 
account for a small portion of data comparing to the IP traffic, the possibility of security attacks 
compromising these keys are considerably lower. Therefore, the use of hash functions and nonces 
in delivering keying materials to the MN is acceptable, although it might does not satisfy the 
cryptography fans. Please also be noted that IPSec protocols can be used to secure date packets.
4.3 Authenticated and authorized network access mechanism
The proposed authenticated and authorized network access mechanism provides the MN with 
the authenticated access control. And it also generates a handover key (Kaaa_en), which can be 
used to secure the signalling between the serving and target access networks. This key can be also 
used to secure the handover process in the target access work, as the security credentials can be 
distributed through the AAA hierarchy.
4.3.1 Assumptions
The following assumptions are made for the proposed mechanism:
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- Overlapping of serving network and target networks
During the inter access networks handover from a serving network to a target network, it is 
assumed that the MN is in the coverage of both the networks, i.e. the two networks are 
overlapping sufficiently for the MN to prepare for the handover. The overlapping is necessary for 
the MN to receive signal from the target network before it loses coverage from the serving 
network. The required size of the overlap between the coverage of the two networks depends on 
the max speed of the MN [55].
- Trust relationship
It is also assumed that the required trust relationship has been established beforehand, as 
explained in section 4.2.2. As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the AAAH server shares secrets with the 
MN and AAA servers of the serving and target access networks respectively: Ks, K aaal and 
K_aaa2. And the AAAF servers in the serving visited network and target visited network share 
secrets with the corresponding ENs respectively: K enl in the serving access network and K_en2 
in the target access network.
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Figure 4.3 Pre-established trust relationship
4.3.2 Description of the Mechanism
The mechanism is illustrated in Figure 4.4 and signalling is explained accordingly as follows:
1. The MN is about to perform handover from the serving network to the target network. It 
listens to a Router Advertisement (RA) message sent by the target AR in the target
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network. The common Challenge/Response authentication method for MIPv4 defined in 
[56] is applied here. The target EN provides MN with a challenge on behalf of the HA 
through an extension to a RA [56]. The MN hashes the challenge with a pre-shared secret 
key with the home network (Ks), and creates a response as,
Response = HMAC SHA1 (Ks | Challenge),
The MN then sends the challenge together with the hashed response over to the home 
network via the AAA infrastructure and waits for the response from the home domain. 
The information for the target EN, such as global IP address of the target EN, is also 
included in the RA message.
2. The MN initiates a Handover Preparation Request (Handover Prep Req.) message and 
forwards it to the serving AR. In this request message, the Network Access Identifier 
(NAI: MN ID@Realm) is included. Other information includes; handover key request 
extension and MN_AAA authentication request extension, which is the hashed response. 
The keying materials generated by the AAAH server after the access is granted will be 
distributed. The generated key Kaaa en can be used in the new access network for the 
registration purpose. It can also be used to secure the signalling between the serving 
enhanced node and the target enhanced node if necessary, for example, QoS context 
transfer.
3. The serving AR forwards the Handover Preparation Request message to its sei-ving EN.
4. Upon receiving the Handover Preparation Request message from an AR in its domain, the 
EN, as an AAA client, initiates an AAA request message, encapsulating the information 
in the Handover Prep Req. message. The AAA request message is sent to the AAAF 
server.
5. The AAAF server discovers that the AAA request can not be resolved locally, and then 
forwards the AAA Req. message to the AAAH server according to “Realm” field in the 
NAI.
6. Upon receiving the AAA Req. message, the AAAH server should now authenticate the 
MN by comparing the “response” to the hashed result in its database. Depending on the 
authentication result, the AAAH server takes different actions.
a. If the authentication is unsuccessful, the MN will be denied the network access and 
would be notified through the AAA response message to serving AAAF sei*ver.
b. If the authentication is successful, the following steps are performed,
i. The AAAH server generates the key Kaaa en as follows,
Kaaa en = HMAC_SHAl(Ks, MN ID | N_aaa | E N IJD  | EN2JD),
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where, N aaa is a nonce generated by the AAAH sei'ver, ENI ID is the global 
IP address of the serving EN and EN2_ID is the global IP address of the target 
EN.
ii. The AAAH server sends the key/keying material to the serving AAAF servers 
in the AAA response message. There are two different ways to secure the 
key/keying material: encrypt the whole message with the pre-shared K aaa l or 
encrypt the A VPs that carry the key/keying material with K aaa l. And in order 
to save the computational cost, the latter one is always preferred.
Also, integrity can be provided by appending MAC to the whole message or 
just to the session key/keying materials A VP:
HMAC (K aaal, K aaa  1 (Kaaa en)), K aaa l (Kaaaen),
Where, K aaal is the pre-shared secret between the AAAH server and the 
serving AAAF server. K aaal is used as a KEK to encrypt Kaaa en and related 
keying materials. It can be also used to calculate the MAC option of the 
message field.
iii. Upon receiving the AAA response message from the AAAH server, the serving 
AAAF server can validate MAC using K aaal. After successful validation, the 
serving AAAF server decrypts Kaaa_en using K aaal.
7. The AAAH server sends an unsolicited AAA response messages to target AAAF server, 
informing the relevant key/keying material. The information can be secured in a similar 
way as described in 6-b-ii (AAAH server->serving AAAF server). If MAC option is 
needed to provide integrity, then
HMAC (K_aaa2, K_aaa2(Kaaa_en)), K_aaa2(Kaaa_en);
Where, K_aaa2 is the pre-shared secret between the AAAH server and the target AAAF 
server. Upon receiving the AAA response message from the AAAH server, the target 
AAAF server validates MAC using K_aaa2. After successful validation, the target AAAF 
server deciypts Kaaa en using K_aaa2.
8. The target AAAF server sends an AAA response message to the target EN in the target 
foreign network. The information can be secured in a similar way as described in 6-b-ii 
(AAAH server->serving AAAF server). If MAC is included in this message for 
authentication and integrity purpose, then:
HMAC (K_en2, K_en2(Kaaa_en)), K_en2(Kaaa_en), 
where, K_en2 is the pre-shared secret between the target AAAF server and the target EN.
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Upon receiving the AAA response message from the target AAAF server, the target EN 
can validate MAC using K_en2. After successful validation, the target EN decrypts 
Kaaa en using K_en2.
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Figure 4.4 Signalling for the proposed authenticated and authorized network access mechanism
9. The serving AAAF server forwards AAA response message to the serving EN. The AAA
Resp. message includes the following information:
a. the keying materials that the MN needs to generate Kaaa en: N aaa, MN ID, EN I ID, 
EN2 ID and the key generation algorithm. The information can be secured using pre­
shared key K e n l.
b. Kaaa en is transmitted either through an encrypted chanel or in an encrypted AVP, 
using the pre-shared key between seiwing AAAF server and serving EN. If MAC is 
included in this message for integrity purpose, then:
HMAC (K e n l, K e n  I (Kaaaen)), K_enl(Kaaa_en), 
where, K enl is the pre-shared secret between the serving AAAF server and the 
serving EN. Upon receiving the AAA response message from the serving AAAF server, 
the serving EN can validate MAC using K enl. After successful validation, the 
serving EN deciypts Kaaa en using K enl.
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10. The EN, as an AAA client, converts the AAA Resp. message into a Handover preparation 
reply message as the response to the Handover Prep Req. message, and sends the 
Handover Prep Rep. message to the serving AR.
11. The serving AR sends the Handover Prep Rep. message to the MN, It includes the 
following information:
a. NAI extension: MN ID@ReaIm;
b. Handover key response extension: keying materials that MN needs to generate 
Kaaaen;
c. MN AAA authentication response extension: authentication result, indicating 
whether the network access is granted or not.
After the MN receives the Handover Prep Rep. message, it generates Kaaa en, using the 
keying materials obtained from the Handover Prep Rep. message and the pre-shared 
secret with the AAAH server (Ks).
4.3.3 Benefits of the Mechanism
Trust relationsWp is established among network entities, so that secured communication can be 
achieved making use of the existed trust as mentioned in section 4.3.1. The usage of Kaaa en can 
be summarized in the following two ways:
1. Kaaa en can be used to secure the communication between the serving EN and target EN in
the neighbouring access networks. For instance, QoS context transfer may need to be
performed between the serving and target ENs in different access networks. It is proposed in 
[55] a combined mobility and QoS framework for heterogeneous networks. More details are 
explained in Appendix A. In this framework, a combined mobility and QoS context transfer 
takes place between the ENs in different access networks. Therefore, it is essential that trust 
is established prior to MN’s handover to the new access network, so that the necessary 
context transfer can be secured.
2. Kaaa en can be derived by the MN that has been granted the authenticated and authorized 
network access, using the keying materials obtained from the Handover Prep Rep. message. 
Thus, trust relationship is established between MN and target EN/target AAAF server. 
Kaaa en can be used in the target access network to secure mobility signalling between the 
MN and the target EN, such as BU and BA. In the case where re-authentication o-f the MN is 
needed, there is no need to traverse the wide internet in order to reach the MN’s home
domain, because the established trust between MN and the local AAA server (AAAF server
in target access network). In another word, since AAAF server and the MN now shares a
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secret, the authentication can be performed locally by the AAAF server without going back 
to the AAAFI server in MN’s home network.
4.3.4 Compatibility with the localized AAA solution
The concept of shadow registration was explained in section 4.1 and the AAA hierarchy for 
shadow registration was described in section 4.2.1. The idea of shadow registration is to establish 
the local security association a priori anticipating a possible handoff when the MN registers to the 
given subnet, for instance, given AR. Thus, when a MN performs handover to a neighbouring 
subnet, the AAA solution is processed locally within the new subnet without traversing the wide 
Internet to the MN’s AAAH server in the home network. The process for shadow registration was 
defined and enhanced in [48], [49], [50], [51] and [52], and an improved solution, dynamic 
shadow registration, was proposed in [53]. However, none of those previous work investigated 
how the shadow registration is realized with regard to the establishment of local security 
association.
The proposed solution here can be extended to facilitate the localized AAA solution. In order to 
implement the extension, an enhanced AAA hierarchy needs to be employed, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. Apart from the AAAF server in the visited network, another local AAA server, namely 
AAAL server, is required in the AR domain. Thus, the AAA solution can be optimized, with 
AAAF passing the MN’s security credentials to the AAAL servers. The AAA solution can be 
localized within the AR, even without the need to go back to the AAAF server in the enhanced 
node domain. The extended AAA/HMIPv6 integrated architecture for shadow registration is 
shown in Figure 4.5.
In the HMIPv6 network, the enhanced node (MAP) can interact with the AAA infrastructure to 
perform authenticated access control on MNs. The AAAF server needs to consult with AAAH 
server in performing the AAA solution for a newly entered MN. An AAAF server in the enhanced 
node level can then store the MN’s security credentials after the MN Is allowed network access. 
Thus, the AAAF server can speed up the authentication process by having the MN’s security 
credentials which can be used to verify the MN. As shown in Figure 4.5, during the handoff 
between ARs within one enhanced node domain, the AAAF server could pass the MN’s security 
credentials to the AAAL servers located in the AR’s domain to avoid performing the AAA 
process involving the AAAH server. Therefore, the AAA solution is localized even in the subnet 
(AR) domains. Figure 4.5 shows the network architecture for the localized AAA solution in 
HMIPv6 network.
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Since the distribution of either actual key or keying materials needs to be done in a secured 
manner, SAs are necessary for distributing the MN’s security credentials to the local AAA server 
(AAAL server) in the AR’s domain. Except the pre-shared secrets illustrated in Figure 4.3, 
additional SAs are required between entities in the AAA architecture. As shown in Figure 4.6, 
SAs are needed between AAAF server and the AAAL servers in the enhanced node domain.
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Figure 4.5 Extended AAA/HM IPv6 integrated architecture
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Figure 4.6 Additional SAs for the extended AAA architecture
The secure distribution of keys or keying materials can be achieved in the followir^ ways.
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Key wrapping method. If the two communication end points have trust relationship, the key 
wrapping method can be used for key distribution. It uses a symmetric key, which is shared by 
the two end parties, to encrypt the keys or keying materials. The symmetric key is also referred 
to as key encryption key (KEK). It is straightforward to use this key wrapping method for 
distributing MN’s security credentials from the AAAF server to the AAAL servers, as AAAF 
server and AAAL server shares a secret (shown in Figure 4.6).
Trusted third party. If the two communication end points have trust relationship, it is also 
popular to use a third party trusted by the two end points to perform the key distribution. For 
instance, AAA server could usually act as a trusted third party. As the key distribution is 
required from AAAF server to AAAL servers, it is not desired to involve another AAA server 
that can act as a trusted third party. For example, it is not natural to involve AAAH server 
again for key distribution between AAAF server and AAAL servers, because it is basically 
against the concept of localized AAA solution.
4.4 Syntax and Semantics of the Messages
4.4.1 Protocols Used between Different Network Entities
AAA protocol
(key for Enhanced Node)AAAF
Keying material for 
MN
Mobile IP
Figure 4.7 Protocols between network entities
In order to achieve the authenticated access control and to deliver the key/keying materials to 
the relevant networks entities, both of AAA protocol and mobile IP protocol should be involved. 
Figure 4.7 emphasizes the protocols to be used between different network entities. Mobile IP 
protocol is used between the MN and mobility agent, such as enhanced node. If the HA needs to 
be involved in some scenarios, the protocol between MN and HA is also Mobile IP. AAA 
protocol is used in the AAA infrastructure: between AAAH server and AAAF server, and
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between AAAF server and enhanced node. As part of the AAA infrastructure, mobility agent, 
such as enhanced node, can function as an AAA client. Since requiring all of the AAA client’s 
functionality might become a burden for a mobility agent, it is acceptable to have only the 
essential functions. The minimal required functionalities are listed as follows,
- Interact with AAA server. The mobility agent should be able to convert or at least encapsulate 
message into a format that AAA sei'ver can understand (such as AAA request message) and 
vice versa.
- Have pre-shared SA with AAA server. Hence, the key can be delivered to the mobility agent 
through AAA protocol either over an encrypted channel or in the encrypted attributes.
It should be noted that DIAMETER should be used as the protocol for AAA infrastructure here, 
rather than RADIUS. This is not only due to the limitations imposed by AAA protocol such as 
RADIUS, but also the lack of integration of RADUIS and Mobile IP specifications. Compared to 
other AAA protocols, DIAMETER provides detailed specification for Mobile IP support, and 
most of them are standardized by IETF. On the contrary, veiy few IETF standards exist for 
RADIUS support of any Mobile IP protocols, however, there are some efforts by various 
communities (such as 3GPP2) designing their own specification for RADIUS/Mobile IP 
integration.
4.4.2 Extensions for Mobile IP Protocol
Extensions are needed for both of the Mobile IP protocol and DIAMETER protocol in order to 
support the proposed DIAMETER/MIP application. The extensions for Mobile IP protocols are 
possible because of the flexibility of mobility options. New mobility options can be defined to 
enable new applications. The syntax and semantics of the messages are explained in the following 
sections.
1. Handover Preparation Request message (MN -> server AR serving Enhanced Node)
It uses Mobile IP mobility header with a few new mobility options. The mobility options required 
are explained as follows,
a. HK request extension
MN needs to request a nonce from the AAAH server, which would be used by the MN as keying 
material to generate the key. When this extension is discovered, the mobility agent should interact 
with AAA servers to request key/keying materials. Table 4.1 describes the message fields of a 
generalized key generation nonce request extension, which is used here to request keying 
materials.
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M essage Field Description
Type Type o f  the extension, in addition to those defined in the M obile IP 
specification. Type nuinber=40
Subtype A  number assigned to identify the w ay in which the Nonce Request Subtype 
Data is to be used when generating the registration key. When A A A  is used, 
subtype nuinber=l
Length Length o f  the extension. It is equal to the number o f  bytes in tlie Subtype 
Data field plus 4  (for SPI)
M N SPI SPI that the M N would assign for the SA created for use with the generated 
key. The relevant m obility agent (such as enhanced node) includes this SPI 
in the authentication extensions for m essages from the mobility agent to the
M N .
Key Generation N once 
Request Subtype Data
Data needed to carry out the generation o f  the key on behalf o f  the MN.
Table 4.1 Generalized key generation nonce request extension
b. MN-AAA Authentication extension
This mobility allows the MN to be authenticated by the AAA servers. It includes materials that 
AAAH server needs to authenticate the MN. A generalized Mobile IP authentication extension is 
introduced in [56], which allows the MN to be authenticated by a generic verification 
infrastructure. Table 4.2 illustrates the message format of the generalized Mobile IP 
authentication extension with the descriptions.
M essage Field Description
Type Type o f  the extension, in addition to those defined in the M obile IP 
specification. Type number=36
Subtype A  number assigned to identify the authentication strategy. For instance, 
when A A A  server is used, it is assigned to be 1, and it is called “MN- 
A A A  authentication extension”
Length 4  (for SPI) plus the number o f  octets in the authenticator field. It should 
be at least 20 .
SPI Security parameter index
Authenticator The length is variable, subject to different authentication method. The MN  
uses the A A A  key it shares with the A AAH  server to calculate the 
authenticator field. It is a hashed m essage authentication code-M D 5/SH A l 
(HM AC-M D5 or H M A C -SH A l)
Table 4.2 Generalized authentication extension 156]
The challenge/response authentication mechanism is used in the proposed solution, hence, the 
authenticator is calculated as.
Authenticator = HMAC-MD5/SHA1 (challenge, Ks)
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It is noticed that both of MD5 [57] and SHAl [58] can be used to compute the authenticator. 
Since SHAl provides stronger security protect than MD5 in terms of hashed MAC, the use of 
HMAC-SHAl is preferred.
The other mobility options included in the handover Prep. Request message include NAI 
extension and MN-FA challenge extension.
2. Handover Preparation Reply message (serving Enhanced Node seiwer AR -> MN)
It uses Mobile IP mobility header with a few new mobility options. The mobility options required 
are explained as follows,
a. HK response extension
It carries the nonce from the AAAH server that MN needs to create the key. Table 4.3 describes 
the message fields of a generalized key generation nonce reply extension.
M essage Field Description
Type
Subtype
Length
Key Generation N once  
Reply Subtype Data
Type o f  the extension, in addition to those defined in the M obile IP 
specification. Type number=41.
A  number assigned to identify the way in which the N once Reply Subtype 
Data is to be used to obtain the key. Subtype nu m bem l, i f  the nonce is from 
AA A  server.
It is equal to the number o f  bytes in the N once Reply Subtype Data.
The nonce, along with any other keying materials needed by the M N to 
derive the key.
Table 4.3 Generalized key generation nonce reply extension
b. MN AAA authentication response extension
A flag is used to indicate the authentication result. “Flag=l” indicates that network access is 
granted, while “Flag=0” suggests that network access is denied.
If integrity protection is needed for the handover preparation reply message, one more 
authentication extension, whose value is calculated using the generated key, can be inserted. By 
verifying this authentication extension, the MN can trust the handover preparation reply message.
The other mobility options included in the handover Prep, reply message include NAI extension 
and key lifetime extension.
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4.4.3 Extensions for AAA Protocol
The AAA protocol (DIAMETER) need to interact with the relevant mobility agents. In terms of 
extensions required in AAA protocol to achieve the DIAMETER/MIP integration, it basically 
implies the following points;
- Support of the Mobile IP related authentication method and key generation at the AAA server 
needs to be defined.
- DIAMETER protocol needs to define the A VPs for carrying Mobile IP related information in 
the AAA infrastructure. And of course, the DIAMTER messages to carry the AVP need to be 
specified as well. A VPs usually carry specific authentication, authorization, accounting, 
routing and security information as well as configuration details for AAA exchanges. AAA 
protocols can support creation of new AVP for new applications.
In lETF’s AAA working group, the DIAMETER applications for MIPv4/v6 have been defined 
in [36] [38] and [37]. In these documents, DIAMETER Mobile IP application defines new 
commands and specific AVPs to transport Mobile IP related information in the AAA 
infrastructure. Some more functionalities are also introduced to assist the application. For 
example, DIAMETER makes use of the MN’s NAI to help the routing of DIAMETER messages 
to the AAAH server.
I . AAA Request message (serving EN -> serving AAAF server -> AAAH server)
DIAMETER defines a new command “AA-Mobile Node Request (AMR)” which can be used for 
interaction from mobility agent (such as EN) to DIAMETER server (either AAAF or AAAH 
server). Through AMR command, mobility agent can forward the MN’s authentication request, 
key generation request and other related information to the AAA servers, which can then make 
decisions and generate key/keying materials. See Appendix B for the complete message field for 
AMA command. Only a few essential fields are explained here.
a. User-Name AVP
AVP Code=l. The data field contains MN’s NAI.
b. MIP-Authenticator AVP
AVP Code=488. The data field contains the authenticator data from the received handover prep, 
request message. The mobility agent extracts this data from the MN-AAA Authentication 
extension included in the received handover prep, request message. It will be used by the AAAH 
server to verify the MN.
c. MIP-MN-AAA-Auth AVP
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AVP Code=322. It is a grouped AVP, consisting of many sub-AVPs which include information to 
help the AAAH server to calculate the authenticator value. By comparing the value AAAH server 
calculated itself with the copy MN provides, the AAAH server is able to verify the MN.
d. MIP6-Feature-Vector AVP
AVP Code=124. It consists of many flags with values set by the mobility agent or local AAA 
servers. The flags indicate different information to the AAAH server. For example, flag=16 
suggests that the MN requests the AAAH server to generate key/keying materials.
e. MIP-challenge AVP
A new AVP, similar to MIP-FA-Challenge AVP (AVP code=344). The data field contains the 
challenge that MN and AAAH use in the challenge-response mechanism.
2. AAA Response message (AAAH server -> target AAAF seiver target EN, AAAH server 
serving AAAF server -> serving EN)
DIAMETER defines a new command “AA-Mobile Node Answer (AMA)” which can be used for 
interaction from DIAMETER server (either AAAF or AAAH sei'ver) to mobility agent (such as 
EN) that sent the AMR command. In the AMA command, AAA server can deliver useful 
information to mobility agent through AVPs. The information includes authentication result, the 
keying materials that MN needs to derive the key, etc. See Appendix B for the complete message 
field for AMA command. Only a few essential fields are explained here.
a. Result-Code AVP
AVP code=268. The value can be either indicating success or failure. It is used to inform a peer 
whether a request has been successfully accepted or declined.
b. User-Name AVP
AVP Code=l. The data field contains MN’s NAI.
c. MIP-Session-Key AVP
AVP Code=343. The data field contains the session key generated by the AAAH server and sent 
to the mobility agent.
d. MIP-MN-to-MAP MSA AVP
A new AVP with AVP code to be assigned. It is similar to MIP-MN-to-FA-MSA AVP (AVP 
code=325). It is a grouped AVP carried in AMA message. It includes the information MN needs 
to generate the key, such as nonce, key generation algorithm type, etc.
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e. MIP-MSA-Lifetime AVP
AVP Code=367. The data field contains the period of time for which the keys/keying materials 
are valid.
4.5 Analytical Models
Analytical models are used to evaluate the proposed solution. There are two aspects of the 
modelling: network model and user mobility model. The network model describes the network 
layout configuration, while the user mobility model is utilized to define the mobility pattern of the 
mobile terminals. Both of the two aspects will be explained in detail in this section.
4.5.1 Network Model
It is assumed here a two-dimensional (2-D) cellular configuration, the hexagonal network 
layout such as shown in Figure 4,8. It is also assumed that each domain managed by an enhanced 
node has the same number of rings of ARs. Each cell is surrounded by several rings of cells. The 
innermost cell 0 is called the centre cell; cells are labelled “ 1” form the first ring around cell “0” 
and so forth. Each ring is labelled according to its distance from the centre cell such that ring 
refers to the cells in the first ring away from the centre cell. In general, (/t=l, 2, ...) refers to 
the ring away from the centre. Let C(/C) be a cluster of cells and the outmost cells are in the 
j^th e.g., C(3) in of Figure 4.8 (1). The number of cells in ring is 6'k. And the number
of cells NOO in C(if) is as follows,
K
N (K )= ^ Y ,6 x k  + l = 3{K  + \ ) x K  + l Eq. 4-1
*=i
where K  denotes the outmost ring, e.g., K=3 in Figure 4.8 (1).
Figure 4.8 (1) shows the layout of one enhanced node domain. It is assumed that one access 
network is composed of rings of enhanced node domain. Figure 4.8 (2) gives an example of one 
access network consists of 3 rings of enhanced node domains. And each of the enhanced node 
domain contains several rings of ARs.
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4.5.2 User Mobility Models
There are two widely used mobility models in the literature: fluid flow model [59] 
and random walk model [60] [61]. Of the two models, fluid flow model is more suitable for users 
with high mobility pattern, which means infrequent speed and moving direction changes. Random 
walk model is more appropriate for pedestrian users, whose mobility pattern is generally limited 
to certain geographic area, such as residential and business building.
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In this section, the fluid flow model and random walk model will be explained in detail.
4.5.2.1 Fluid flow model
Fluid flow model is widely adopted to analyze boundary crossing issue, such as handover, in 
the application of legacy wireless networks providing mainly voice services. Some initial work 
has been carried out in [62] , [63] and [64] making use of the fluid flow model to evaluate the 
system performance for personal communication systems (PCS). Recently, the fluid flow model 
has been utilized to analyze location related issues in Mobile IP protocols, such as MIPv6 in [65], 
HMIPv6 in [66] and [67], the comparison of MIPv6 and HMIPv6 in [68], etc.
In the fluid flow model, it is assumed that the direction of an MN’s movement is uniformly 
distributed in the rage of (0,2a:) [59]. Average speed of an MN is denoted by v. Let and 
be the enhanced node domain crossing rate and the network crossing rate, respectively. Then 
enhanced node and network crossing rates are given by Eq. 4-2 and Eq. 4-3 respectively.
Eq. 4-2
n Eq. 4-3
where, In and p are the perimeters of an enhanced node domain, a network and MN’s density, 
respectively. In a network C(K) consisting of K  rings of enhanced nodes, is as follows,
/„ = 6 x (2 f^ + I)x ^  = (2A: + l)x 4, (/:> !) Eq. 4-4
In [69], the value of perimeter I is estimated using the formula for the area and circumference of 
a circle with size S:
l  =  2 ‘ ^ n - S  Eq. 4-5
From Eq. 4-2 and Eq. 4-5, it is derived that,
_  2pVyfS ^in ~ I— ^9" 4-6
In order to derive the enhanced node crossing rate for a single moving user, Eq. 4-6 is divided by 
total number of moving users in its area, which is pS. Thus,
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Therefore, the movement rate for an MN out of a network can be represented as follows,
2v
"  ^> rN {K )S
Eq. 4-8
where, S is the enhanced node domain area and iV(R) is the network domain size (number of 
enhanced node domains).
4.5.2.2 Random walk model
Random walk model is also one of the commonly adopted mobility models. Similar to fluid 
flow model, the Random walk model has been used to analyze location related signalling cost 
issues in PCS networks [61] [70] [71]. In HMIPv6 network, the random walk model has also been 
applied to evaluate the signalling cost, such as BU cost, in [66] [67] and [72].
In random walk model, the next position occupied by an MN is equal to the previous position 
plus a random variable whose value is drawn independently from an arbitrary distribution [73]. In 
Figure 4.8, if the MN is located in a cell of ring, the probability that a movement will result in 
an increase or decrease in the distance from the centre is derived as follows,
= and =  —  — — Eq. 4-9'  3 6r  ^ 3 6r
^ R - 2 , I i - \  ^ R - \ J Î  ^ R ,R H
P r - \ ,R - 2  P r ,R - \  P r +{,R
Figure 4.9 State transition diagram  for the markov chain model
A Markov chain of r states is defined here, as shown in Figure 4.9. The state r  (r > 0) 
indicates the distance between the current location of the MN and the centre. Thus, the state is 
equivalent to the index of a ring in which the MN is located in. For instance, state “3” indicates 
that MN currently resides in the 3"** ring; the MN is in state r if it is currently residing in ring r. 
The transition probabilities and Pr.r-i represent the probabilities of MN’s movement from 
state r  to r+1, and from state r to r-1. They also indicate the distance of the MN from the centre of 
an access network increases (r->r+l) and decreases (r-^r-1), respectively. a,..r+i and can 
be represented as below.
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Eq. 4-10
A,._, = ( ' if 1 s r S Æ Eq-4-11
where, q is the probability that the MN remains in the same enhanced node domain. And 1-q is 
the probability that the MN moves to another enhanced node domain. R is the number of rings of 
enhanced node domains within one access network, for instance, R=3 in Figure 4.8 (2).
Let 7T^ R be the steady state probability of state r  within an access network consisting of R rings 
of enhanced node domains. By Eq. 4-10 and Eq. 4-11, Ur,R can be represented as follows,
R
R r -1  _
/•=! /=o f^+hi
r=0
l^ r < R  E q.4-12
,=0 "i+\J
Therefore, the probability that the MN leaves the access network is îTr rCTr r^+i .
4.5.3 Calculation of the Signalling Cost
4.5.3.1 Signalling Cost Using Fluid Flow Model
From Eq. 4-2 and Eq. 4-3, the enhanced node domain crossing rate (Rm) and the network 
crossing rate in the fluid flow model are obtained. The location update cost per MN can be 
derived as follows,
p  ~  ^  ^ E N  .-  -  Eq. 4-13
P^n
where, Q  and Crn are the location update cost in the inter access network handover and in the 
inter enhanced node domain handover. And is the number of enhanced nodes in one network. 
Sn represents the area of the given access network. Since the access network consists of 
enlianced node domains, the sum of all enhanced node crossing rate includes the network crossing 
rate. Therefore, Rm^EW is the rate of enhanced node crossing within the access network.
Based on the hexagonal network layout and Eq. 4-1,
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+ 3 i? +  1 Eq. 4-14
where, R is the number of rings the in network model.
~  ^ E N  ^ ^ E N  ~  ^ E N  ^ ^ 4 , ^9" 4-15
where, X V3/24 is the dimension of a hexagonal enhanced node domain.
Substituting Eq. 4-2, Eq. 4-3, Eq. 4-14 and Eq. 4-15 into Eq. 4-13,
+rW„ +3R + l ) - W ,lx Q „
Q „  = --------------------------------------   J-- Eq. 4-16
; t x ^ x { 3 R ^ + 3 R  + l )x l l
From Eq. 4-4 and /„ = {2R +1) x , let r  ~ /„ / /,„ = 2i? +1. Thus,
vrC„ +  Fv X (3R  ^ 4- 37? + 1) -  v r l  x 
C , u  =  W -------------------       Eq. 4-17
;rx |^ x (3 i?= + 3 Æ  + l)x/,„
Since the signalling cost is proportional to the distance of two entities in IP networks [66], the 
following parameters to calculate the signalling cost are defined:
- t :  the unit transm ission cost in a wired link. It is assumed that the unit transmission cost 
is the cost for BU to HA.
- K : the unit transmission cost in a wireless link
- Dx-y'. the distance between network entity %andy, and Dx-y =
- PCx' the processing cost at network element x.
- Cx-y : the coefficient of transm ission cost for BU/BA (to HA) from entity x  to y. The 
coefficient is calculated based on the unit transm ission cost.
- C'%_y: the coefficient of transm ission cost for BU/BA (to CN) from entity x to y .
In HMIPv6, the MN performs global binding update when it moves across the MAP domains 
and across networks. The global binding update is a process in which an MN registers its RCoA 
with the CNs and the HA. Therefore, and can be obtained from the below equation.
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C  E N
=  /t* +  r  X  ^  E N - H A  )  +  X  H A - E N  ^  ^  H A - E N  +  ^  E N - A l l  ^  ^  E N - A R  )  ^  A R - M N  ^  ^
X  A* X  +  Aff-yy X  r  X  x  +  C x  D )
- ^ C i V  X  A" X  C ^ C N  X  î"  X  X  D ^ p _ p ^  +  X  D p y _ p f ^  ^
+ PC ^^ + X + P C p y
Eq. 4-18
where, Nqn is the number of CNs that the MN is communicating with.
Let SyiMip be the security signalling cost per MN for the inter access network handover using 
the previous mechanism, thus,
^ H M i P  ~  (^rt X Q )  /  ( p  X S',, )  Eq. 4-19
where, Q  is the security cost in the handover between access networks. In order to provide 
authenticated access control in the previous mechanism, the MN needs to consult the AAAH 
server. The messages are exchanged in the route of MN<"^AR^^EN<—>AAAF4-^AAAH, 
thus, Cs can be expressed as follows,
Cç ~ fcx (iS'i I +  »S,2 )  +  r  X ( jS j, +  S 2 2  )  X D ^ p _ p y
+  T X (  jS j j -I- 8 ^ 2  )  X D p f ^ _ ^ ^ p  +  T X (  5*4, +  5*42 )  X E q .  4-20
+  ^ ^ A R  +  ^ ^ E N  ■*' ^ ^ A A A F  ^ ^ A A A H  +  ^  ^ h a s h
where, the transmission cost of security signalling in a wireless and wired link between 
corresponding entities is Sij times of k , t  (the transmission cost of BU in the same link), under the 
previous security mechanism. For example, S1 2  is the coefficient for the transmission cost from 
MN to AR, and 521 is for the transmission cost from AR to MN. H^ash is hashing cost.
Let 5/zjvnp be the security signalling cost per MN for the inter access network handover using 
the proposed mechanism, therefore,
^  ' h m i p  x C \ ) / ( / ? x 5 ' „ )  Eq. 4-21
where, Cj is the security cost in the handover between access networks.
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^  s =  +  TX *5 2%x + T x S  3jX + r  X iS 4,x
+  r  X *5 42 X D +  T x S  32 X D aaAF~EN
+ T X S  2 2  X + r ex  S  j 2 + T X 5 '  X +  T X 5' X ^pargeZ/l^^F-rargcrEV
■*■ ^ ^ A R  ■*■ ^ ^ E N  ^ ^ A A A F  +  P ^ A A A H  ^ ^ T a r g e l A A A F  /  2  H* /  2
+ 2 ' + 1 0  - + 8 •
Eq. 4-22
where, is session key generation cost, H^ash is hashing cost and Ed^s is encryption/deciyption 
cost using DES. And the transmission cost of security signalling in a wireless and wired link 
between corresponding entities is S lj  times of k , t  (the transmission cost of BU in the same link), 
using the proposed security mechanism. S' and S" are the coefficients for the transmission cost 
from AAAH server to target AAAF server and from target AAAF server to target EN, 
respectively.
Let Ctotai and Qotai be the total signalling cost using the previous security mechanism and the 
proposed security mechanism. Thus,
^ to ta l ~  ^ L U  "b Qv Eq. 4-23
^  total ~  ^ L U  ■b (2  % Eq. 4-24
4.5.3 2 Signalling Cost Using Random Walk Model
According to the random walk model presented in the previous section, the probability that an 
MN leaves the given access network is ttr rCTr r+i . Hence, the total signalling cost per unit time 
for the previous security mechanism and the proposed security mechanism can be expressed as 
follows,
^  __ ^ R , R ^ R , R + \  X (Cy + C„) + (l -  ) X Cppi ^
"  j !  Eq. 4-25
^ , _  ^ R , R ^ R , R + \  X (C  V + C„ ) +  (l -  )  X ^
^  total ~  j t  Eq. 4-26
where, T  Is average enhanced node domain residence time.
The values of the parameters are shown in Table I of Appendix C. Some of the parameter 
values for analysis are referenced from [65], [66], [72], [74] and [75].
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4.6 Simulation Results and Analysis
In this section, performance of the proposed mechanism is compared to the previous 
mechanism defined in [36], [53] and [76] in terms of signalling cost, using both fluid flow model 
(section 4.6.1) and random walk model (section 4.6.2). In the previous mechanism, DIAMETER 
protocol is only used to provide the mobile user authenticated access while it roams across Mobile 
IP foreign networks, without the key management capacity to establish key between MN and new 
access network and without establishing trust between neighbouring access networks, as in the 
proposed mechanism.
4.6.1 Results Using Fluid Flow Model
Signaling co st (fluid flow model)
70 -
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— proposed security mechanism
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Velocity of the MN
Figure 4.10 Impact o f M N ’s speed on total signalling load (fluid flow model)
The unit signalling cost is defined in section 4.5.3.1 to be the transmission cost of a BU 
message to HA, and it applies to all the result figures in this section. Figure 4.10 shows the impact 
of MN’s speed on the signalling cost using fluid flow model. The result shows that the signalling 
cost increases as MN moves at a faster speed. And the signalling cost for the proposed security 
mechanism is higher than the previous one. This is because that the previous security mechanism 
does not involve the key generation/distribution process and the signalling for authentication is 
only performed between the home network and target access network. However, the proposed 
security mechanism introduces signalling between the home network and target access network 
for key distribution. The advantage of the proposed security mechanism is that no extra handover 
delay is introduced, because the authentication of MN and the establishment/distribution of the 
keys are performed before MN is connected to the target access network.
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Figure 4.11 Impact o f R (size o f the access network: number o f rings) on signalling load, using 
fluid flow model. (1) Total signalling cost v.s R; (2) Ratio v.s R, where Ratio= total signalling cost 
using proposed security mechanism / total signalling cost using previous security mechanism
Figure 4,11 shows the impact of R (size of the access network in terms of number of rings in 
hexagonal layout) on signalling cost, using fluid flow model. Figure (I) shows that signalling cost 
decrease as R increases. This is because that larger network size indicates smaller inter-access 
network handover rate, which results in less inter-access handover signalling cost. The proposed 
security mechanism introduces more signalling compared to the previous one, however, it is also 
shown in Figure (1) that the signalling cost gain of proposed security mechanism to previous 
mechanism decreases as R increase. Figure (2) shows the impact of network size R on the
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signalling cost ratio which is defined as [^ atio = signalling cost with security mechanism As R
signalling cost with previous security mechanism
increases, the ratio gets closer to I, which indicates the extra security cost introduced by the
proposed security mechanism can be neglected for large network size.
4.6.2 Results Using Random Walk Model
Signaling cost (random walk model)
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Figure 4.12 Impact o f R (size o f the access network: number o f rings)on signalling load, using 
random walk model. (I) Total signalling cost v.s R; (2) Ratio v.s R, where Ratio= total signalling cost 
using proposed security mechanism / total signalling cost using previous security mechanism
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Figure 4.12 demonstrates the impact of R (size of the access network in terms of number of
rings in hexagonal layout) on signalling cost, using random walk model. Figure (1) shows the
impact of R on the total signalling cost for previous and the proposed mechanisms, and figure (2)
shows the impact of network size R on the signalling cost ratio which is defined as
Ratio -  signalling cost with security mechanism ^ concluded from Figure 4.12 that the
signalling cost with previous security mechanism
extra signalling cost introduced by the proposed security mechanism, comparing to the previous 
mechanism, can be minimised if large network size is considered. Also, both of figure (1) and (2) 
demonstrate similar trend as those shown in Figure 4.11.
Signaling cost (random walk model)
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Figure 4.13 Impact o f average residence time in enhanced node domain on total signalling load, using 
random walk model. (1) R=3; (2) R=3 and R=15
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Figure 4.13 shows the impact of average residence time in enhanced node domain on total 
signalling cost. Also, signalling cost generally decreases as average residence time increases. This 
is because that large residence time in the enhanced node domain suggests the MN moves across 
domains fewer times in a given time. Therefore, the total signalling cost is less. Figure (1) also 
demonstrates that proposed security mechanism introduces around 30% more signalling cost than 
the previous mechanism, due to the fact that more signalling between home network and target 
network is introduced. Figure (2) shows the impact of network size R on the signalling cost. It can 
be noticed that signalling cost for larger network size (R=15) is generally smaller than that for 
smaller sized network (R=3). As shown in Figure (2), the signalling cost gain of proposed security 
mechanism to previous security mechanism is larger for R=3 than that for R=15. This 
demonstrates that the proposed security mechanism performs better in a larger sized network.
It is also investigated the sensitivity of the signalling cost to the variance in the enhanced node 
domain residence time. It is assumed that the enhanced node residence time follows a Gamma 
distribution. The probability density function (pdf) of a Gamma distribution is as follows,
j _ t
where, k is the shape parameter, 9 is the scale parameter and F (k )  = T . The variance
of the Gamma distribution is kG^ and the mean h k G . The Laplace transform of (f) can 
be represented as,
(*) = ( ! + '
The residence time in an access network is the sum of total residence time that the MN stays in 
the enhanced node domains within the network. It is assumed here that the number of enhanced 
node domains passed by a MN is a random variable p  with uniform distribution on
The probability mass function of an uniform distribution can be expressed as,
And its Z transform is [70]:
N{ R)  ,  ,
— E, . 4. 30
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Let the pdf of the residence time in the network be (/) and its Laplace transform (a’) is 
as follows [70],
I Eq. 4-31
N { R )
From the property of the Laplace transfonn, the first-order moment, i.e, the mean value t of the 
residence time in the network, is as follows.
^ S G ,A s)  k 0 { N{ R)  + \)
ÔS 2
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Figure 4.14 Probability v.5 signalling cost, using random walk model. The enhanced node domain 
residence time follows Gamma distribution with mean=4 and variance= 4,8 or 16. Size o f network
R=3.
In [66] [77], Gamma distribution is used to model the cell residence time because of its 
flexibility in setting various parameters. It is assumed here that the enhanced node domain 
residence time follows Gamma distribution with mean=4 and variance=4, 8 or 16. Figure 4.14 
shows probability distribution of signalling cost (signalling cost/enhanced node residence time), 
indicating the impact of variance in the enhanced node residence time. If the enhanced node 
residence time is with a large variance, a high signalling cost occupies a larger amount of the 
overall signalling cost compared to the enhanced node residence time with small variance. This is 
because that larger variance of the enhanced node residence time indicates the probability that an 
MN remains in the enhanced node domain for a shorter time. In other words, MN is with higher
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mobility rate. Figure 4.14 also demonstrates that for the same probability, signalling cost for the 
proposed security mechanism is larger than for the previous security mechanism.
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Signaling cost (random waik modei)
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Figure 4.15 Probability v.s signalling cost (signalling cost/network residence tim e), using random  
walk model. The enhanced node domain residence time follows Gamma distribution with mean=4 
and variance= 4,8 or 16. And the network residence time is derived using enhanced node domain
residence time.
Figure 4.15 shows probability distribution of signalling cost (signalling cost/network residence 
time), using random walk model. The enhanced node domain residence time follows Gamma 
distribution with mean=4 and variance=4, 8 or 16. And the network residence time is derived 
using enhanced node domain residence time as explained before. It is shown in the all of the 
figures that a high signalling cost occupies a larger amount of the overall signalling cost with 
larger enhanced node residence time variance value. This is because that larger variance of the 
enhanced node residence time indicates the probability that an MN remains in the enhanced node 
domain for a shorter time is higher. In another word, the MN has a higher enhanced node and 
network crossing rate. Figure 4.15 also demonstrates that for the same probability, signalling cost 
for the proposed security mechanism is generally larger than for the previous security mechanism. 
Figure (I) and figure (2) shows the impact of different network sizes; R=1 in (1) and R=2 in (2). 
Obviously, the signalling cost gain of proposed security mechanism to previous security 
mechanism is larger in network size R=l than that in R=2 (comparing figure (1) with figure (2) 
with linear x scale). This is because smaller network size suggests higher probability of inter­
network handovers. Also, it can be observed in figure (I) and (2) (see log x scale) that for the 
same probability, signalling cost for the proposed security mechanism is larger than for the 
previous security mechanism.
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4.7 D iscussions
In section 4.6, the performance of the proposed security mechanism is evaluated using the fluid 
flow model and random walk model. The proposed solution is compared with the previous 
security mechanism defined in [36], [53] and [76] in terms of the signalling cost. The signalling 
cost is evaluated against different parameters, such as speed of the MN, size of the network, etc. 
The results indicate that the proposed security mechanism generates slightly more signalling cost 
than the previous security mechanism. There are two reasons for the extra signalling cost:
- The previous security mechanism only provides authenticated access control, without the 
attempt to generate session keys to be used by the MN and mobility agent. While the proposed 
security mechanism authenticates the MN and generates key to be used between serving and 
target EN across access networks and possibly to be used between the MN and EN in the target 
access network.
- In the proposed security mechanism, messages are exchanged between the AAA infrastructure 
in the home network and both of the target and serving access network for the purpose of 
authentication and key distribution. But in the previous solution, message exchange is only 
performed between AAAH server and target access network to authenticate the MN.
The impact of security mechanism on mobility protocols involves two important factors: 
signalling cost and handover latency. To minimise the negative impact of security, it is desired 
that the extra signalling load and handover latency introduced by security mechanism should be 
minimal. However, there is always a trade-off between these two factors. Although the proposed 
solution introduces more signalling load, it does not introduce extra handover latency. In the 
proposed solution, the authentication and key generation/distribution are performed before the 
MN actually hands over to the target access network. Thus, it does not affect the handover latency 
and also ensures that the session key is available to be used when MN connects to the target 
network. However, it takes an extra round-trip-time (RRT) to authenticate the MN under the AAA 
infrastructure using the previous security mechanism, which inevitably increases the handover 
latency. More detailed analysis for handover delay is provided in Appendix D. It should also be 
noted from the results that in large scale networks, the proposed solution achieves very similar 
performance as the previous security mechanism, in terms of signalling cost.
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Chapter 5
5 An Enhanced Key Management Scheme for 
Securing Handover/Fast Handover in 
HMIPv6 Networks
With the introduction of MAP in HMIPv6, one access network is further divided into domains 
which are managed by MAP. The mobility management can be localized in one MAP domain, 
while the procedures for location update is different for handoff across MAP domains. Therefore, 
handover in HMIPv6 networks can be classified as shown in Figure 5.1 :
- Network level handover: The scenario where the MN moves across different access networks.
- Macromobility level handover: The scenario where MN moves within one access network, 
performing handover across enhanced node domains.
- Micromobility level handover: The scenario where MN moves within one enhanced node
domain, performing handover from one AR to another.
UA CN s
N e tw o r k  I
N etw ork
Level N e tw o r k  2
M acro m o b ility
Level
Node Node Node
AR AR AR
AR AR AR AR AR AR
M ic rom ob ility
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Figure 5.1 Different handoff domains: micromobility level, M acromobility level and network level
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Many existing security issues need to be solved in all of the three handover scenarios. Chapter 4 
considers the network level handover by providing solution to authenticate the MN and generate 
key that can be used later on. Problems remain in the area of micromobility level handover. 
Among the security issues in the micromobility handoff scenario, the following two problems are 
essential:
- Authentication of the MN. It is to make sure that it is the authentic MN which is requesting the 
handover.
- Secure the important mobility signalling. It is required that the key management scheme exists 
to generate the key for the purpose of securing the mobility signalling, such as BU message.
5.1 R elated W ork
In order to secure the essential signalling messages, such as BU, it is required to establish SA 
between two Mobile IP entities. Much progress has been done in securing the global BU/BA 
messages exchanged between MN and CNs, using return routability procedure defined in [4] and 
Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) proposed in [78]. However, these solutions are 
proven to be inefficient against DoS attacks in [79].
With the introduction of local location update in HMIPv6 network, securing local BU/BA 
messages is necessary as well, although there is not as much work as in securing the global 
BU/BA messages. In general, there are two methods to secure the handover in HMIPv6: CGA 
based mechanism and AAA based mechanism.
- CGA based mechanism
CGA is a method for binding a public signature key to an IPv6 address in the Secure Neighbour 
Discovery Protocol (SEND) [80]. The basic idea is to generate the interface identifier of the IPv6 
address by computing a one-way hash of the public key. The resulting IPv6 address is called a 
CGA, The corresponding private key can then be used to sign messages sent from this address. 
The other end point can verify the binding between the public key and the address, by re­
computing the hash and comparing the result with the interface identifier. Thus, messages sent 
from the IPv6 address can be secured by attaching the public key and related parameters and by 
signing the message with the corresponding private key. Mechanisms using GCA work without a 
certification authority or verification infrastructure [78].
Based on the concept of CGA, some authenticated symmetric key exchange protocols have 
been proposed in [81] [82] [83]. In [81], It is specified a method that allows the MN to establish
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SA with certain MAP. It is proposed in [82] a general method to secure the handover signalling as 
required in IPv6 handover optimization protocols such as FMIPv6 and context transfer protocol 
(CXTP) [84]. A mechanism is proposed in [82] to distribute a symmetric handover key for 
FMIPv6 using Secure Neighbour Discovery (SEND) protocol. All of these solutions are based on 
the use of CGA technology, thus, the MIP address (such as the MN’s LCoA) is required to be 
computed based on CGA technology.
- AAA based mechanism
A verification infrastructure is one of the means for authentication and establishment of SA. 
AAA infrastructure has been proven to achieve good integration with MIP protocols. In Mobile IP 
networks, AAA infrastructure not only provides authenticated network service to MN roaming in 
a foreign network, but also functions as a server to generate keys and deliver key/keying materials 
to the relevant entities.
The reasons why AAA infrastructure is chosen to be used in the proposed solution are,
a. It is to be consistent with the previous solution proposed in chapter 4, which also uses AAA 
protocol. In order to most re-use the resources, including the “hardware” resources such as 
network entity, and the “software” resources such as the keys generated in other solution, it is 
beneficial if all of the solutions can be based on the architectural framework proposed in 
Figure 3.1.
b. It is to avoid the necessity of introducing CGA technology and unnecessary overhead of 
computing MIP addresses based on CGA technology.
Much work has been done making use of AAA protocol to secure the MIPv4/v6 signalling [85],
while the integration of AAA/HMIPv6 (FMIPv6) remains to be explored. It is proposed in [86], a
mechanism to establish handover keys for securing FMIPv6/HMIPv6 signalling using AAA
infrastructure. The Initial attempt has also been made in [87] to secure the handover in F-HMIPv6
based on the mechanism proposed in [86]. It is defined in [86] a key management protocol to
generate handover key between a MN and an AR for the purpose of securing signalling messages
in FMIPv6 or any other protocol that requires to establish SA between the MN and the related
network entity. The problem with this mechanism is that it introduces too much overhead because
of the key generation process. Every time the MN changes the AR, the key generation, which is
believed to be a time-consuming process, needs to be executed. In order to reduce the negative
impact of the key management scheme on the handover performance, a “lightweight” solution
with less signalling overhead involved to generate the handover key is needed. As an
improvement for the mechanism proposed in [86], it is proposed in this chapter an enhanced key
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management scheme for handover/fast handover in HMIPv6 network to simplify the key 
generation process.
5.2 Solution Overview
Based on the architectural framework shown in Figure 3.1, it is proposed here an enhanced key 
management scheme to secure the handover within one enhanced node domain and between 
enhanced node domains within one access network. It authenticates the M N before the handover 
takes place and also protects handover by securing the signalling between the two entities 
involved (M N  and AR, or M N and E N) using a handover key (HK) generated in the scheme. The 
secured handover process includes two procedures: key generation and securing handover 
messages, such as BU, fast BU, etc. In the proposed solution, making use of the intelligence of the 
EN, a bunch of keys can be generated at one time and distributed to the entities involved at a later 
stage. Thus, the signalling overhead and handover latency introduced by key management can be 
reduced.
5.2.1 Operational Domain and New Terminology
0
AR
Handover 
key server
J EnhancedNode
AR ARAR
MN a
Figure 5.2 The proposed solution: domain and entities involved
Figure 5.2 illustrates the domain that the proposed solution is operating in and relevant network 
entities involved in the solution. As shown in the figure, a new network entity, namely handover
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key server (HKS), is introduced. In theory, it is the entity that could generate the handover 
key/keying materials required for securing MIP signalling. In practice, the HKS can be collocated 
with a AAA server (either AAAF server or AAAH server) in the AAA infrastructure. The HKS 
interacts with the EN to distribute keys/keying materials.
As introduced in Section 2.1.2.2, the mobility management is localized when MN moves within 
one enhanced node domain. In order to keep the enhanced node updated with MN’s new LCoA 
when the MN moves between ARs, the local BU/BA messages need to be exchanged between the 
MN and the enlianced node via AR. It is essential to ensure that it is a legitimate MN requesting 
the handover service. And at the same time, the location update signalling messages must be 
secured. Since Mobile IP protocol does not provide a method to establish session keys/related 
keying materials between the MN and corresponding network entity, a key management protocol 
needs to be introduced to assist the procedure,
5.2.2 Trust Model
It is assumed that some pre-established SAs exist between some network entities. The trust 
model is illustrated in Figure 5.3, and explained as follows,
- Between MN and HKS
Serving as a trusted third party, the HKS shares two keys with the MN,
a. A pre-shared handover master key (HMK) exists between the MN and the HKS. The HKS is 
not for the purpose of securing any signalling messages, as it is only used for derivation of 
other keys, such as handover key. The method of establishing HMK is out of the scope of the 
proposed mechanism. However, as part of the AAA infrastructure, there are many ways to 
establish the pre-shared secrets between the MN and HKS. As mentioned in section 5.2.1, the 
HKS can be collocated with AAA server. For instance, if the HKS is collocated with the 
AAAH server, the HMS can be established when MN subscribes to the service (as the key Ks 
in Chapter 4). If the HKS is collocated with the AAAF server, the HMS can be established in 
a way described in Chapter 4, when the MN first enters an access network.
b. A handover integrity key (HIK) is also shared between the MN and the HKS. As indicated by 
its name, it is a key used to provide integrity for messages exchanges between MN and HKS. 
It is derived from the HMK.
- Between enhanced node and ARs within its domain
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As specified in HMIPv6 protocol, the ARs within one MAP domain should assist the MN in 
selecting the most appropriate MAP and should deliver the RtAdv message sent by the MAP to 
the MN. Therefore, the secured links must exist between the enhanced node and all ARs located 
within its domain. It is feasible by using the intelligence of the enhanced node. The enhanced 
node is configured to have knowledge about its surrounding entities, such as neighbouring 
enhanced node, the ARs, etc. And the enhanced node is supposed to be able to manage the ARs 
within its own domain.
Enhanced
Node
Distribute K eys/K eyin g  
M aterials<  -  - ................... Handover Key Server
Distribute K eying  
M aterials
(f  HM K  
HIK
a MN
Group o f  ARs in 
the EN domain
Figure 5.3 Trust Model
Figure 5.3 also shows the interaction between HKS and enhanced node. Once receiving request 
from the enhanced node, the HKS should distribute relevant keys/keying materials to the 
enhanced node as the response. Among the group of ARs within one enhanced node domain, the 
serving AR should also assist in delivering keying materials to the MN.
5.2.3 Assumptions and Requirements
The following assumptions are made:
- The use of AAA infrastructure
It is assumed that AAA infrastructure is used. Based on the key management ability provided 
by AAA protocol, it is beneficial to use AAA framework for the establishment of handover keys. 
The HKS, as part of the AAA infrastructure, is collocated with the AAA server. The enhanced 
node which interacts with the HKS, should be able to function as the AAA client. AAA protocol 
is used for message exchanges between HKS (AAA server) and the EN (AAA client).
- Pre-shared secrets
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The proposed solution works based on the existence of pre-shared secrets, as explained in 
Section 5.2.2. The establishment of the pre-shared keys is outside the scope of the mechanism, 
although it should be noted that the master key must be refreshed periodically. This is basically to 
avoid the possibility of compromising the key by analyzing a considerably large amount of traffic.
Some requirements are also explained as follows,
- Minimal impact on MIP protocol
It is required that the key management procedure should have minimal impact on the mobility 
protocols. By ‘‘minimal impact”, it suggests the proposed solution should not introduce too much 
handover latency and signalling overhead.
- Freshly generated session keys
Since AAA-based key management is widely deployed by a variety of standards developed by 
either IETF or other organizations, guidance for AAA key management is provided by IETF 
networking group in [88]. It is required by the guidance that the session keys should be strong and 
fresh. And the session keys should not be dependent on one another. Thus, the compromise of one 
session key does not lead to the failure of other ones. A fresh cryptographic key is the key 
generated specifically for only one purpose. The AAA protocol needs to ensure that the keying 
materials for deriving the session keys are fresh. This is feasible by using a randomly generated 
value that is used only once, which is usually called the “nonce”. Multiple session keys can be 
derived from a pre-shared secret and a nonce, thus it is guaranteed that the session keys are fresh.
5.2.4 Overview on the key generation procedure
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Handover Key 
responseHandover Key 
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Figure 5.4 Overview on the key generation procedure 
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Figure 5.4 gives an oveiview on the basic key generation procedure. The HKS, which 
cooperates with the MN to generate a HK, is collocated with the AAAF server. The MN, upon 
attaching to an AR that belongs to a new enhanced node domain, sends a handover key request 
(HKReq.) message to the AR. The discovery of entering a new enhanced node domain can be 
done through the RtAdv. message. After validating the MN’s CoA, the AR forwards the HKReq. 
message to its enhanced node. The enhanced node then initiates an AAA request message, 
encapsulating the payloads of HKReq. message. After successful authentication and authorization 
using the MAC option which is calculated by the MN using the HIK, the HKS then generates a 
bunch of HKs for eveiy ARs in its domain and sends an AAA response message over to the EN. 
All HKs and keying materials are included in the response message. After receiving the AAA 
response message, the EN can distribute the relevant HK to the corresponding AR in it domain, 
except for the MN’s serving AR. The EN also sends a handover key response (HKResp.) message 
to the MN’s serving AR. In this message, the keying materials for the MN to generate the HKs are 
included. It also includes the HK for the serving AR. When the MN receives the HKResp. 
message from the serving AR, it retrieves the keying materials and derives the HKs using the 
materials. The MN can also authenticate the HKResp. message by validating a MAC option 
calculated by the HK shared between the MN and the serving AR.
5.3 The Enhanced Key Management Scheme for Securing 
Handovers in HMIPv6 Networks
5.3.1 Description of the Signalling Details
Continuing with the key generation procedures described in Section 5.2.4, the signalling 
details illustrated in Figure 5.5 are explained in the following paragraphs. It is assumed that MN
enters a new enhanced node domain which has n ARs; ARi, ARg,   AR„, and the MN is about
to connect with AR- .^
1. The MN sends a handover key request (HK Req.) message to the serving AR (AR^,), The HK 
Req. message includes the following information:
MN’s CoA, a nonce generated by the MN (N^nX the pseudo random function (PRF) algorithm 
that the MN chooses to use for key generation, the MN’s ID ( /£ > m /v)» which is NAl of the MN, a 
message ID (ID^sg) which can identify this message exchange and MN-HKS MAC option.
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The MN-HKS MAC option is a MAC of the message field calculated by the MN. The value of the
MN-HKS MAC is calculated using the HIK, which is the key derived from the HMK and shared
between MN and HKS, Therefore, by validating the MN-HKS MAC option, the HKS can
authenticate the MN and perfonn authorization for the handoffs before deriving the HKs.
2. Upon receiving the HK Req. message, the seiwing AR needs to verify the M N’s CoA 
carried in the message. If  the CoA is valid, ARi foiwards the HK Req. message to the 
enhanced node.
3. The enhanced node, as an AAA client, initiates an AAA request message, encapsulating the 
infoi*mation in the HK Req. message. Apart from the information in HK Req. message, the 
following information is added to the AAA request message by the enhanced node:
the number of the ARs which belong to the enhanced node domain {NumAns) and the ID of each
AR    which is the IP address of all ARs as seen by MN.
4. Upon receiving the AAA request message, the HKS should first validate MN-HKS MAC 
option using the HIK it shares with the MN. If the authentication and authorization is 
successful, the HKS then proceeds to take the following actions;
a. The HKS generates a set of HKs/lceying materials. A nonce is needed for each of the ARs,
thus, n nonces are generated: Nhksj .^  ^ hksj.^  , ^ h ksji  ^ where Nhksjl denotes
the nonce generated for HK between MN and A R i. The nonces will be used in the HK
generation correspondingly. The HKS also generates n keys: HI<i, HI<2 >....... , since n
different session keys are required to be shared between MN and n ARs. Where, HI<i (i~I, ...n) 
is the handover key to be shared between MN and ARi .
b. The HKS sends a AAA response message to the enhanced node. It includes n nonces
generated by the HKS, n freshly generated HKs: HI<i, Hl<2 ,....... , HI<n, and a result code
indicating whether the authentication is successful or not.
5. Upon receiving the AAA response message, the enhanced node should take different actions 
for the seiwing AR iAR{) and all other ARs (AR2 ,  ..... .. AR^) in its domain.
a. The enhanced node sends handover key response (HK Reps.) message to the serving AR. The 
following information is included in this message:
i. The message ID {ID^sg) earned in the HK Req. message to identify it is the response
to the particular HK Req. message MN initiated.
ii. The CoA of the MN, which is carried in the HK Req. message.
iii. The pseudo random function (PRF) algorithm that the HKS uses for key generation.
iv. The M N’s ID (10^^), as earned in the HK Req. message.
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V. The result code indicating the result of the HK Req. message.
vi. The SPI that can be used to index eveiy key
vii. The Key/keying materials: the HK for ARi'. HK^ and all of the nonces that MN needs 
to derive the HKs: Nhks_2 , ........., ^h k s j i’
The enhanced node also sends the HKs: HK2 , , HKn with its SPI, to the corresponding
ARs: AR2 ,  , ARn- This can be secured by the SA existed between the EN and all ARs in
its domain.
MN ServingARI AR2 AR3 .......  ARn
Enhanced Node 
(AAA Client)
HKS 
(AAA Server)
fH M K
(?'HIK 1 i
H M K #
HIK
Handover Key Request: 
CoA, N_MN, PRF, 
ID_MN, ID_MSG, 
MN-HKS MAC
IfandoveriKey Request:
MN-HKS MAC i AAA Request (CoA, N_MN, PRF, ID MN, ID MSG. 
MN-HKS MAC, Num_ARs, ID_ARi)
Validate MAC 
Generate HKs/ f  ** 
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1 i Deeiypt HKs g
AAA Response 
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andoven Key Response:
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Figure 5.5 Signalling o f  the enhanced key managem ent schem e for securing the handover process
6. Having received a HK Resp. message with a successful result code, the serving AR (ARj^) 
stores HK-i received from the enhanced node. The also sends the HK Resp. message to 
the MN. It includes the following information in this message:
the message ID MN’s CoA, the PRF which HKS confirms to use for key generation,
result code indicating whether HK Request is successful or not, SPIs to index the HKs, the keying
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material which MN needs to derive the HKs: Nhks_u   , ^ hksji  ^ and a MN-AR MAC
calculated by AR^ using HK^.
Making use of the keying materials obtained, the MN derives all o f the HKs: HK-i, HK2 ,  ,
HKj^, and validates the MN-AR MAC using HKi. Therefore, the group of HKs: HI<2 , ........ ,
HK^, is available to secure the future handovers between ARs within this enhanced node domain.
In the proposed scheme, the MN is authenticated and authorized when it first enters an 
enhanced node domain. The MN now obtains all o f the HKs that are possible to be used in the 
handovers within one enhanced node domain. Therefore, when the MN performs handoff, it is not 
necessaiy to generate HK eveiy time the MN changes point o f attachment. The HKs can be used 
to secure the handover signalling between MN - AR-Enhanced Node. The “signalling” here, does 
not only mean the mobility massages, but also the QoS messages, such as QoS combined BU.
5.3.2 Details on Key Derivation
As discussed in section 5.3.1, two types of keys needs to be derived based on the master key 
shared between MN and the HKS: HIK and HKs. The key generation details will be provided in 
this section.
An adaptation of pseudo-random function (prf+) defined in [44] is used here as the key 
derivation method. The function is termed as “Generalized PRF+ (gprf+)” and it is defined in [86] 
as follows,
gprf+ (key, string) = T1 | T2 j T3 ...
where, “j” indicates concatenation ; T1 = PRF (key, stiing | Y); T2 = PRF (key, T1 j string | Y+1); 
T3 = PRF (key, T2 | string | Y+2). It continues as many times as needed to compute all required 
keys. The keys are taken from the output string depending on the length of the key required.
5.3.2.1 Derivation of HIK
The gprf+ is used as follows to derive the HIK as defined in [86] :
HIK = gprf+ (key, string);
Input values: key = HMK; string = “Handover Integrity Key”; Y = IDj^ sg i» hex
The string “Handover Integrity Key” is a 22-character ASCII string without null teimination. The 
value of Y is the message ID carried in HK Req. message. The use of ID ^sg allows HIK to be 
different every time the gprf+ is computed. According to the requirements in section 5.2.3, the
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session keys should be freshly generated and used only for one purpose. This usually involves a 
changing parameter “nonce”. However, the MN and the HKS only shares the HMK at the stage of 
HIK generation, it is necessary to involve a changing parameter so that the HIK can be different 
every time when it is used. The use of ID^sg ensures that the HIK is fresh and new for eveiy HK 
Req./HK Resp. exchange.
5.3.2.2 Derivation of HK
The gprf+ is also used to derive the HK as defined in [86] . Let HKi denote the HK
shared between MN and AR( . And HKi ean be derived as follows,
HKi = gprf+(key, string);
Input values: key = HMK; string | Nh^sj  I  I I  “Handover Key”; Y -  0x0000
The string “Handover Key” is a 12-character ASCII string without null termination. is the 
nonce generated by the MN and transmitted to the HKS through HK Req. message. N^ks i is the 
nonce generated by the HKS and to be used for generation of HI<i. Nonce N^ks t is 
communicated to the MN through HK Resp. message. /Dmw is the NAI of the MN. And is 
the IP address of the corresponding A R i .
It can be noticed that among the keying materials, i and IDar. are the two sets of 
information which the MN does not own. The i is generated by the HKS, and must be 
transported to the MN through HK Resp. message. However, it might not be necessary to send 
IDari  ^ of all ARs in the enhanced node domain in the HK Resp. message, as this would 
unavoidably result in large signalling overhead. To solve this problem, the MN can use IDar. 
transmitted in a RtAdv. message. Since RtAdv. message is sent out before the MIP location 
update signallings, the MN is still able to generate the HK before the handover is performed. It is 
assumed that SPI is included in the RtAdv. message, so that the MN can figure out which Nfj^s i 
should be used to generate the handover key for particular AR.
It is assumed that the enhanced node maintains a table, as shown in Table 5.1, to index the
keys/keying materials. It generates an index table for each MN entering its domain. When the
enhanced node receives a HK Req. from a MN, it automatically creates a table of n x 5, where n
is the number of ARs in its domain. The enhanced node puts the index number in the first column,
and the IDarj in the second column. In the AAA request message, the enhanced node should put
the the IDarj in corresponding AVP in the same sequence as listed in its index table. The HKS
generates nonces and HKs for the corresponding AR, and also puts them in the same order in the
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AAA response message as IDarj the AAA request message. Therefore, the enhance node 
would be able to match right nonce and HK to corresponding AR, and put them in the index table. 
Upon receiving the AAA response message, the enhanced node also allocate SPI for the 
key/keying materials. As shown in the table, the SPI is placed in the last column. The SPli can be 
used to index corresponding N^ksj and HKi, The enhanced node does not need to keep record of 
index table, thus, once the MN leaves the enhanced node domain, the index table for this MN 
would be deleted.
Index AR’s ID N_HKS HK SPI
1 ^^AR_l ^HKS_1 HK^ 5P/i
2 ^^AR_2 ^HKSJZ HK2
3 ^Dar_3 ^HKS_3 S P h
n ^Darji ^HKSjl H K n S PI n
Table 5.1 Index table at the enhanced node, which contains /i ARs in its domain
5.3.3 Syntax and Semantics of the Messages
5.3.3.1 Handover Key Request/Response Message
The HK Request message is initiated by the MN, and forwarded by the serving AR to its 
enhanced node. In order to carry the HK Req. message, a new type of mobility header needs to be 
introduced. The format of the mobility header which carries the HK Req. message is similar to 
that as defined in [86] with minor modification.
1 2  3 4 5 6 7  8 1 2 3 4  5  6 7 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Message ID PRF Reserved
Care-of-Address
Mobility Options
Figure 5.6 Handover Key Request message form at 
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The message fields shown in Figure 5.6 are explained as follows,
- Message ID: I-byte value to identify the HK Req. message. And it remains the same in the HK. 
Resp. message.
- PRF: a 2 bit field indicating the PRF algorithm that MN advises to use for HIK and HK 
generation. Different value is assigned to different algorithm. For instance, when PRF field is 
set to “1”, it suggests HMAC-SHAl would be used.
- Reserved: Resei’ved field for future use. It is set to 0 if not used.
- CoA: 16-byte field containing the MN’s CoA
- Mobility Options: This field with variable length might contain one or more mobility options 
that are defined separately for different purposes. Since HK Req. message needs to cany 
MN’s Nonce, MN’ ID and the MN-HKS MAC as described in section 5.3.1, three mobility 
options need to be defined. It is named as Nonce mobility option, MN Identifier mobility 
option and MAC mobility option, which will be explained in detail in the following sections.
The Handover Key Response message (HK Resp.) message is sent from enhanced node to AR
and from AR to MN. In order to carry the HK Req. message, a new type of mobility header needs
to be introduced.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3  4  5 6  7  8 1 2  3 4  5 6  7  8
Message ID F PRF Reserved
Result Code Lifetime
Mobility Options
Figure 5.7 Handover K ey Response message format 
The message fields shown in Figure 5.7 are explained as follows,
Message ID: 8-byte value to identify the message. And it should match the Message ID field 
sent in the HK Req. message to indicate that it is the response to the HK Req. message.
F: One bit flag to identify the type of HK Resp. message. As HK Resp. messages with 
different message field are sent from enhanced node to AR and from AR to MN, the type flag 
is required to identify it. If the type flag is set to 0, it indicates the message is the HK Resp. 
sent from the enhanced node to the AR. If the type flag is set to 1, it indicates the message is 
the HK Resp. sent from the AR to the MN.
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- PRF: a 2 bit field indicating the PRF algorithm that the HKS used for key generation. If the 
HKS uses the algorithm suggested in the HK Req. message by the MN. The PRF field in the 
HK Resp. message should be set be the same value as the PRF field in HK Req. message. If 
the HKS does not use the algorithm proposed by the MN, the value of PRF indicates the 
algorithm that HKS used. In this scenario, it is mandatory for the MN to use this algorithm. If 
the key generation algorithm is not agreed, it results a failure in the result code.
- Reserved: Reserved field for future use. It is set to 0 if not used.
- Result Code: One byte field indicating the result of HK request. Value of “0” indicates the
success, in terms of authentication and key generation. Other values of the code can be
assigned to failure with different reasons, such as authentication of the MN failure, PRF 
algorithm agreement failure (HKS does not agree to use the PRF algorithm proposed by the 
MN), etc.
- Lifetime: two bytes field indicating the lifetime (in seconds) of the HKs.
- Mobility Options: This field with variable length might contain one or more mobility options 
that are defined respectively for different purposes. The HK Resp, message with different 
“Flag” values contains different mobility options. With Flag value set to 0, the mobility 
options should at least contain Nonce mobility option to carry the Nonces generated by the 
HKS and HK mobility option to carry the HK to the serving AR. With Flag value set to 1, the 
mobility options must at least contain Nonce mobility option to carry the nonces MN needs to 
generate HKs and MAC mobility option to carry the MN-AR MAC sent from the serving AR 
to the MN.
S.3.3.2 New Mobility Options
As described in section 5.3.3.1, new mobility options, which are included in the HK 
Req./Resp. messages, need to be defined. Four different types of mobility options were 
mentioned: Nonce mobility option, MN identifier mobility option, MAC mobility option and HK 
mobility option. They will be explained in detail in this section.
1. Nonce Mobility Option
The Nonce mobility option is defined to carry nonce generated by the MN or the HKS. It needs 
to be included in both of the HK Req. and HK Resp. messages.
The fields of Nonce mobility option shown in Figure 5.8 are explained as follows,
- Type: one-byte field to identify the type of the mobility option: “handover nonce”
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- Length: two-byte field representing the length (in bytes) of the messages fields excluding 
“Type” field.
- Subtype: one-byte field indicating the type of Nonce mobility option.
“0”: it carries nonce generated by the MN. It is included in the HK Req. message. In this 
subtype value, a few fields in the mobility option are not used and set to 0. These fields include 
“Number”, “SPI Lgth”, “Reseived” and “SPI”.
“ 1”: it carries a number of nonces generated by the HKS. It is included in the HK Resp. 
message.
- Number: one-byte field indicating the number of nonces carried in this mobility option. If
subtype is set to 1, the value of “number” is 1. If subtype is set to 2, the value of “number”
should be equal to the number of ARs in this enhanced node domain.
- SPI Lgth: one-byte field indicating the length of each SPI in bytes. Although the default length 
of SPI is four bytes, this field allows flexible length of SPI to be chosen by the enhanced node.
- Nonce Lgth: one-byte field indicating the length of each nonce carried in this mobility option.
- Reserved: one-byte reserved field for future use. It is set to 0 if not used.
- SPI: SPI is a four byte security parameter index to identify the key/keying materials.
For instance, particular SPIi can be used to identify the nonce generated by the HKS to derive
HI<i and the handover key H/fj. This fields carries all SPI^ ( i = l , n )  : SPI^, SPI2 , ....... , SPIn,
which is used to index the corresponding nonce generated by HKS: Nhkst.^  , n-
- Nonce: this field carries nonce generated either by the MN or the HKS for the purpose of HK 
generation. With “subtype” set to 1, it carries one nonce generated by the MN. With “subtype”
set to 2, it carries n nonces generated by the HKS: ^ hksji  ^ .......» ^ hksji- The n
nonces are arranged in the order as the SPIs, so that the nonce can be indexed by 
corresponding SPI at the MN.
1 2  3 4  5 6  7  8 1 2  3 4  5 6  7  8 1 2 3 4  5 6  7  8 1 2  3 4  5 6  7  8
Type Length Subtype
Number SPI Lgth Nonce Lgth Reserved
SPI
Nonce
Figure 5.8 Nonce mobility option 
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2. MN identifier mobility option
The MN identifier mobility option is used to carry the MN’s ID, which is the NAI. The MN 
identifier mobility option is defined in RFC 4283 [89], thus, there is no need to introduce new 
mobility option here. As defined in RFC 4283, the MN-NAI mobility option is used to identify 
the MN. It uses an identifier of the form “user@realm”, with the name of network access 
identifier (NAI), which is introduced in [90].
3. MAC mobility option
The MAC mobility option is defined to carry the MAC value and related information. In the 
HK Req. message, it carries the MN-HKS MAC. In the HK Resp. message with “F” value set to 1, 
the MN-AR MAC needs to be carried in the MAC mobility option. And the MAC mobility option 
is not included in the HK Resp. message if the “F” value is equal to 0. This mobility option is 
defined in [86] and can be used here.
1 2  3 4  5 6  7 8 1 2  3 4  5 6  7  8 1 2  3 4  5 6  7  8 1 2  3 4  5 6  7 8
Type Length Subtype Reserved Alg
MAC Value
Figure 5.9 M AC mobility option [861
The fields of Nonce mobility option shown in Figure 5.9 are explained as follows.
Type: one-byte field to identify the type of the mobility option: “MAC”
Length: one-byte field representing the length (in bytes) of the mobility option excluding the 
“Type” field
Subtype: one-byte field indicating the type of MAC this mobility option carries. Value of “0” 
indicates that it contains the MN-HKS MAC (HK Req. message). And value of “ I” means that 
it contains the MN-AR MAC (HK Resp. message).
Reserved: 5-bit reserved field for future use. It is set to 0 if not used.
Alg: 3-bit field indicating the type of algorithm used for MAC calculation. In order to validate 
the MAC, the receiver must use the algorithm that the sender used to calculate the MAC. 
Therefore, it is mandatory for the receiver to use the algorithm indicated in “Alg” field. If the 
algorithm is not supported at the receiver, the authentication will fail and a failure code will be 
included in the HK Resp. message. “Alg” value of “ 1” suggests HMAC-SHAl, which is the 
default algorithm, was used in the MAC calculation.
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- MAC Value: this field carries the value of MAC. Two different MAC options may be included 
in this field: MN-HKS MAC option and MN-AR MAC option. The MN-HKS MAC is 
calculated using the HIK. And the MN-AR MAC option is calculated using the HK, which is 
shared by the MN and the serving AR. If HMAC-SHAl is used as the algorithm, MAC can be 
calculated as follows,
MN-HKS MAC= HMAC-SHAl (HIK, mobility header data);
MN-AR MAC= HMAC-SHAl (HK, mobility header data);
where, mobility header data is the content of corresponding mobility header message up to and 
including “Alg” field in the MAC mobility option.
4. HK mobility option
The HK mobility option is defined to carry HK from enhanced node to the MN’s seiving AR in 
the HK Resp. message. It only needs to be included in HK Resp. message with “F” value set to 0.
The fields of Nonce mobility option shown in Figure 5.10 are explained as follows.
1 2  3 4  5 6  7  8 1 2  3 4  5 6  7  8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Type Length SPI
SPI Reserved
HK
Figure 5.10 HK mobility option
Type: one-byte field to identify the type of the mobility option: “handover key”
Length: one-byte field representing the length (in bytes) of the mobility option excluding the 
“Type” field
SPI: four-byte field to carry the SPI which indexes the handover key carried in this mobility 
option
Reserved: two-byte reserved field for future use. It is set to 0 if not used.
HK: Variable length field that carries the handover key. As the HK Reps. Message is sent 
from the enhanced node to the serving AR, the HK to be shared between the seiving AR and 
MN is included in this mobility option. It is assumed in section 5.2.2 that SA exists between 
the enhanced node and all ARs in its domain. To secure the handover key delivery, it could be 
an encrypted HK that is carried in this field.
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S.3.3.3 AAA Request/Response Message
The DIAMETER applications extend the DIAMETER base protocol which only defines the 
minimum requirements for an AAA protocol, by introducing new commands and/or AVPs. As 
DIAMETER has been engaged in integrating with Mobile IP protocols, many DIAMETER 
applications, such as DIAMETER Mobile IPv4/v6 applications, have been standardized by AAA 
working group in IETF. Based on the good efforts made on DIAMETER/MIP integrated 
application, it is promising to involve AAA infrastructure in solving the security issues related to 
Mobile IP. This is because a large amount of AVPs have been defined in DIAMETER MIPv4/v6 
applications, and AAA also provides the ability to introduce new AVPs which can be used to 
carry specific information. The Diameter protocol is designed to be extensible in terms of defining 
new AVPs, although reuse of existing AVPs is strongly recommended.
DIAMTER Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) application defined in RFC 4072 [91], 
enables the encapsulation of EAP packets in DIAMTER by introducing new commands and 
AVPs. Since the definition of new command codes and AVPs must be approved by Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (lANA), it is not desired to go too far on saying that new 
DIAMETER application is defined for this “handover key distribution” scenario. However, it is 
believed that DIAMETER can provide the functionality to encapsulate other message and perform 
authentication.
In the proposed solution, the HKS is supposed to be collocated with AAA server, thus, AAA 
protocol is used to transport request message from enhanced node to HKS. It is assumed that 
“DIAMETER-HK-Request” command and “DIAMETER-HK-Response” command exist as the 
AAA request and AAA response message. In the DIAMETER-HK-Request, it includes the 
information in the HK Req. message (CoA, PRF, IDmsg-> MN-HKS MAC) and the 
information added by the enhanced that the HKS would need for key generation (N uitlars, 
IDarj ). In order to encapsulate the payloads, new AVPs are needed in the
DIAMETER-HK-Request command:
- HKReq-Payload AVP: It is used to encapsulate the HK Req. sent from AR to the enhanced 
node.
- Num-AR AVP: It is used to carry Nutrars added by the enhanced node. By checking this 
AVP, the HKS would be able to decide the number of handover key to be generated for this 
particular AAA request.
- AR-IP AVP: It is a grouped AVP which is used to carry lDARj{i=l,...,n). W ar i is one of the
keying materials that the HKS uses to generate HKs between i4/?f and MN. As defined in [31],
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a gi’ouped AVP is an AVP whose data is a sequence of AVPs. Diameter protocol allows AVP 
values of type ’grouped’, which implies that the data field is actually a sequence of AVPs. As it 
is required that the IP address of each AR within the enhanced node domain needs to be 
transported to the HKS, a grouped AVP is necessary here.
NAS-IPv6-Address AVP defined in section 9.3.2 of RFC 4005 [92] can be used to carry each 
IDarJ ‘ And n of the same types in sequence should be included in the grouped AVP to 
include all IDa r j .
In the AAA response message, DIAMETER-HK-Response command is used to carry the
following information sent by the HKS to the enhanced node:
PRF, Nuksj, HKi, Key Lifetime, Result Code,
Therefore, the DIAMETER-HK-Response command must contain the following AVPs:
- MlP-Algorithm-Type AVP (AVP code 345): It can be used to indicate the algorithm that the 
HKS used to generate HKs. It is defined in section 9.8 of RFC 4004 [36] and can be reused 
here to transport “PRF” info from the HKS to the enhanced node.
- MIP-Nonces AVP: It is a grouped AVP which is used to carry nonces generated by the HKS: 
Nhksj- MIP-Nonce AVP (AVP code 335) defined in section 9.12 of RFC 4004 [36] can be 
used to carry each Nhksj- And n of the same types in sequence should be included in this 
grouped AVP to include all Nn^sj- Please be noted that the sequence should be in accordance 
with the sequence of IDarj AR-IP-AVP, so that the enhance node would be match i 
to the correct AR.
- MIP-Session-Keys AVP: It is a grouped AVP which is used to cany HKs generated by the 
HKS: HKi. The HKs can be secured using SA existed in the AAA infrastructure. MlP-Session- 
Key AVP (AVP code 343) defined in section 9.7 of RFC 4004 [36] can be used to carry each 
HKi. Similar to the MIP-Nonces AVP, each AVP to carry particular HK should be placed in a 
sequence according to the AVPs in AR-IP-AVP.
- MIP-MSA-Lifetime AVP (AVP code 367): It can be used to represent the period of time (in 
seconds) for which the nonces/HKs are valid. It is defined in section 9.13 of RFC 4004 [36].
- Result-Code AVP (AVP code 268): It is defined in RFC 3588 [31] and can be used to indicate 
the processing result, such as result of validating MN-HKS MAC, result of HK generation, etc. 
In this AVP, one value is assigned to indicate “success”, and other values are assigned to 
suggest different reasons of “failure”, such as failure to validate MAC, failure to use the PRF 
algorithm proposed by MN for key generation, etc.
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5.4 Analytical Models
In this section, the network model [68] and mobility models [68] used to evaluate the signalling 
cost of the proposed mechanism will be explained in detail.
5.4.1 Network and Mobility Models
Two different mobility models are used to model the user’s mobility pattern: fluid flow model 
and random walk model as explained in chapter 4. They are used in this section with different 
network layout to evaluate the performance of the proposed solution.
5.4.1.1 Fluid flow model
Network Layout
In order to analyze the signalling load, the following network model (Figure 5.11) is assumed.
First Layer Node, 
such as Enhanced 
Node (EN )
Second Layer Node  
Such as AR, HA, CN
Figure 5 .11 Network model consisting o f two layers o f nodes
1. The network is a simple two-layer hierarchical model, as illustrated in Figure 5.11. The first 
layer has a mesh network topology. The enhanced node is first layer node. The second layer 
has a tree topology with the depth of 1. The AR, HA and CN are second layer node. The MN, 
CN and HA are located in different network domains.
2. The link hops between the first layer nodes is a, and the link hops between the first and 
second layer nodes in the same network domain is h. The ratio of the network scale is defined 
to be r=b/a.
3. MN is connected to the AR through hops of wireless link. And the unit transmission cost 
over a wireless link is assumed to be k times of the unit transmission cost over a wired link.
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Markov chain model
^ 1,2 ‘^ 2,3 a K-\,K
Figure 5.12 A continuous-tim e Markov chain model {68|
Figure 5.12 shows a continuous-time Markov chain model, which describes the movement 
pattern of an MN. The state of a continuous-time Markov chain model, i (i > 0), is defined as the 
number of AR domains (subnets) where an MN has stayed within an enhanced node domain. For 
example, state 2 indicates that MN has stayed in 2 AR domains within a given EN. And the state 0 
represents that the MN stays out of the given enhanced node domain. The transition rate 
a  ^  1) represents the MN’s movement rate to a neighbouring AR within a given domain. 
And the transition rate ocg  ^ represents the MN’s movement rate to an AR within a given domain 
from out of this domain. On the other hand, q (i ^  1)represents the MN’s movement rate to 
another domain from the given domain. It is also assumed that the MN moves out of a given 
domain within the maximum of K movements (K is a finite number).
I assume a fluid flow model, explained in section 4.5.2.1, for the MN’s movement pattern. The 
parameters used are summarized as follows,
- j: the movement rate for an MN out of an AR domain
- X: the movement rate for an MN out of an AR domain within a given enhanced node domain
- p: the movement rate for an MN out of a given enhanced node domain
From Eq. 4-7, the movement rate y for an MN out of an AR domain can be expressed as.
r  = 2v Eq. 5-1
where S is the AR area. It is assumed that an enhanced node domain is composed of N(K) ARs, 
as defined in Eq. 4-1, therefore, the movement rate p for an MN out of a given enhanced node 
domain is.
2v
^7tN (K )S
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Because the MN moves out of a given enhanced node domain also moves out of an AR domain, 
the movement rate X for an MN out of an AR within a given enhanced node domain can be 
derived from Eq. 5-1 and Eq. 5-2 as.
2. = / - / /  = ( ! - 1 ) /  Eq. 5-3
Therefore, the parameters and oCg i, Pi q in Figure 5.12 can be expressed as,
^ i j + i  0  — 0  — » <^ 0,1 “  A .o ~  M  Eq. 5-4
It is assumed that Ui is the equilibrium probability of state i. And the following equations can 
be obtained,
K
j u n Q = ^  j L l Y ^ T t ,  Eq. 5-5
(=1
= ( A + / /)  7T,., i = \  Eq. 5-6
À T T j  =   ^A +  ^ i +\> 2  ^  <  Æ — 1 Eq. 5-7
~  J L lT t j , i  —  K  Eq. 5-8
By the law of the total probability, the sum of the probabilities of all states is 1. Thus,
K
;To +  ;Tj +  ;r, + . . .  +  ^  =  1 Eq. 5-9
From Eq.5-5 and Eq. 5-9, it can be obtained that ttq — 1/2.
From Eq. 5-6, Eq. 5-7, Eq. 5-8 and Eq. 5-9, Tti can be derived as.
_j_ 
2
U M2 /I + //
\ (  À
À + ju
it'i=0
if  1 < i < K-1
Eq. 5-10
if  i=K2\À  + f.i
Substituting Eq. 5-1, Eq. 5-2 and Eq. 5-3 into Eq. 5-10, tci can be expressed as.
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if  i=0
N /-I
1 —
Eq. 5-11
1—X 2
nM
1 - ifi=K
Let ç>(K) be the average number of ARs that the MN stays within a given enhanced node 
domain. can be calculated as follows,
=  2 n ^  +  3;t3 + . . .  +  K n ^  -  ^  Eq. 5-12
Substituting Eq. 5-11 into Eq. 5-12, (p{K) can be expressed as,
<p{K) = U^ 1 - 1 Eq. 5-13
Signalling Cost
Based on the mobility model and network model, I derive the signalling load, including the 
security cost and mobility cost, which is location update cost, generated by an MN during its 
average domain residence time.
(I) Mobility Signalling Cost
In order to derive the mobility signalling cost, I differentiate the location update messages as 
follows,
Binding Update (BU), which is generated by MN when it crosses the AR domain.
Binding Acknowledgement (BA), which is the acknowledgement message for BU or BR 
message.
Binding Refresh (BR), which is periodically generated when the binding lifetime expires.
The expressions used in the location update cost calculation are summarized as follows,
Lh m i p - Location update cost in HMIP 
BUhmip' BU/BA cost in HMIPv6 
BR cost in HMIPv6 
BUpj^: BU/BA cost to register with the enhanced node
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BUfiA - BU/BA cost to register with HA 
BUqn: BU/BA cost to register with CN
BRx: cost for BR sent from entity X. For example, is the cost of BR sent by HA.
The MN sends BU message to HA and CNs when it handovers across the EN domain, while it 
only updates the EN when it performs handover between ARs within one EN domain. Thus, the 
BU cost can be derived as follows,
B  U h m h ' ~ ^ 0   ^ (B  ^  e n  B U  + N  x  5  U (AT )  — 1 )  x B  U  Eq. 5-14
where, Ncn is the average number of CNs when an MN moves into out of a given enhanced node 
domain. The BU cost to EN, HA and CN can be derived as,
+ Eq.5-15
+ + Eq.S-16
B [/^ = (B P P ^ + B P ^ ^ )x (a  + 26)4-2x(BP%^+RP^g")x%'xw^ Eq.5-17
Here, represents the signalling bandwidth consumption generated by a BU message to 
entity x (EN, HA or CN), and B W ^ ^  represents the signalling bandwidth consumption generated 
by a BA message from entity x (EN, HA or CN) as response to corresponding BU. It is assumed 
that both of MN and CN are connected to the network through wireless links. And it is also 
assumed that all of the EN, HA and CN return BA messages to the MN.
The signalling cost for BR messages can be represented as below,
BR„^„. = + BR^„ x i p { K ) x ^  Eq. 5-18
h c N  ^ H A  U 'N
And, B R x  can be calculated as below,
B R ^  =  B W ^ j ^ x b  +  B W ^ ^  XATX w j  Eq. 5-19 
B R p ^  =  B x { a  +  2 b )  +  B W S , f x K X  W j  Eq. 5-20
BR .^  ^ = BIK^f X(a +  2 b ) + 2 x B B ^ ;^  x k x W j  Eq. 5-21
where, B W g p  is the signalling bandwidth consumption generated by a BR message sent by entity 
X (EN, HA or CN). In Eq. 5-18, and T c n  are the binding lifetimes for the enhanced node,
the HA and the CNs, respectively, tsub k  the MN’s average AR residence time. Therefore, the
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average rate of sending BR message to the enhanced node is Similarly, the average rates of
sending BR message to the HA and the CN are g % respectively.^ isI ‘ H A  J L T c n  j
the ratio of an MN’s average binding time for the CNs to its average domain residence time.
From Eq. 5-1, tgub can be expressed as,
 ^ Eq. 5-22
2v
The location update cost is the sum of BU/BA cost and BR cost, thus,
~  H M IP  ^ ^ H M I P  Eq. 5-23
Substituting Eq. 5-14 and Eq. 5-18 to Eq. 5-23, the total location update cost can be obtained.
(2) Security Signalling Cost
Let Spre and denote the security cost in previous security mechanism and in the proposed 
security mechanism. In the previous security mechanism, handover key request needs to be 
performed every time the MN changes AR, while it is only performed once when the MN changes 
the EN domain, in the proposed mechanism. Therefore, Sp^ -e and 5en can be expressed as below, 
similar to Eq. 5-14;
S , r .  = X (U .T , + y r .% )+  { f  {K  ) -  l ) x  { U l "  + [ / C r )  EO-5-24
■S’„ = * r . x ( u ' : ,  +  C/“ „ )  E q.S-25
where, and I/^esp represent the security cost for handover key request and handover key 
response in previous mechanism. And and represent the security cost for handover 
key request and handover key response in the proposed mechanism.
a. Scenario 1: HKS located in the home domain
If the HKS is located in the home domain, for instance, HKS is collocated with the AAAH 
server, the parameters in Eq. 5-24 and Eq. 5-25 can be calculated as below,
U Z  =  x (a  + è) Eq. 5-26
x b + B W Z r ^ . A ^ + b )  E q .5-27
K . ,  = x /cx w , - h S r »  x6 + 81P% ,^, x{a  + b) Eq. 5-28
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xb^[N{K)-\)xBW -^^^, x{a+b)
Eq. 5-29
where, BVl^^^and BWP' represent the signalling bandwidth consumption generated by message 
X in the previous mechanism and in the proposed mechanism, respectively. The relevant
parameters in Eq. 5-26, Eq. 5-27, Eq. 5-28 and Eq. 5-29 are listed and explained as follows,
^^HKReq' signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the HK Req. message (MN*^AR 
and AR^EN) in previous mechanism.
BW^XRespi • signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the HK Req. message
(AR-^MN) in previous mechanism.
^^HKResp2 ■ signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the HK Req. message
(EN->AR) in previous mechanism.
^^AAAReq ' signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the AAA Req. message 
(EN->HKS) in previous mechanism.
^^AAAResp • signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the AAA Resp. message 
( H K S EN) in previous mechanism.
BWpKReq' signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the HK Req. message (MN->AR 
and AR->EN) in the proposed mechanism.
BW^KRespi- signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the HK Resp. message (serving 
AR-^MN) in the proposed mechanism.
BW^}lggsp2 ■ signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the HK Resp. message 
(EN-^serving AR) in the proposed mechanism.
BWpxResp3 : signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the HK Resp. message 
(EN-Mother ARs in the EN domain, except for the serving AR) in the proposed mechanism. 
BW^AAReq • signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the AAA Req. message 
( E N HKS) in the proposed mechanism.
BWaaarbsp : signalling bandwidth consumption generated by the AAA Resp. message
( H K S EN) in the proposed mechanism.
b. Scenario 2: HKS located in the visiting domain
If the HKS is located in the visiting domain, for instance, HKS is collocated with the local 
AAAF server, the parameters in Eq. 5-24 and Eq. 5-25 can be calculated as below,
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+  8 ^ % , ,  X b + X S ,  Eq. 5-30 
U Z r  =  +  S F ^ r .^ , X 6 + X 3 ,  Eq. 5-31
%  = 5 l^ * R = ,X 2 f X W „ + 8 > F “ , „ , x 6  +  8 » a l ^ , X 3 ,  E q.5-32
Xè + ( i V W - 1 ) X X è -k8fC^Re.„ x 3,  
Eq. 5-33
where, is number of hops that HKS is located away from the enhanced node. And all the other 
parameters are the same as explained in scenario 1.
Parameters Value is provided in Table II in Appendix C. Some of the parameter values are 
from [68],
5.4.1.2 Random walk model
Grid Network Layout
A grid (square) network model [93], as illustrated in Figure 5.13, is considered in the analysis. 
It is assumed that the coverage of the mobile network is divided into cells and the cells are non­
overlapping, with equal size and rectangular shape. Figure 5.13 (I) shows a mobile network 
model with 3 x 3  cells. The central cell is numbered as “0”. And the other cells are labelled by the 
distance of this cell from the cell “0”. The distance between two cells represents the minimum 
number of movements that is required for an MN to move from one cell to the other one. Thus, 
the distance between two cells with coordinates (%i,yi) and (%2 ,yz) is |%i — + lyi — yzl, as
shown in Figure 5.13 (2). Each cell has four neighbouring cells, to which an MN is possible to 
move to in one movement.
3
3 2 3
3 2 1 2 3
3 2 1 0 1 2 3
3 2 1 2 3
3 2 3
(*2,y2)3
( 1) (2)
Figure 5.13 Network Model. (1) Grid Network M odel, in which cell is labelled by the distance to 
the centre cell “0”; (2) Distance between cells with coordinates (x l ,  y l)  and (x2, y2)
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I consider the cell of the serving enhanced node of an MN as cell “0”. A cell labelled with is 
the cell that is of distance i away from the centre cell.
I define as a (d + 1) x (d + 1) transition matrix. Element PA (0 <  i ,j < d) in the matrix 
represents the probability of a MN moving from a distance-/ cell to a distance^/ cell in n 
movements, where d is the movement threshold. When n = 1, P^ can be represented as follows.
^ 0 , 0 « 0 ,1 « 0 , 2 « 0 ,£ /
« 1 .0 « 1 .1 « 1 ,2 • • •  « ! ,£ /
« ( / - l . l « f / - l , 2 « £ / - ] ,£ /
_ « < / ,0 « r / . t « £ / ,2 « £ /.£ /
Eq. 5-34
where, Ui j  is the probability of moving from distance-/ cell to distance-/ cell in exactly one 
movement. Then for 1 < n < d, P^ can be represented below,
Eq.s.3 5
And Pq j (0 < j  < n) is the probability that the current AR is of distance j  away from the 
enhanced node after n movements.
In the grid network layout, two different mobility patterns are considered in this section: 
directional model, in which the mobile user moves towards one direction, and rectangular model, 
in which the mobile user can move to all of its neighbouring cells. These two random walk 
models will be explained in detail in the following sections.
Directional Random Walk model
Directional walk model [94] is suitable for mobile vehicle users in the “Manhattan” style street 
layout. It is assumed that a MN moves towards one direction only in the directional model. 
Therefore, the MN moves to the next cell on its direction with a probability of 1, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.14 (1). ag- can be presented as follows.
_  / 1  i f i + l = j  
i , J  ^ 0  o th e r w is e  Eq. 5-36
And P^ can be expressed as below.
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P'.=
0 I 0 0 0 ••• ... 0 0 o'
0 0 1 0 0 ... ... 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 ... ... 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 ... ... 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ... ... 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ... ... 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 ... ... 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 ... ... 0 0 1
Eq. 5-37
The state transition diagram for directional model is shown in Figure 5.15 (1). Transition 
probability from state / to j  is the probability that the mobile user moves from distance-/ cell to 
distance-y cell in one movement. States 0 to n-1 are transient states while state n is an absorbing 
state.
# - 1 1
1/4t
1/4^" ^1 /4
T1/4
( 1 ) (2)
1/6
1/6 1/6
1/6 1/6
1/6
(3)
Figure 5.14 M N ’s walk model (1) Directional W alk Model; (2) Rectangular W alk Model; (3)
Hexagonal W alk Model
Rectangular Random Walk Model
The rectangular random walk model [93] [94], is suitable for pedestrian mobile users. In the 
rectangular model, a MN moves to one of its four neighbouring cells with equal probability of 
1/4, as shown in Figure 5.14 (2). a ij can be presented as follows.
2 / + 1
4/
2 / - 1
4/
i= 0 , j = l  
i> 0 , j = i + 1
i> 0 , j= i - l  
oth erw ise
Eq. 5-38
And can be expressed as below.
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P. =
■ 0 I 0 0 0 ■ 0 0 0
1/4 0 3/4 0 0 • 0 0 0
0 3/8 0 5/8 0 • 0 0 0
0 0 5/12 0 7/12 • 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 ■ 2{d~\)-\4(i/-l) 0
l{d-\) + \ 
4(c/-l)
_ 0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 1
Eq. 5-39
(</+l)x(</+l}
1
The state transition diagram for rectangular model is shown in Figure 5.15 (2). States 0 to n-1 
are transient states while state n is an absorbing state.
( 1)
3 ,4  5 ,8  7 ,1 2  ^
® = ® r ® = ® r  # ® 5 -4 ( h - I )  4 h
(2)
1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
1 A  1/2 A  5 /12  A  7 /18  2 { n - 2 ) ^ \  A  2 (//- l)+ l
....
1/6 1/4 5 /18  7 /24 2(«-l)-l
6(h - 1)
(3)
Figure 5.15 State diagram for different random w alk models. (1) Directional Model; (2) 
Rectangular Model; (3) Hexagonal Model
Hexagonal Network Layout
In the Hexagonal network layout (similar as Figure 4.8) [95] [96], a MN can move to one of its 
six neighbouring cells with equal probability of 1/6, as shown in Figure 5.14. The MN can also 
move from one cell to another within the same ring (a ring consists of cells with the same distance 
to the centre cell). Thus, a^j can be presented as follows.
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i
2/ + 1
6/
2 / - 1
6/
1/3
i=0,j=l
i>0,j=i+I
i>0,j=i-l
i>OJ=i
otherwise
And can be expressed as below,
P.=
Eq. 5-40
■ 0 1 0 0 0 • 0 0 0
1/6 1/3 1/2 0 0 • 0 0 0
0 1/4 1/3 5/12 0 • 0 0 0
0 0 5/18 1/3 7/18 • 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 6(rf-l) 1/3
2(«'-l)  + l 
6(c/- l)
0 0 0 0 0 • 0 0 1
Eq. 5-41
Using the concept of rings in the network model, the complex 2-D random walk model can be 
simplified to a 1-D random walk model. The state transition diagram is shown in Figure 5.15 (3). 
States 0 is barrier state and state n is absorbing state. States 2 to n-1 are transient states. In the 
state diagram, state i represents the probability that the MN is in a ring-/ cell. As illustrated in 
Figure 5.13 (1) and Figure 4.8 (1), the central cell is number as “0”, and the other cells are 
labelled by the distance of this cell from cell “0”. Thus, ring-i cell is the cell which is with “i” 
distance from the central “0 ”.
5.4.2 Signalling Cost Analysis
5.4.2.1 Mobility Signalling Cost
The mobility signalling cost here means the location update cost. In HMIPv6 , the location 
update includes the local registration and the global registration. When the MN moves within one 
enhanced node domain, only local registration to the enhanced node is needed. When the MN 
moves across enhanced node domain, global registration to HA (possibly CNs) is performed. To 
calculate the mobility signalling cost, let Ci be the signalling cost for local registration to the 
enhanced node, Q  be the signalling cost for registration to the HA, and Ccn be the signalling 
cost for registration to the CN.
The following parameters are defined in order to obtain the mobility signalling cost,
- k: distance (number of hops) between HA and enhanced node, as shown in (1) of Figure 5.16.
- j: distance (number of hops) between enhanced node and AR, as shown in (1) of Figure 5.16.
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-1: average distance (number of hops) between enhanced node and CN, as shown in (1) of Figure 
5.16.
- c: average number of CNs that the MN is communicating with while performing handovers
- Ô: transmission cost is assumed to be proportional to the distance between the source and 
destination entities. And 6  denotes the unit transmission cost in a wired link. It is assumed that 
the unit transmission cost is the cost for local BU to enhanced node.
- m: It is assumed that the transmission cost over a wireless link is m times of the cost over a 
wired link.
- 0x‘. transmission cost coefficient for mobility signalling from one entity to another. It is defined
„ bandw idth  consum ption fo r  certa in  m o b ility  signalling in a w ired  link m  — .as Sx  ------ r— ----------------— -—:—  ^ ,------------. The coefficients arebandw idth  consum ption fo r  local BU in a w ired link
listed as follows,
a. Si', transmission cost coefficient for local BA from enhanced node.
b. Sfii transmission cost coefficient for BU to HA.
c. S'li'. transmission cost coefficient for BA from HA,
d. Sc', transmission cost coefficient for BU to CN.
e. Sc', transmission cost coefficient for BA from CN.
-Cwireiess'- ntobility signalling cost over a wireless link between AR and MN.
- Cg„: mobility signalling cost between enhanced node and AR
- Che', mobility signalling cost between HA and enhanced node
- Cce'. mobility signalling cost between CN and enhanced node
- Cpi processing cost in the mobility agent (i.e, enhanced node) for the mobility signalling.
The registration cost includes the transmission cost and the processing cost of registration 
signalling.
^L ~  w^irehss + ^ ea + 3C^ = mô + jÔ + JÔ,Ô + mô,5+ =  (w + y )* (l + <?/) • ^  + 3C^ , Eq. 5-42 
= {k + J+m)^{S,,+S',,)^S + 5C^ , Eq. 5-43
+  C„ H- 5C=mS^S+ jS^.S + IS,S+IS'^S +  ja„S + m S '/ +  5C„ 
= (m + j + iy { S ,^ S l ) - S  + 5C^
Let Costi denote the average local registration cost for the movement. Then,
E q. 5-44
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[ ( ;  +  » ,)  +  E q .5-45
7=1 7=1
where, Pq j (0 < j  < n) is the probability that the current AR is of distance j  away from the 
enhanced node after n movements.
Home registration is performed after the movement to change the enhanced node domain. 
The average distance between the current enhanced node and the AR after d movements is
A / = Z ^ o j -7 Eq-5-46y=o
Let Cost^ be the cost for home registration and CN registration, then,
Cost"„={k + m + D,i)-{â„ + S;,)-S+5C^ + cx[(m + l + D ,)-(S^+Sl)-S + 5C,,']
Eq. 5-47
Let Cost denote the average registration cost per movement between enhanced node domains. 
Since there is one home registration eveiy d movements and one local registration per movement, 
then Cost can be expressed as.
Cost = '^Cost'l + Cost'll
H=1 7=1
+(k + m ^ D jy  (j), + Ô,, ) • 5C^ , Id Eq. 5-48
S.4.2.2 Security Signalling Cost
The security signalling cost is analyzed based on Figure 5.16, The security signalling costs 
using both of the previous and proposed mechanism are evaluated in this section. In Figure 5.16,
(1) shows the HMIPv6  domain, on which the mobility signalling cost is evaluated; (2) shows the 
previous security mechanism, which performs key generation every single time the MN 
handovers; (3) shows the proposed security mechanism, which only performs key generation 
when the MN firstly enters a new enhanced node domain.
Previous Mechanism
The security signalling cost means the extra siagnalling cost introduced by security mechanism.
In order to calculate the security signalling cost introduced by the previous security mechanism,
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let5f, and 5// denote the security signalling cost in local handoff procedures (handover between 
ARs within a enhanced node domain) and in enhanced node handoff procedures (handover 
between enhanced nodes), respectively.
Foreign Network
Foreign Network
Home Nctworit CN Domain
Foreign Network
Figure 5.16 Signalling cost. (1) HIVIiPv6-based network domain; (2) HM IPv6-based network with 
previous security mechanism; (3) HlMlPvô based network with the proposed security mechanism
The follows parameters are defined in order to obtain the security signalling cost:
5pi security processing cost in the mobility agent (i.e, enhanced node) and security entities (i.e, 
HKS). It is assumed that Sp is two times of Cp.
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- 5ea : security signalling cost between AR and enhanced node. Security transmission cost is 
assumed to be proportional to the distance between the source and destination entities.
- Sse' security signalling cost between HKS and enhanced node.
- ^wireless' Security cost over a wireless link between AR and MN.
- s: distance (number of hops) between enhanced node and HKS, as shown in (1) of Figure 5.16.
- Ssx- transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from one entity to another. It is defined
j. bandw id th  consum ption f o r  certa in  secu rity  sign a llin g  in a  w ired  link  t,,  ™ .as ÛSX = -r——— f    r — :—;— rrrr- ---------------------- . The coefficients arebandw id th  consum ption f o r  local BU in a  w ired  link
listed as follows,
• 5^11 : transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from MN to AR, as shown in (2) of
Figure 5.16.
• ^5 1 2* transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from AR to MN, as shown in (2) of
Figure 5.16.
• Ss2 i ‘ transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from AR to enhanced node, as 
shown in (2) of Figure 5.16.
• Ss2 2 ‘- transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from enhanced node to AR, as
shown in (2) of Figure 5.16.
• transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from enhanced node to HKS, as 
shown in (2) of Figure 5.16.
• 6 3^ 2 % transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from HKS to enhanced node, as
shown in (2) of Figure 5.16.
Since in the previous mechanism, the key generation is performed every time the MN 
handovers between ARs, Sl can be expressed as below,
Eq. 5-49
Since the security procedure in enhanced node handoff is the same as that in local handoff, 
using the previous security mechanism, thus. S u  can be expressed as,
+ ^ ea + + 55*^  = W • | + ^ , 2  ) • ^  + ‘ + ^ S22 ) ' ^  + S' (<^3, +  ^ 3 2  ) ‘ ^  + 55^
Eq. 5-50
Let S l  denote the average signalling cost local cost in local handoff for the movement. 
Then,
= É C [ “ -('5.vii+‘y.vu)-^ + ^ '-(^«.+<5:vK)-^+s-('î.v„+<y.v„)-^ + 5S,] Eq.5-51
y=l j = [
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Let S  denote the average security signalling cost per movement between enhanced node 
domains. Thus, S  can be expressed as,
2 2 2 %  ' [^ '(^ ^ 1 1  + + +«=1 y=i >f a
+ m  ‘ 1 +  ^  '  ( ^ .V 2 i +  ^.V22 )  ■ <^ +  5  • +  ^^-32 )  ‘ <  ^+  5 5 ^ ,  J
Eq. 5-52
The Proposed Solution
In the proposed security mechanism, the enhanced node needs to notify all the other ARs 
(except for the serving AR) the generated HK, when an MN first enters an enhanced node 
domain. And no any other security signalling are required in the local handoffs within this 
enhanced node domain afterwards.
The follows parameters are defined in order to obtain the security signalling cost,
- Sga- security signalling cost between serving AR and enhanced node.
- 5/y/f ; security signalling cost from enhanced node to all the other ARs except for the sei*ving AR, 
which is the cost for distributing handover key to the ARs.
- S ’sgi security signalling cost between HKS and enhanced node.
- Sl f^ireiess- security cost over a wireless link between AR and MN.
- Sgx : transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from one entity to another. The 
coefficients are listed as follows,
• ^siitransmission cost coefficient for security signalling from MN to AR, as shown in (3) of 
Figure 5.16.
• 5^12 • transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from AR to MN, as shown in (3) of 
Figure 5.16.
• ^s2 i '  transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from serving AR to enhanced 
node, as shown in (3) of Figure 5.16.
• ^s2 2 ' transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from enhanced node to serving 
AR, as shown in (3) of Figure 5.16.
• Ô’s2n ’ transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from enhanced node to all the 
other ARs in its domain except for serving AR, as shown in (3) of Figure 5.16. This 
coefficient stands for the cost of distributing the HK to corresponding AR.
• 5^ 31 : transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from enhanced node to HKS, as 
shown in (3) of Figure 5.16.
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• 5s22- transmission cost coefficient for security signalling from HKS to enhanced node, as
shown in (3) of Figure 5.16.
Let N be the number of ARs in the enhanced node domain. Therefore,
N  =
1 + ^ 4 /  = 2r^ + 2 r  + 1 rectangular layout
f=l
r1 + ^ 6 / = 3r^ + 3r +1 hexagonal layout
Eq. 5-53
where, r  is the number of rings in the network model. Therefore, the enhanced node needs to 
notify N-1 ARs the corresponding handover key, as shown in Figure 5.16 (3).
Let 1 denote the proportional constant of the security signalling cost to the distance between 
enhanced node and ARs (for the delivery of HKs from enhanced node to corresponding AR). 
Thus, X = 0 g2n X 5 .
And, Shk can be expressed as,
=  À +  /^ . • 2 ' N 2 +  "  • +  À" r  ' Eq. 5-54
where, TV,, is the number of ARs in ring r. And N^ . can be expressed as follows,
1 directional model 
4/ rectangular model 
6/ hexagonal model
Eq. 5-55
Therefore,
A- directional model
rectangular mode! 
hexagonal model
Eq. 5-56
where, r  is the number of rings in the network.
Let S'u denote the security signalling cost in enhanced node handoff procedure (handover 
between enhanced nodes). And, %  can be expressed as.
^ 'h -  w^ireless + ^ ea + ~ ^  ( ^ S'l 1 + 4,12  ) ‘ ^  + A / ’ ( ^ S2l + ^ S22 ) ' ^
+ ‘^ ■(^531+ 4»-32 ) * ^  + + ( N - \ ) ' S p +
Eq. 5-57
113
Chapter 5. An Enhanced Key Management Scheme for Securing Handover/Fast Handover in
HMIPv6 Networks
It should be noted that no any security signalling are involved in the local handoffs within the 
enhanced node domain. Let S denote the average security signalling cost per movement between 
enhanced node domains. 5 = S'u/d .
Values of the parameters are provided in Table 111 in Appendix C.
5.5 Simulation Results
In this section, performance of the proposed mechanism is evaluated against the previous 
scheme proposed in [8 6 ], in terms of signalling cost.
5.5.1 Fluid Flow Model
Figure 5.17 <p(K) as a function o f K. <p(K) is the number o f an M N ’s movements within a given
enhanced node domain.
(p{K^, which is the average number of ARs that the MN stays within a given enhanced node 
domain, is plotted in Figure 5.17 as a function of K. As illustrated in this figure, unless K is much 
smaller than domain size N (N=20, 30 or 40), <^(/f) is rarely sensitive to the change of K. Thus, in 
order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that K is equal to N (N=20).
Ratio of the network scale is defined to be r=b/a. Thus, larger r indicates smaller distance 
between the foreign network and home network. The signalling cost is calculated by the 
accumulative signalling bandwidth consumption in bytes:
signallin g  bandw idth  in b y te s  xnum ber o f  link hops 
an MN's average dom ain residence tim e
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Figure 5.18 Impact o f r=b/a on signalling cost, with HKS located in another domain. Parameters: 
N=20; v=20 km/hr; 8=10 km^, HK size (1) 128 bits (2) 256 bits
Figure 5.18 shows the impact of r on the signalling cost in HMlPv6 , HMlPv6  with previous
security mechanism and HMIPv6  with enhanced security mechanism. It is assumed that HKS is
located away from the enhanced node in another domain, and different HK sizes are considered:
HK=128 bits in figure (1); HK=256 bits in figure (2). As illustrated in both of (1) and (2) Figure
5.18, signalling cost decreases as r increases, because smaller distance between home network and
foreign network indicates less signalling cost, as the registration cost to HA/CN and security
signalling cost to the HKS are smaller. As shown in (1), if HK size is 128bits, the signalling cost
of enhanced security mechanism is generally smaller than that of previous security mechanism.
Also, the signalling cost gain (signalling cost in enhanced security mechanism-signalling cost in
previous security mechanism) is larger when smaller r is considered. This is because that key
generation takes place every time when MN changes AR in the previous security mechanism,
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thus, the signalling cost is higher when HKS is in another domain that is far away from the 
visiting domain. As shown in (2), if HK size is 256 bits, the signalling cost of enhanced security 
mechanism is generally close to that of previous security mechanism. This is because that, in the 
enhanced security mechanism, distributing all of the HKs with large key size to corresponding 
ARs introduces more signalling overhead. However, it can be noticed that the signalling cost in 
enhanced security mechanism is slightly smaller than that in previous security mechanism when r 
is small, and when r is large, the signalling cost in enhanced security mechanism can even 
becoming a little bit larger than that in previous security mechanism. This is because the HKs are 
generated by the HKS, thus if the HKS is far away from the visiting domain, distributing HKs and 
keying materials will introduce more signalling overhead.
HMIPv6 and HMIPv6 w ith security m echanisms
%\ \
-e ^ H M IP v €  with 
O - -HMIPÆ with 
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- * - - ' h MIPv6 with 
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m echanism
mechanism
1,v=201.v=5 ■
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Ratio of the network scale "r=b/a"
Figure 5.19 Impact o f r=b/a on signalling cost, with HKS located in another domain. Parameters: 
N=20; HK size=128 bits; v= 5 or 20 km/hr; S=10 km^
Figure 5.19 the impact of r on the signalling cost under different MN’s average moving speed 
v=5 km/hr and v=20 km/hr. The impact of r is similar to that shown in (1) Figure 5.18. And it can 
be noticed that the signalling cost with v=5 is generally higher than the signalling cost with v=20. 
Because when the number of MN’s movements (handovers) is fixed, if the MN is moving at a low 
speed, more signalling traffic is generated by the periodic BR messages. Within a certain network 
residence time, there are more BR messages generated with a lower moving speed.
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Figure 5.20 Impact o f M N’s average speed v on signalling load, with HKS located in another 
domain and in the visiting domain (s=2 hops away from the enhanced node). Parameters: N=20; HK
size =128 bits; 8=10 km^; r=0.2
Figure 5.20 shows the impact of MN’s moving speed v on signalling cost. And two scenarios 
are considered: HKS is in another domain; HKS is in the visiting domain and it is s (s=2) hops 
away from the enhanced node. The result shows that the signalling cost decrease as v increases. 
The reason has been explained in Figure 5.19. As v increases, the number of BR messages 
decreases, therefore, the total signalling cost during the average network residence time decreases. 
The result also shows that signalling cost generally is lower when HKS is located in the visiting 
domain than in another domain, for both security mechanisms. This is because that the security 
signalling traversing different domains would result in more signalling overhead. It is also 
illustrated in Figure 5.20 that the proposed security mechanism outperforms the previous 
mechanism by introducing less overhead, when HKS is located in another domain. And the 
propose mechanism gives similar performance (neglectably more) to the previous mechanism, 
when HKS is in visiting domain with s=2 hops away from the enhanced node. The HKS has to be 
involved every single time MN performs handover in the previous mechanism, thus, the location 
of HKS affects the previous mechanism more. However, the proposed mechanism is not as 
sensitive to the location of HKS as the previous mechanism, since the HKS is only contacted once 
when MN crosses the enhanced node domain. The reason why the propose mechanism gives 
similar performance to the previous mechanism when the HKS is located in the visiting domain, 
is that the keys/keying materials distribution introduce more signalling overhead, although the HK 
generation is performed less often in the proposed mechanism.
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Figure 5.21 Impact o f  domain size N on signalling cost, with HKS located in another domain and 
in the same domain (s=2 hops away from the enhanced node). Parameters: v= 20 km/hr; HK size
=256 bits; 8=10 km^; r=0.2
Figure 5.21 shows the impact of domain size N (number of ARs in one enhanced node domain) 
on signalling cost. The signalling cost generally increase as the domain size gets larger, as larger 
domain size means more possible handovers within the domain which would result in more 
registration signalling and security signalling. As illustrated in Figure 5.21, the signalling cost in 
the proposed security mechanism is relatively more sensitive to the increase of domain size. 
Because it is chosen here HK length=256 bits, the distribution of the HKs dominates the security 
signalling.
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Figure 5.22 Impact o f HK size on signalling cost, (1) HKS located in visiting domain, S = l,2 ,5  hops 
away from the enhanced node; (2) HKS is located in another. Parameters: N=20; v= 20 km/hr; S=IO
km^; r=0.2
Figure 5.22 shows the impact of HK size on the security signalling cost. Two scenarios are 
considered: HKS is in the same visiting domain and it is s (s=l, 2 or 5) hops away from the 
enhanced node, as in figure (1); HKS is in another domain (etc, home network), as in figure (2). 
Different key sizes are considered: DES-56bits, 3DES-56bits, 1 12bits or 168bits, AES-128bits, 
192bits, or 256bits, as marked in the figures with black text arrows. As illustrated in the figure (1), 
the signalling cost is smaller if is HKS is placed closer to the enhanced node, which means 
smaller s value. And, the signalling cost generally increases when larger HK size is chosen. It is 
also illustrated that the signalling cost produced by the proposed security mechanism is generally 
more sensitive to the change of HK size, compared to the previous mechanism. This is because 
that in the proposed solution, the HK/keying materials would be distributed once to all relevant 
entities. The distribution of keys/keying materials would also result in more signalling cost, if the 
HKS is with moderate distance away from the enhanced node(s=l and s=2 in figure (1)). If the 
HKS is located further away from the enhanced node (s=5 in figure (2)), the proposed scheme 
introduce less signalling overhead when smaller key size is chosen (3DES-56, 3DES-112 and 
AES-128). However, if larger key size is considered (3DES-168, AES-192 and AES-256), the 
proposed mechanism would still introduce more signalling cost, this is because that large keys 
transmitted over multiple hops (s=5) would result in more signalling overhead. Figure (2) shows 
the impact of HK size on the signalling cost, if the HKS is located in another domain, rather than
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the visiting domain. It is clearly demonstrated that the proposed mechanism generally introduces 
less signalling overhead than the previous mechanism, no matter what size of the key is 
considered. However, more gain is achieved, if small key size is chosen (etc, 3DES-56). The 
reason why the previous mechanism introduces more signalling cost is the interaction with the 
HKS located far away in another domain every time the MN performs handover.
HMIPv6 with security m echanisms
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Figure 5.23 Impact o f r,=b/s on signalling load, with HKS located in the visiting domain (s hops 
away from the enhanced node). Parameters: N=20; b=IO; HK size= l28  bits.
Ratio = b /s  is defined to evaluate the location of HKS, when it is located in the visiting 
domain. Larger indicates that HKS is located closer to the enhanced node. Figure 5.23 shows 
the impact of on the security signalling cost. The signalling cost introduced by security 
mechanisms generally decrease as increases, as shown in the figure. Thus, it is always 
recommended that HKS should be better collocated with the enhanced node, or at least as close to 
the EN as possible. The result also shows that the proposed security mechanism would introduce 
more signalling overhead, because of the distribution of keys/keying materials to all ARs. And the 
signalling cost gain (signalling cost in proposed mechanism-signalling cost in previous 
mechanism) increases as gets larger. This is because that the previous mechanism is more 
sensitive to the location of HKS, as the security related signalling has to go to the HKS every time 
handover is performed.
120
Chapter 5. An Enhanced Key Management Scheme for Securing Handover/Fast Handover in
HMIPv6 Networks
Value of R"
o  0.65
Value of rs Value of r
(I) Previous Security Mechanism
Im pact of r and rs on 'R*
(D 0 7
3 54
Value of rs Value of r
(2) Proposed Security Mechanism
Figure 5.24 Impact o f r=b/a and r,=b/s on R= Security Signalling/(HM IP Signalling + Security 
Signalling), with HKS located in visiting domain (s hops away from the enhanced node). ( 1 )  Previous 
security mechanism; (2) Proposed security mechanism. Parameters: N=20; HK size=128; v= 20
km/hr; S=10 km^; b=10
Ratio R = secu rity  signallin g  cost is defined, thus, larger R indicates thatHMlPv6 signalling co st+ secu rity  signalling cost 
the security signalling occupies bigger percentage in the overall signalling and also suggests more 
security signalling cost. Figure 5.24 shows the impact of ratios r and r^on /?, when the HKS is 
located in the visiting domain, for previous mechanism (figure ( 1)) and proposed mechanism
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(figure (2)). Comparing (1) and (2) in Figure 5.24, the value of R in previous security mechanism 
(Figure (I)) is generally smaller than in proposed security mechanism (Figure (2)). Thus, the 
security signalling cost is higher in the proposed security mechanism than that in the previous 
mechanism. It can be also obsei*ved that figure (1) and (2) illustrate similar trend: lai'ger results 
in smaller value of R and smaller r results in smaller value of R. The reason is that as Vg increases, 
security signalling cost decreases which results in smaller R (smaller security signalling cost 
results in smaller R). And also as r increases, HMIPv6  mobility signalling cost decrease which 
results in larger R (smaller mobility signalling cost means larger R). Larger value of and 
smaller value of r would bring on smaller value of R, which indicates that the security signalling 
takes less percentage of the overall signalling cost.
5.5.2 Random Walk Model
In this section, the signalling cost is evaluated against the movement threshold d, which is the 
number of handovers the MN performs before it leaves a given EN domain. The signalling cost 
unit is the cost of transmitting a local BU to EN, as defined in section 5.4.2.1.
5.5.2.1 Directional Model
Figure 5.25 shows signalling cost vs. d, in directional walk model. Figure (1) illustrates
registration cost in HMIPv6  with different k, which is the distance between enhanced node and
HA. Large k indicates that MN is far away from its home network, therefore, the registration cost
is high. It can also be noticed that the registration cost is very high with small d value and is
slightly increasing as d increases when large values of d are selected. This is because small value
of d suggests often inter enhanced node handovers which would result in more registration to the
home network. And as d gets larger, it suggests MN stays in the enhanced node longer, which
would increase the local registration cost. Figure (2) shows total signalling cost (mobility
signalling and security signalling) in HMIPv6  with previous security mechanism and the proposed
security mechanism. The total signalling cost using the proposed security mechanism is higher
than that using previous security mechanism when d is small. This is because smaller d indicates
more frequent handoffs between enhanced node domains, in which case the large signalling cost
for distributing HKs/keying materials to all ARs and MN in the proposed security mechanism
dominates the total signalling cost. It can be also observed hom figure (2) that the total signalling
cost in the proposed security mechanism gets smaller than that in the previous security
mechanism when d increases. This is because larger value of d suggests that MN performs more
handoffs within one enhanced node domain, thus, the handover key generation needs to be
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performed every time MN handovers to new AR in the previous mechanism. However, no more 
key generation needs to be performed in the proposed solution, unless the MN leaves the current 
enhanced node domain. It is demonstrated the figure (2 ) that the proposed security mechanism 
performs better when MN stays longer within one enhanced node domain.
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Figure 5.25 Signalling cost in directional walk model. (1) registration cost in HIVllPv6; (2) total 
signalling cost (m obility signalling and security signalling) in HMIPv6 with previous security 
mechanism and the proposed security mechanism. K is the distance between HA and enhanced node
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Figure 5.26 Impact o f threshold (d) on cost ratio in directional walk model. The ratio is defined as: 
total signalling cost in H M lPv6 with security/ registration cost in HMIPv6.
The cost ratio is defined as: R=total signalling cost in HMlPv6  with security mechanism/ 
registration cost in HMlPv6 . If R is closer to 1, it means less security signalling cost comparing to 
the mobility signalling cost. Figure 5.26 shows the impact of threshold (d) on cost ratio in 
directional walk model. The result shows that cost ratio decreases and gets close to one as d 
increases, in the proposed security mechanism. And the cost ratio increases as d increases, with 
previous security mechanism. This is because that HKs are distributed at one time once MN 
enters an enhanced node domain, in the proposed mechanism. If MN performs more handovers 
within this enhanced node domain, the proposed mechanism would be more beneficial. It can be 
also noticed that smaller K results in larger cost ratio, because smaller k means lower registration 
cost in HMIP.
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S.5.2.2 Rectangular Model
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Figure 5.27 Signalling cost in rectangular w alk model. (1) registration cost in HM lPv6; (2) 
signalling cost (m obility signalling and security signalling) in HMIPv6 with previous security 
mechanism and the proposed security mechanism. K is the distance between HA and enhanced node
Figure 5.27 shows signalling cost vs. d, in rectangular random walk model with different values 
of k. Figure (1) and figure (2) demonstrates similar trend as Figure 5.25, although the signalling 
cost are not as sensitive to the increase of threshold (d) as in Figure 5.25. And the signalling cost 
is generally less comparing to the cost shown in Figure 5.25, except for the situation when very 
small value of d is chosen for the proposed security mechanism. This is because that it is less 
possible that the MN moves far away from the enhanced node as d increase, in rectangular model
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than in directional model. In directional model, as MN moves on, it gets further away from the 
enhanced node. And in rectangular model, as MN moves on, it could get closer to the enhanced 
node, from outer ring back to inner ring (such as ring 3 to ring 2). Thus, the mobility signalling to 
enhanced node and the security signalling to HKS would both reduce, in rectangular model. 
However, the proposed mechanism introduces a lot more signalling overhead when d is small 
(figure (2)). The reason is that the HKS has to distribute HKs/keying materials to a large amount 
of ARs in the enhanced node domain. With the same number of rings, the domain size (number of 
ARs in one EN domain) in a rectangular model is larger than the size in directional model. It is 
also demonstrated the figure (2) that the proposed security mechanism performs better when MN 
stays longer within one enhanced node domain.
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Figure 5.28 Impact o f threshold (d) on cost ratio in rectangular model. The ratio is defined as: 
total signalling cost in HIVIIPv6 with security/ registration cost in HMIPv6.
Figure 5.28 shows the impact of threshold (d) on cost ratio in rectangular random walk model. 
It demonstrates similar trend as Figure 5.26, although cost ratios are generally higher than in 
Figure 5.26. The registration cost for HMIP is lower in rectangular random walk model than in 
directional walk model. The security cost with the proposed security mechanism is higher in 
rectangular random walk model than in directional walk because the domain size is larger in 
rectangular model and it costs more to distribute the HKs to every ARs in the domain. The 
security cost with previous security mechanism is lower in rectangular random walk model than 
in directional walk model because MN is less possible to be far away from enhanced node in 
rectangular model than in directional model and it costs less to generate HK every time MN 
moves. Based on the analysis, it is obvious that the cost ratios are generally higher in rectangular 
model than in directional model.
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5.S.2.3 Hexagonal Mode!
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Figure 5.29 Signalling cost in hexagonal random walk model. (1) registration cost in HMIPv6; (2) 
signalling cost (m obility signalling and security signalling) in HM lPv6 with previous security 
mechanism and the proposed security m echanism . K is the distance between HA and enhanced node
Figure 5.29 shows signalling cost v.s d, in hexagonal random walk model with different k. 
Figure (1) and figure (2) demonstrates similar trend as Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.27, although all 
of the signalling cost are less sensitive to the increase of threshold (d) as in Figure 5.27. And 
figure (2 ) especially shows that the signalling cost using the proposed security mechanism when d 
is with small value, is much higher, comparing to the results in Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.27 This
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is because that the domain size in hexagonal model is larger than in rectangular model, with same 
number of rings. Therefore, the signalling cost to distribute HKs/keying materials to every AR is 
higher in hexagonal model than in rectangular model.
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Figure 5.30 Impact o f threshold (d) on cost ratio in hexagonal walk model. The ratio is defined as: 
total signalling cost in HM IPv6 with security/ registration cost in HMIPv6.
Figure 5.30 shows the impact of threshold (d) on cost ratio in hexagonal random walk model. It 
demonstrates similar trend as Figure 5.26 and Figure 5.28, although cost ratios in hexagonal 
model are generally higher than those in rectangular model, and of course directional model. The 
reason is similar as the explained in Figure 5.28.
5.6 Discussions
In section 5.5, the performance of the proposed security mechanism is evaluated using the fluid 
flow model and random walk model. The proposed solution is compared with the previous 
security mechanism in terms of the overall signalling cost. The signalling cost is evaluated against 
different parameters, such as speed of the HK size, location of the HKS, enhanced node domain 
size, etc. The results indicate that the proposed security mechanism generates about 10%-50% 
more signalling cost than the previous security mechanism depending on the scenarios, if the HKS 
is located in the visiting domain. And if the HKS is located in another domain, rather than the 
visiting one, the proposed solution can result in less signalling overhead, depending on the 
distance between the two domains. The main reason why the proposed solution could bring on 
more signalling cost is the distribution of a bunch of keys/keying materials to all of the ARs/MN. 
Any of the following situations can increase the signalling cost;
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- Large domain size (number of ARs in one enhanced node domain).
- Large size key is chosen
- HKS is located far away from the enhanced node
- MN performs limited number of handoffs within the enhanced node domain and leaves the 
domain quickly. In this case, lots of HK might not be used, and the previous security 
mechanism outperforms the proposed solution by introducing considerable less signalling 
overhead.
It can be also concluded that the better scenario for using the proposed security mechanism is that 
MN stays in the serving enhanced node domain for longer period and the HKS is collocated with 
or located close to the enhanced node. Moderate enhanced node domain size and key size are also 
preferred.
The impact of security mechanism on mobility protocols involves two important factors: 
signalling cost and handover latency. To minimise the negative impact of security, it is desired 
that the extra signalling load and handover latency introduced by security mechanism should be 
minimal. However, there is always a tradeoff between these two factors. Although the proposed 
solution could introduce more signalling load in some of the scenarios, it is obvious that it is 
beneficial in terms of introducing less handover latency. When the MN performs handover 
between enhanced nodes, the HKS needs to be contacted to generate HK in both of the previous 
and the proposed solutions. Thus, the two solutions would perform similarly by introducing the 
extra RRT to interact with the HKS. When the MN performs handover between ARs within one 
enhanced node domain, the previous mechanism still introduce one extra RRT for key generation. 
However, there is no extra RRT involved in the proposed solution, as the MN already has the 
keying material. The only extra time introduced is the time MN needs to generate the HK using 
the keying material in its memory. The key generation time can be almost neglected, comparing to 
the RRT to the HKS. More detailed analysis for handover delay is provided in Appendix D.
It should be also noted that the replay protection is not provided in the mechanism. However, 
timestamp based replay protection between MN and HKS is possible, by inserting a “timestamp” 
mobility option to the message. The timestamp can be verified to be valid, if it is in within certain 
value. The clocks need to be synchronized, if the timestamp based anti-replay method is used. 
Otherwise, it may result in one more RRT to synchronize the clock.
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Chapter 6
6 Secure Fast Handovers in HMIPv6
6.1 Integration of HMIPv6 with Fast Handovers
The concept of “Fast Handover” primarily aims to minimise handover latency. FMIPv6  is 
introduced to improve the handover latency resulting from the MIPv6  procedures. The operation 
of FMIPv6  protocol was introduced in section 2.1.2.3. The FMlPv6  protocol enables an MN to 
quickly detect that it has moved to a new subnet when the MN is still connected to its current 
subnet. Before the MN establishes the connection with the new AR, the packets still arrives at 
previous AR and will be redirected to the new AR.
The idea of integrating FMIPv6  and HMlPv6  (F-HMlPv6 ), is also explained in section 2.1.2.4. 
The invention of HMIPv6  allows MlPv6  to benefit from not only reduced mobility signalling but 
also less additional delay element resulting from global updates to HA and all CNs. With the 
introduction of MAP, the handover latency related to global location updates is considerably 
reduced, as the MN only needs to update its MAP if the handover is performs within one MAP 
domain. Therefore, the necessity of integrating HMlPv6  with fast handovers when the handoff is 
performed locally within one MAP domain is not as appealing as the others. Although, there are 
some investigations carried out in HMIPv6  standard [6 ]. In [6 ], it is specified a method to 
integrate HMlPv6  with FMlPv6 . In this method, MAP is placed above the ARs as an aggregation 
router, thus, the fast handover negotiating and packets forwarding takes place between MAP and 
new AR, instead of between PAR and NAR as defined in FMlPv6  standard. The integration of 
HMlPv6  and fast handovers is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Figure (1) shows the idea of using MAP 
as the anchor point of initiating and negotiating fast handover process, as specified in [6 ]. In this 
case, MAP processes the FBU request from the MN and exchanges messages with the NAR 
regai'ding the handovers. Figure (2) shows the concept of basic fast handover procedures proposed 
in FMlPv6  standard. As opposed to figure (1), PAR is used here as the anchor point for fast 
handovers. It can be noticed (figure (1) ) that the message exchanges to enable MAP to foiward 
packets to NAR is probably the same as those needed to perform the local location update, thus, it 
is not wise to involve MAP as the anchor point to achieve fast handovers. Based on the
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assumption that ARs be connected for location registration and packet forwarding, the method in 
figure (2) is a natural way to implement fast handovers in HMIPv6 .
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Figure 6.1 Integration o f HIVfIPv6 and fast handovers
In the situation where handover is performed between different MAP domains, the fast 
handover mechanism is more necessary, as the global location update is believed to be time- 
consuming and can cause noticeable disruptions. It is explained in section 2,1.2.4 the method to 
enhance HMIPv6  with fast handovers in the scenario of inter-MAP domain handovers. As shown 
in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7, the handover negotiation is performed between previous MAP and 
new MAP, and the packets are forward from PMAP to NMAP.
6.2 Security Considerations
It is discussed in section 6.1 the integration of fast handovers and HMIPv6  in both of the 
micromobility and macromobility scenarios (defined in Figure 5.1). In either of the two scenarios, 
there are two main security vulnerabilities to be identified and solved as follows,
- Secure FBU
Insecure FBU can cause security threat, for instance, packets meant for one address could be 
stolen or redirected to the malicious node. Hence, the PAR needs ensure that the FBU packet 
arrived from a node that is authentic and legitimately owns the PCoA. Therefore, the access router 
and MN should use certain mechanism to establish a security association which is used to secure 
the FBU.
In the micromobility handover scenario, the FBU/FBA is exchanged between MN and PAR, 
and in the macromobility handover scenario, they are exchanged between MN and PMAP via
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PAR. Therefore, using the handover keys established by the mechanism in chapter 5, the FBU can 
be secured.
- Secure handover negotiation and context transfer between ARs/MAPs.
Two types of messages are possible to be exchanged between neighbouring ARs/MAPs:
a. Hi/Hack messages
The Handover Initiate (HI) and Handover Acknowledgment (HAck) messages are exchanged 
between ARs/MAPs to negotiate the handover. It is suggested in the FMIP standard [7] that 
Hi/Hack must be protected using end-to-end SAs to offer integrity and data origin authentication.
b. QoS context transfer
In some scenarios, context transfer occurs between neighbouring ARs/MAPs. It is proposed in
[11] a combined mobility QoS mechanism based on HMIPv6  (with details in Appendix E). In this 
mechanism, QoS context transfer is performed between enhanced nodes if it is a handover across 
enhanced nodes.
To protect the two types of message exchanges, it is important to establish keys between 
neighbouring ARs/MAPs. This chapter will provide solutions for establishing keys between 
ARs/MAPs to secure the fast handovers in HMIPv6  networks.
6.3 Previous work
Aiming at solving the two main security vulnerabilities explained in section 6.2, some work has 
been carried out to establish keys to secure FBU or to protect message exchanges between 
neighbouring ARs/ENs. It is proposed in [82] a method using SEND for providing a shared key 
from AR to MN to protect the signalling. As discussed in section 5.1, a lot work has been 
undertaken using CGA related method to establish SA for the purpose of securing FBU. And the 
mechanism making use of AAA infrastructure proposed in chapter 5 can be also used to establish 
keys between AR and MN. Hence, one of the major areas where work still needs to be done is to 
establish SA between neighbouring ARs/ENs.
Relatively less work has been undertaken in establishing SA between ARs/ENs. It is specified 
in [97] a mechanism to secure packet forwarding using a temporary session key. In intra-MAP 
handoff, the temporary session key is established between old AR and new AR, while in inter- 
MAP handoff procedure, the session key is established between old MAP and new MAP. 
However, this mechanism only focuses on reducing unnecessary overhead introduced by AAA 
solution in terms of authentication and key distribution, and the integration of mobility and 
security is not achieved. Since fast handover signalling is not considered to be integrated with the
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security procedure, security signalling could have negative impact on MIP protocols, in terms of 
introducing large handover latency and too much signalling overhead.
In this chapter, I introduce the mechanism to establish keys between neighbouring ARs/ENs to 
secure the fast handovers in HMlPv6  networks. A trusted third party (either the EN or the AAA 
server) is involved in the key generation and distribution.
6.4 Description of the Mechanism
6.4.1 Security Association (SA) model
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SA2 IA2
to be established N ew  EN  
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Figure 6.2 Trust model for F-HMlPv6  domain
It is assumed that AAA infrastructure exists for the Mobile IP application. And it is assumed 
that some pre-established trust exists between some of the network elements. The trust model is 
shown in Figure 6.2. As illustrated in the figure, the visited network is divided into four 
hierarchies: MN, ARs, enhanced node (EN) and AAA servers in the foreign network. In order to 
establish SA between neighbouring ARs (PAR-NAR) and between neighbouring ENs (PEN- 
NEN), the following pre-established SAs are assumed,
- SA exists between enhanced node and the ARs in its domain.
This assumption is the same as described in section 5.2.2. Using the intelligence of the EN, the
EN is able to have knowledge about surrounding entities and can manage the ARs in its domain.
The establishment of SA between EN and AR is outside the scope of discussion. However, the
HKs established between EN and AR using the mechanism in chapter 5 can be used for this
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purpose, if MAP does not have EN functionality and is not able to establish SA with ARs within 
its domain.
- SA exists between AAAF sei*ver and the enhanced nodes
It is assumed that AAA infrastructure is used for Mobile IP application. The enhanced node, 
acting as the mobility agent in mobile IP, is supposed to have part of the functionality of AAA 
client. It is required in the AAA/MIP application that the mobility agents have a permanent trust 
relationship with the AAA server within the domain they belong to, such as HA-AAAH server, 
MAP-AAAF server, etc. Hence, AAA messages that includes keys/keying materials can be 
carried in a secured link.
SAs also exist between MN and the ARs to secure FBU. They can be established using the 
mechanism explained in chapter 5.
6.4.2 Handover between ARs within One Enhanced Node Domain
The predictive fast handover is assumed here. In the predictive mode, the fast handover is 
initiated in advance so that an MN is able to send an FBU when it is still attached to the PAR, 
which then enables forwarding traffic even before the MN attaches to the NAR. There are two 
types of methods to initiate the handover; network initiated handover and MN initiated handover. 
In a MN initiated handover, the MN sends a Router Solicitation for Proxy Advertisement 
(RtSolPr.) message to PAR to prompt ARs for Proxy Router Advertisements (PrRtAdv.). In 
response, the PAR sends PrRtAdv. message back to the MN, providing the link-layer address, IP 
address, and subnet prefixes of neighbouring routers. In a network initiated handover, the 
handover control resides in the network. In such scenario, the PAR sends an unsolicited PrRtAdv 
containing information of the NAR. The unsolicited PrRtAdv allows the network to inform the 
MN about geographically adjacent AR without the MN requesting that information. It reduces the 
amount of wireless traffic required for the MN to obtain information about neighbouring AR. 
Upon receiving the PrRtAdv. message, the MN processes it to configure the new CoA. The two 
different modes of handover initiation are shown in Figure 6.3.
In both of the MN initiated and the network initiated handover, the MN sends a FBU to the 
PAR after the PrRtAdv. message is processed. The signalling of the mechanism is shown in 
Figure 6.3. The messages in italics are the security related signalling to establish fast handover 
key between neighbouring ARs (PAR and NAR). More details are explained as follows,
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Figure 6.3 Signalling for handover within one enhanced node domain
1. FBU
Fast BU message is sent by the MN instructing PAR to redirect traffic to the NAR. This can be 
achieved by creating a binding between the previous CoA (PCoA) and new CoA (NCoA). The 
format of FBU message is identical to the standard MIPv6  BU message, however, the FBU 
message is with different flag values and mobility options.
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 1 2  3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
Sequence #
H K Reserved Lifetime
M obility options
Figure 6.4 FBU message format [7]
It is proposed here two one-bit flags using the reserved field: “T” flag and “S” flag as
highlighted in red in Figure 6.4. “T” flag indicates the fast handover type. With “T” value set to 0,
the message is the FBU message for handover within one EN domain. With “T” value set to 1, the
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message is for fast handover between ENs. Please be noted that the message might contain 
different mobility options for handover within/across EN, although the message field is the same 
as shown in Figure 6.4. “S” flag indicates whether security mechanism will be triggered or not. If 
“S” flag value is set to 0, the normal fast handover procedure will be carried out, without the 
security messages (FHK Req. and FHK Resp.) being involved. If “S” flag value is set to I, the 
PAR will need to initiate a fast handover key request message (FHK Req.) in order to obtain a fast 
handover key to be shared with the NAR. With “S” value equal to 0, the mobility option in the 
FBU message only includes these options suggested by the FMIPv6  specification, such as 
alternative CoA option. With “S” value set to I, more mobility options need to be included, apart 
from the compulsoiy ones defined in FMIPv6 . The mandatory ones are:
- NAR’s IP address mobility option
IP address/prefix option defined in Mobile IPv6  fast handovers specification [7] can be used to 
cany the NAR’s IP address. With “option-code” value set to 3, the IP address option carries 
NAR’s IP address.
- MN identifier mobility option
The MN identifier mobility option is used to carry the MN’s NAI. The MN identifier mobility 
option is defined in RFC 4283 [89], thus, there is no need to introduce a new mobility option here.
2. FHK Req.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Message ID Reserved
New CoA
Mobility options
Figure 6.5 Fast handover key request message
The PAR sends a FHK Req. message to the enhanced node. It basically instructs the enhanced 
node to generate a FHK to be used between the PAR and the NAR. The FHK Req. message uses 
MH type value ‘TBAl’. The NCoA is included this message, as the keying material that EN 
needs to generate FHK. Please be noted that the NCoA here is the CoA that the MN proposes to 
use in the new link. However, the NAR can deny using the NCoA and proposes another NCoA 
which is mandatory for MN to use in the new link. The format of message data field in the MH is 
shown in Figure 6.5. The options filed can cany different mobility options as required. The 
mandatory options are the MN identifier mobility option and the NAR’s IP address mobility
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option, as explained in last section. If the integrity protection is required for the message, the 
MAC mobility option can be included in the “options” field.
The FHK is derived in a similar method as explained in section 5.3.2.2,
FHK = gprf+ (key, string);
where, key is a seed to generate the FHK which can be refreshed by the EN periodically; string = 
^EN  I  I  PCoA I NCoA I “Fast Handover Key”; Y = 0x0000. Ngiq is a nonce generated by the 
EN for FHK. is the MN’s NAI. The EN can obtain the PCoA by checking its binding cache. 
The NCoA, which is the NCoA MN proposes to use, is included in the FHK Req. message.
3. and 4. FHK Resp.
The enhanced node generates the FHK, and sends a fast handover key response (FHK Resp.) 
message to the PAR, in response to the FHK Resp, message. The enhanced node also sends an 
unsolicited FHK Resp. message to NAR. The FHK Req. message uses MH type value ‘TBA2’. 
As SA is assumed to exist between EN and all ARs within its domain, the FHK Resp. message 
can be secured. The format of message data field in the MH is shown in Figure 6 .6 .
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2  3 4 5  6 7 8  1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8
Message ID Result Code
Lifetime Reserved
SPI
Mobility options
Figure 6.6 Fast handover key response message
1 2 3 4  5 6  7 8 1 2 3 4  5 6  7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Type Length Reserved
FHK
Figure 6.7 FHK mobility option
The message ID is to match the FHK Resp. message with corresponding request. And the result 
of key generation is indicated in “result code” field. Different values of the result code indicate 
the status of the request: ‘0 ’ indicates success, while other values may be assigned to different 
reasons of failure. The lifetime (in seconds) of FHK is carried in “lifetime” field. “Reserved” field
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is set to 0 and ignored upon reception. The four-byte “SPI” carries the SPI to index the FHK. The 
“options” filed can carry different mobility options as required. The mandatory option that must 
be carried in the FHK Resp. message is: FHK mobility option (as shown in Figure 6.7), which 
includes the FHK. Similarly to the FHK Req. message, MAC mobility option can be included in 
“options” field to provide message authentication.
Upon receiving the FHK Resp. message from the EN, PAR and NAR obtain the FHK and 
corresponding SPI. The PAR then sends handover initiate (HI) message to the NAR regarding the 
MN’s handover, before creating a binding between PCoA and NCoA.
5. and 6 . HI/HAck.
The PAR exchanges HI and handover acknowledgement (HAck) messages with NAR. The 
main purpose of HI and HAck messages is to determine whether the NCoA is valid. If the NCoA 
is already in use in NAR’s link, the NCoA is not valid and NAR will propose another NCoA, 
which will be transmitted to PAR in the HAck message.
7. FBA
In response to the FBU, the PAR sends a FBA message to MN. If there is a NCoA assigned by 
the NAR, the MN will be notified in the FBA message. And the MN must use the assigned NCoA 
upon its attachment to the NAR.
8 . UNA
Unsolicited Neighbour Advertisement (UNA) message is sent by the MN to the NAR, as soon 
as the MN establishes connectivity on the new link. It is basically to instruct the NAR to forward 
the arriving or buffered packets to the MN.
6.4.3 Handover between Enhanced Nodes
To integrate HMIPv6  with fast handovers, the handover between enhanced node domains is 
crucial. As the global location update could result in noticeable handover disruption and packet 
loss. The procedure is explained in section 2.1.2.4, and the signalling is illustrated in Figure 2.7. 
The predictive mode is considered in this section, which means the fast handover is triggered in 
advance so that the FBA message is received on the previous enhanced node’s link.
The information for a potential handover is exchanged between MN and PAR either through 
RtSolPr./PrRtAdv. messages in a MN initiated handover or through unsolicited PrRtAdv. message 
in a network initiated handover. Using the information contained in the router advertisement 
message, the MN obtains the new LCoA to be used in the NAR’s link and the new RCoA to be
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used in the NEN’s domain. In the router advertisement, MAP option is included. This RCoA is 
constructed by combining the MN’s interface identifier and the subnet prefix received in the MAP 
option.
The signalling details shown in Figure 6 .8 , are explained as follows,
1. and 2. FBU
The MN initiates a FBU to the previous EN through previous AR. This is to instruct PEN to 
buffer the packets to MN with previous CoA as the destination address. The MN’s new LCoA and 
new RCoA are also included in FBU, so that the PEN can check the validity of new addresses 
with New EN in the following message exchanges.
With “T” and “S” flag values set to 1 (as shown in Figure 6.4), the FBU message is for 
handover between ENs and requires key to be established between PEN and NEN. Apart from the 
regular mobility options for fast handover, the other mandatory mobility options include:
- MN identifier mobility option, as explained in section 6.4.2
- NEN’s IP address mobility option
IP address/prefix option defined in Mobile IPv6  fast handovers specification [7] can be used to 
carry the NEN’s IP address. It is proposed that the value of “option-code” is set to 5, thus, the “IP 
address” field carries NEN’s IP address.
Please be noted that there are two types of FBU message: MN-^PAR and PAR-^PEN. And the 
mobility options in the messages may vary. For instance, the IP address option which carries 
MN’s previous LCoA needs to be included in the FBU from PAR to PEN.
3. AAA Req.
Upon receiving the FBU message, the previous EN realizes that the fast handover procedure 
has been triggered and the fast handover key is required if the “S” flag in FBU is set to 1 (as 
explained in section 6.4.2). To establish the fast handover key with new EN, the previous EN 
should consult AAAF server. The previous EN initiates the AAA Req. message to the AAAF 
server, requesting the AAAF server to generate the fast handover key. The “DIAMETER-FHK- 
Request” command is proposed here, similar to the “DIAMETER-HK-Request” command 
defined in section 5.3.3.3. In the DIAMETER-FHK-Request command, it includes the 
information that the AAAF server needs to generate the fast handover key. In this command, the 
following AVPs must be included to carry the information to AAAF server,
- Mobile-Node-ldentifier AVP
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This AVP (AVP Code 506) is defined in section 5.6 of RFC 5779 [98]. This AVP contains the 
mobile node identifier in the NAI format.
- MIP-CoAs AVP
It is a grouped AVP, which contains MIP-Careof-Address AVPs (AVP Code 487) defined in 
section 6.7 of RFC 5778 [38]. It carries the MN’s previous RCoA and new RCoA.
- EN-IP-Address AVP
It is address type AVP proposed here to carry the new EN’s IP address. It is similar to “Host- 
IP-Address” AVP defined in RFC 3588 [31].
Once the AAA Req. message is received, the AAAF server should generate a fast handover 
key. The FHK is derived in a similar method as explained in section 5.3.2.2:
FHK = gprf+ (key, string);
where, key is a seed to generate the FHK which can be refreshed by the EN periodically; string = 
^AAA  I  I  previous RCoA | new RCoA | “Fast Handover Key”; Y = 0x0000. N^aa is a nonce 
generated by the AAAF server. ID^jq is the MN’s NAI.
4. and 5. AAA Resp.
The AAAF server generates the fast handover key, and sends an AAA response message to the 
previous EN. The AAAF server also sends an unsolicited AAA message to the new EN. In the 
AAA response message, “DIAMETER-FHK-Response” command is proposed here to carry the 
FHK and related information to both of the previous EN and new EN. The command is similar to 
the “DIAMETER-HK-Response” command defined in section 5.3.3.3. The following AVPs must 
exist in the command:
- Result-Code AVP
Result-Code AVP (AVP code 268) is defined in RFC 3588 [31] and can be used to indicate the 
result of FHK generation. In this AVP, one value is assigned to indicate “success”, and other 
value is assigned to suggest reasons of “failure”.
- Mobile-Node-ldentifier AVP
This AVP (AVP Code 506) is defined in section 5.6 of RFC 5779 [98]. This AVP contains the 
mobile node identifier in the NAI format.
- MIP-Session-Key AVP
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MIP-Session-Key AVP (AVP code 343) defined in section 9.7 of RFC 4004 [36] can be used to 
carry the fast handover key. The AAA response message or the MIP-Session-Key AVP can be 
secured using SA existed between the AAAF server and the EN.
- MIP-sessionkey-SPI AVP
The AVP is proposed here to cany the SPI of the fast handover key. It is similar to the “MIP- 
FA-to-MN-SPI” AVP defined in RFC 4004 [36].
- MIP-MSA-Lifetime AVP
MIP-MSA-Lifetime AVP (AVP code 367) defined in section 9.13 of RFC 4004 [36] can be 
used to indicate the period of time (in seconds) for which the FHK is valid.
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Figure 6.8 Signalling for handover between enhanced nodes
6 . and 7. HI/HAck
The previous EN and new EN exchange information through HI/HAck messages to negotiate 
with each other regarding the MN’s handover. The HI message contains the new LCoA and new 
RCoA of the MN. The new EN needs to validate the new RCoA and new LCoA by checking
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whether it has been used or not. If the validation fails, the new EN proposes another LCoA to be 
used by the MN which will be transmitted to previous EN in HAck message. If the validation is 
successful, the new EN creates a temporary binding between the new LCoA and the new RCoA. 
The new EN also provides the status of the handover request in the HAck message to the previous 
EN. The previous EN then creates a binding between MN’s previous RCoA and new RCoA.
8 . and 9. FBA
Having received HAck message, the previous EN sends a FBA message to MN in response to 
FBU. The fast handover registration is completed by now. Afterwards, the packets addressed to 
MN’s previous location can be tunnelled from the previous EN to the new EN.
10. and 11. UNA
UNA message is sent by the MN to NAR and new EN, as soon as the MN establishes 
connectivity on the new link. It is basically to instruct the new EN to forward the arriving or 
buffered packets to the MN.
6.5 Analytical Models
The following parameters are defined in order to obtain the signalling cost,
- /: number of ARs an MN crossed between two consecutive packet arrivals.
- a (i); probability that an MN crossed / ARs between two packet arrivals [99].
- N: the number of ARs in each enhanced node domain is assumed to be the same and is equal to 
N. It is assumed that N=4.
- k: number of ARs crossed between the last packet arrival and the last enhanced node crossing. It 
is assumed that k=3.
6.5.1 Network Model
It is shown in Figure 6.9 the network model. As illustrated in the figure, there are four ARs 
within each enhanced node domain, thus, N=4. The fast handover can be performed between ARs 
within one enhanced node domain, and can also be performed between enhanced nodes. As 
explained in section 6.4.3, the AAAF server is involved in the handover between enhanced nodes, 
for the purpose of FHK generation.
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Figure 6.9 The Network Model and handover scenarios, with N=4 and k=3
I consider here the parameters: N=4 and k=3, which means each of the enhanced node domains 
is equally composed of four ARs, and the MN’s movement starts from the boundary of one 
enhanced node domain. The handover scenario can be illustrated in Figure 6.9. The handovers can 
be summarized by the following clauses;
If  { i ^ k - i + k N V = = 3/V
fast handover between enhanced node domains is performed
Else
fast handover between ARs is performed
Therefore, the MN moves from the boundary of the enhanced node domain in the analysis. The 
handover between enhanced node domains is performed at the MN’s first movement.
6.5.2 Signalling Cost for Mobility Location Update
FHMIPvb-enbaled MN should be able to operate in the HMIPv6  domain with fast handovers in 
order to address the issues of large handover latency and packet loss. Therefore, the location 
update can be divided into two parts: HMIPv6  related registration and fast handover related 
registration, as shown in Figure 6.10. In the HMIPv6  related registration, the MN updates the 
enhanced node and also update the HA/CN when the MN changes the enhanced node domain. In 
the fast handover related registration, the previous AR/EN is temporarily registered with the new 
AR/EN, in the handover within one enhanced node and across enhanced nodes, respectively.
The HMIPv6  registration cost is the sum of location update cost to EN, HA and CNs. Location 
updates cost for MN to update EN/HA/CN are LU^n , L,Uha and LUcn . And they are illustrated in 
Figure 6.10 and can be expressed as follows,
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LUen =  2P«r +  Pen +  Eq. 6-1
LUha =  2 P ^  +  2 P e „  +  P h a  +  Hî|f„_ar +  H^?_en +  ^ eL u a  Eq. 6-2
L U c n  =  2 P a r  +  2 P , „  +  n . P , „  +  H 2 _ a r  +  V l lr - e u  +  «  ' K n - c n  E q .  6 -3
where, n is the number of CNs communicating with MN when the handover takes place. is 
the signalling cost for location update message between entity a and b, to entity X. For instance, 
^mn-ar is the signalling cost for location update message (BU/BA messages) to EN, between 
MN and AR. is the processing cost for the location update message at entity a.
The fast handover registration cost is composed of location update cost for fast handover 
between ARs {LUpHjiR) and location update cost for fast handover between enhanced nodes 
(LUfh_en)‘ And they are illustrated in Figure 6.10 and can be expressed as follows,
EU pn_A n 3  P a r  F m n —p ar T  F p a r_ a a r  E q .  6 -4
EUfH_EN 2  P a r  T  3 P g a  +  F am —p a r T  F p a r—pen T  F pen—nen Eq. 6 -5
where, Fa-b is the signalling cost for fast handover location update message between entity a and
b. For example, Fpar~nar is signalling cost for messages between PAR and NAR (HI/HAck 
messages). Please be noted that the UNA message is not considered as location update message 
here, as it is to instruct the new AR/EN to forward packets to the MN.
It can be easily known that MN handovers across enhanced node domains times, thus, it 
updates HA/CN/previous enhanced node times. And MN handovers across ARs within one 
enhanced node domain times, thus, the MN updates enhanced node/previous AR
Let Ciu denote the total signalling cost for all location updates, thus,
Eq. 6-6
where, a  (/) denotes the probability that MN moves across i ARs between two consecutive 
packet arrivals. Substituting Eq. 6-1, Eq. 6-5 into Eq. 6 -6 , Cm can be then expressed as.
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Eq. 6-7
« ( 0
The transmission cost is assumed to be proportional to the distance between the source and 
destination entities. And Ô denotes the unit transmission cost in a wired link. It is assumed that 
the unit transm ission cost is the cost for local BU to enhanced node in HMIPv6 . The following 
parameters are also defined to calculate the signalling cost:
- (0 : It is assumed that the transmission cost over a wireless link is co times of the cost over a 
wired link.
- Sa'' transmission cost coefficient for mobility signalling message X in HMIPv6  to/from entity a.
Tx ■ j  X- j  c x  bandw id th  consum ption fo r  m o b ility  signalling m essage X in a w ired  lin  m  It IS defined as: = ------------bandwWth c o ^ t i ^ J o r  local BU in a w ired  linh------------ ‘
corresponding coefficients are listed as follows,
a. 5§^ : transmission cost coefficient for local BA from enhanced node
b. : transmission cost coefficient for BU to HA
c. 5^^: transmission cost coefficient for BA from HA
d. ScN : transmission cost coefficient for BU to CN
e. ScN ’ transmission cost coefficient for BA from CN
- : transmission cost coefficient for mobility message X in fast handover between
ARs/ENs. The corresponding coefficients are listed as follows,
a. dpFij: transmission cost coefficient for FBU message in fast handover between ARs
b. : transmission cost coefficient for FBA message in fast handover between ARs
c. : transmission cost coefficient for HI message in fast handover between ARs
d. ■ transmission cost coefficient for HAck message in fast handover between ARs
e. dpBu'. transmission cost coefficient for FBU message in fast handover between enhanced 
nodes
f. OpBA' transmission cost coefficient for FBA message in fast handover between enhanced 
nodes
g. f  : transmission cost coefficient for HI message in fast handover between enhanced nodes
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h. 6HAck- transmission cost coefficient for HAck message in fast handover between enhanced 
nodes
- Da-b : distance (number of hops) between entity a and b. And D„_j, = Db-a • For instance, 
^AR-EN is the number of hops between AR and enhanced node, is the number of hops
between neighbouring ARs (PAR and NAR).
Thus, Cm can be expressed as follows.
c , , „ = Z i + k “ (O'
= I i + k"ÂT “(0
I ~ i + k~ÂT
+ +« +
i + k 1 /y " (5 /lr+ C )
.  H  . + ^ ar-e„) + (Km-jmr + ^ ,,ar~nar) _
(8 C  + 2L + « -4 ,)  + (“ ■■»,„ +
+(»• A - ., +«■ A„-«,)-'î'(<î(w + 4 “ )
+ ( ® - A „  + + 0 + A , „ „  ' ^ ' ( C  + C ^ )
( 5 C + C )
Eq. 6-8
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Figure 6.10 Signalling cost for location update and security. (1) fast handover between 
ARs within one enhanced node domain; (2) fast handover between enhanced nodes
6.5.3 Security Signalling Cost
The security mechanism introduces extra signalling messages, as shown in Figure 6.3 and 
Figure 6 .8 . The extra signalling cost is calculated in the following sections.
6.5.3.1 Handover within One Enhanced Node Domain
As shown in Figure 6.3, the security mechanism introduces signalling messages between PAR 
and EN, NAR and EN. And with security mechanism enabled, the fast handover location update 
messages need to carry more information in the mobility options, which results in more signalling 
cost. Let SEar denote security signalling cost for handover between ARs within one EN domain. 
Then, SEar can be calculated as,
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~ ^ ^ im i-p a r  ~ ^ ^ p a r -n a r  ~ ^ ^ p a r - c n  ~ ^ ^ m r - e n
= %  +35^,. +S „^ +(*) Eq. 6-9
+  A ,w »- • ^SHI ' ^ + ^ a r ^ r  ' ^SHACK ' ’ 4  ' ' f z  ' A /- c «  * ^3 ‘ ^
where, S^r  and Sen  are the processing cost for security message at AR and EN. 
^mn~par> ^par-nar-> S p a r -e n  and S n a r-e n  are the security signalling cost between MN and PAR 
(FBU/FBA), PAR and NAR (HI/HAck), PAR and EN (FHK Req./Resp.), NAR and EN (FHK 
Resp.), as shown in (1) Figure 6.10. s^ , £ 2  and £3 are transmission cost coefficients for 
corresponding security signalling messages: FHK Req. sent from PAR to EN, FHK Resp. sent 
from EN to PAR, FHK Resp. sent from EN to NAR. It is defined as:
g _  bandw idth  consum ption f o r  certa in  secu rity  signallin g  m essage in a w ired  link ^
bandw id th  consum ption fo r  local BU in a w ired  link ' ^ ^SFBU >
Esfba’ ^shi and Sshack are transmission cost coefficients for FBU, FBA, HI and HAck messages 
with security mechanism enabled.
6.5.3.2 H andover between E nhanced Node Dom ains
As shown in Figure 6.10, the security mechanism introduces signalling messages between PEN 
and AAAF server, NEN and AAAF server. Let SErj^ denote security signalling cost for handover 
between enhanced nodes. Then, SE^i^ can be calculated as,
~  ' ^ ^ a r  ^  ^ a a a  ^ m i i - p a r  ^  ^ p a r - p e n  ^ p e n - n e n  ^ p e i t - a a a  ^  ^ i i e » - a a a
= 2P^ ,. + 37 ,^, + + CO • • s  'spgi, -S + o)' • s  ^
^ a r - e n  ' ^  SFBU ' ^  ^ a r - e n  ' ^  SFBA ’ ^  ^ e n -e n  .W/ ' ^  ^  SHACK ' ^
+  ^ e n -a a a  ' S \ ' Ô  +  ' S \ ' Ô  +  Ô
Eq. 6-10
where. Sen and Saaa are the processing cost for security message at EN and AAAF server. 
^mn—pari ^par—penf ^pen—nen ’ ^pen—aaa and Snen—aaa the SeCUlity signalling COSt between 
MN and PAR (FBU/FBA), PAR and PEN (FBU/FBA), PEN and NEN (HI/HAck), PEN and 
AAAF server (AAA Req./Resp.), NEN and AAAF server (AAA message), as shown in (2) Figure 
6 .1 0 . £ \ ,  £ '2  and £'3 are transmission cost coefficient for certain security signalling message; 
AAA Req. sent from PEN to AAAF server, AAA Resp. sent from AAAF server to PEN, AAA 
message sent from AAAF server to NEN. And e's f b u , £'s f b a > ^” s f b u > ^"s f b a , ^'s h i and e 'sh a c k  
are transmission cost coefficients for FBU (MN-^PAR), FBA (PAR->MN), FBU (PAR-^PEN), 
FBA (PEN-^PAR), HI and HAck messages with security mechanism enabled, respectively.
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Since MN performs handovers between enhanced nodes times and handovers between 
ARs within one EN domain (j. — [ ^ J )  times, the total security signalling cost S  can be expressed
as:
S = ^ a ( i ) i + kN
i + k
N SEr Eq. 6-11
Substituting Eq. 6-9 and Eq. 6-10 into Eq. 6-11, the total security signalling cost S can be derived.
The values of parameters are listed in Table IV of Appendix C.
In order to derive a(f), the following assumptions are made;
- tç : time between two consecutive packet arrivals. And it is assumed that mean value of tc is 
E(tc) — l/Ap. And tc is independent and identically distributed (iid). follows exponential or 
Erlang distribution. fc(t) is probability density function of )^W is  laplace tiansfbrm of /c(t).
- AR i residence time. And it is assumed that mean value of ti is F(ti) =  1 /T^. And ti is 
independent and identically distributed (iid). follows Gamma distribution. fm (t) is probability 
density function of ^ ( s )  is laplace transform o f ^ ( t ) .
If tg follows exponential distribution with /Ig, then the probability density function and its 
laplace transform can be expressed as:
A.
Eq. 6-12 
Eq. 6-13
If tc follows Gamma distribution, then the probability density function and its laplace transform 
can be expressed as:
a 'tJV/-1
e ^v (k )  r ( r )
/.‘W=
for /  >  0 and k ,0>Q Eq. 6-14
6>5 + 1
a
s + a E q. 6-15
where, y = k  and a  = 1 / 0 .  When k=l, it becomes exponential distribution. If k  is large enough, it 
is asymptotically normal around l/A^ .When y (k) is an integer (/c=m). Gamma distribution 
becomes an Erlang distribution, thus, the probability density function and its laplace transform 
can be expressed as:
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ni—\ ^ _________  =  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
0"T {m )  r ( w )  ' Eq. 6-16
/;w= 16s+ \ J I 5 +  ora Eq. 6-17
where, a  = mA^ .
ti follows Gamma distribution, thus, the probability density function and its laplace transform 
can be expressed as:
- 1/0
d ‘r ( k )  r ( / )
S  +  a
Eq. 6-18  
Eq. 6-19
where, a  = .
(1) If follows Gamma distribution with vaiying y and tc follows Exponential distribution 
with Ac, a (0  is derived as [61] [99]:
or(/) -
I- i= 0
Eq. 6-20
—[i -  f,„* ( 4  )] [/„* (4  )]
where p  = X J  .
(2) If ti follows Gamma distribution with varying y and tc follows Erlang distribution with 
m=2 and Ag, a(i) is derived as [99]:
o r ( / )  =
H Q ÿ ! . . r w , i= 0
i> 0
Eq. 6-21
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where, (5) =  ^ , g .  (5) = and x^''^ ( / )  denotes the r“'
derivative of x ( /) .  It is assumed that m=2, therefore, gj’^ (5 )andgj‘^ (5 ) needs to be derived in 
order to obtain «(i). 
cr( 0  can be expressed as:
a{i) =
l . i - + y i= 02X^+yA„j 2X^ +yX„^  
-^[AS(24)-2/7(')(2Aj+A5(2Aj] + (2Aj-2A,(24)+A^+,(24)]4
Eq. 6-22
where,*'^''^ [ /» (■ ')]  a n d = / [ / , ; ( i ) ] " '• / ; « (5 ) —
4 , i ^ + A „ y
\r'+i
i> 0
6.6 Simulation Results
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Figure 6.11 Probability vs. number o f ARs crossed between two consecutive packet arrivals, 
follows exponential distribution with Àc=3, and follows Gamma distribution with varying y  and 
Am=30. (1) y= 0 ,l; (2) y=0.5; (3) y = l;  (4) y=10.
Figure 6 .11 shows probability distribution of the number of ARs crossed between two 
consecutive packet arrivals, indicating the impact of variance on 7^. 7  ^ is the time between two
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consecutive packet arrivals, and is AR residence time. It is assumed that 7  ^ follows 
exponential distribution with Ac=3, and 7^ follows Gamma distribution with varying y and 
A^=30. Figure (I), (2), (3) and (4) shows the results with different y: (I) y=O.I; (2) y=0.5; (3) y=l 
and (4) y=10. Larger variance of the AR residence time indicates the probability that an MN 
remains in AR domain for a shorter time. In other words, MN is with higher mobility rate. 
Therefore, if AR residence time is with a larger variance, a higher number of AR crossed two 
consecutive packet arrivals occupies a larger amount of the overall number of AR crossed, 
compared to the AR residence time with smaller variance. For example, the probability of MN 
crossing two ARs between two consecutive packet arrivals is the highest when y=IO and is the 
lowest when y=0 . 1.
gamm@=0 1 gamm@=0 5
*■ LU+SecLU+Sec
subnets crossed between two call arrivals subnets crossed between two call arrivals
gamma=10
100 100
subnets crossed between two call arrivals subnets crossed between two call arrivals
Figure 6.12 Signalling cost v.s number o f ARs crossed between two consecutive packet arrivals.
Tc follows exponential distribution with kc=3, and Tm follows Gamma distribution with varying y 
and >.m=30. (1) y=0.1; (2) y=0.5; (3) y= l; (4) y=10.
Figure 6.12 shows the impact of number of ARs crossed between two consecutive packet
arrivals on signalling cost (Location update cost in F-HMIP shown in black dotted line and total
signalling cost with security mechanism enabled shown in red dotted line). The unit signalling
cost is the cost for transmitting a local BU to EN, as defined in section 6.5.2. Tc is assumed to
follow exponential distribution and Tm follows Gamma distribution, which is proved to be
effective in [99]. Please be noted that the signalling cost is weighed by probability. For example,
if the MN moves across 5 ARs, the signalling cost is weighed by the probability that MN crosses
5 ARs between two consecutive packet arrivals. Tc follows exponential distribution with Xc=3,
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and Tm follows Gamma distribution with varying lm=30 and y: (1) y=0.1; (2) y=0.5; (3) y=l; (4) 
y=10. Since it is assumed that enhanced node domain size=4 and the start point of the movement 
is the boundary of one enhanced node domain, the signalling cost increases sharply when MN 
crosses enhanced node domain (x=l, 5, 9, 13...in the figure). This is because of the location 
update to HA, CN and location update for fast handovers between ENs. Also, with security 
mechanism introduced, it generates a noticeable amount of signalling cost, if the MN moves 
across EN domain. It can be also noticed that the signalling cost is generally higher with large 
value of y than with small y. This is because that larger variance of the AR. residence time 
indicates the probability that an MN remains in AR domain for a shorter time. In other words, MN 
is with higher mobility rate. And the security mechanism introduces more signalling (about 1/3- 
2/3 of the location update cost in F-HMIP) on the location update cost.
gamma=0.1
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subnets crossed between two call arrivals 0 5 10 15subnets crossed between two call arrivals
Figure 6.13 Probability v.s num ber o f  ARs crossed between two consecutive packet arrivals. Tc 
follows Erlang distribution with Xc=3 and m=2. Tm follows Gamma distribution with Xm=30 and  
varying y  values: (1) y=0.1; (2) y=0.5; (3) y= l; (4) y=10.
Figure 6.13 shows probability distribution of the number of ARs crossed between two 
consecutive packet arrivals, indicating the impact of variance in Tm .It is assumed that Tc follows 
Erlang distribution with Xc-3 and m=2, and Tm follows Gamma distribution with X,m=30 and 
varying y values. Figure (1), (2), (3) and (4) shows the results with different y values: (1) y=0.1;
(2) y=0.5; (3) y=l and (4) y=10. If AR residence time is with a large variance, a high number of 
ARs crossed two consecutive packet arrivals occupies a larger amount of the overall number of 
AR crossed, compared to the AR residence time with small variance. For example, the probability
153
Chapter 6. Secure fast handovers in HMIPv6
of MN crossing five ARs between two consecutive packet arrivals is the highest when y=10 and is 
the lowest when y=0 . 1,
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Figure 6.14 Signalling cost (LU cost and LU+security cost) v.s number o f ARs crossed between two 
consecutive packet arrivals. Tc follows Erlang distribution with kc=3 and m=2. Tm follows Gamma 
distribution with Xm=30 and varying y values: (1) y=O.I; (2) y=0.5; (3) y= l; (4) y=IO.
Figure 6.14 shows the impact of number of ARs crossed between two consecutive packet 
arrivals on signalling cost (Location update cost in F-HMIP and total signalling cost with security 
mechanism enabled). The unit signalling cost is the cost for transmitting a local BU to EN, as 
defined in section 6.5.2. In [99], Tc is assumed to follow Erlang distribution and Tm follows 
Gamma distribution, which will also be applied here. Tc follows Erlang distribution with Xc=3 
and m=2, and Tm follows Gamma distribution with lm=30 and varying y values: (1) y^ ^O.l; (2) 
y=0.5; (3) y=l; (4) y=10. The results illustrate the similar trend as in Figure 6.12. The signalling 
cost in Figure 6.14 is generally higher than that in Figure 6.12. This is because that for the same 
number of ARs crossed between consecutive packet arrivals, the probability for Tc with Erlang 
distribution is higher than for Tc with Exponential distribution (as shown in Figure 6.11 and 
Figure 6.13). It is also shown in the figure that the signalling cost increases sharply when the MN 
crosses EN domains and the security mechanism introduces around 50% more overhead than the 
standard F-HMlPv6  location update cost. It can also be noticed from Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.14 
that the probability behaviour is quite similar, regardless the Tc’s probability density function 
(pdf) choice of exponential distribution (Figure 6.12) or Erlang distribution (Figure 6.14).
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Figure 6.15 shows the impact of call to mobility ratio p= Xc/Àm on signalling cost. Tc follows 
Erlang distribution m=2. Tm follows Gamma distribution with y=0.1. It should be noted that the 
signalling cost here is not weighed by probability as in Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.14. It is shown in 
the figure that signalling cost decreases as p increases. Higher p indicates less ARs crossed 
between two call arrivals, which results in less signalling cost. Therefore, signalling cost 
decreases as call to mobility ratio increases. It can be also noticed that security mechanism 
introduces extra signalling cost, and the gain of total signalling cost with security mechanism to 
location update cost in F-HMIP reduces as p increases. This is because that smaller p indicates 
MN crossing more ARs/ENs between two packet arrivals, which would result in more security 
signalling cost. And the security mechanism adds particularly more signalling cost when the 
handover is performed between EN domains. If p is large enough (close to 100), the MN is 
crossing limited number of ARs between two packets arrivals, which means the probability that it 
performs handover between ENs is very low. Therefore, the gain of total signalling cost is getting 
lower if larger p is considered. The same experiment has been carried out to investigate the case if 
different values of y is chosen (y=1 0), and the similar trend is shown in the result.
gamma-0.118000
— a—  Location updatd
* location update + Security
16000
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Figure 6.15 Signalling cost v.s call to mobility ratio p= Xc/ Xm. Tc follow s Erlang distribution with  
m=2 and Tm follows Gamma distribution with y=0.1.
6.7 Discussions
In section 6 .6 , the performance of the proposed security mechanism is evaluated. The proposed 
solution is compared with the F-HMIP protocol in terms of the signalling cost. The signalling cost
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evaluated against two parameters: AR crossed between two consecutive packet arrivals and call to 
mobility ratio. The results indicate that the proposed security mechanism generates about 1/3-2/3 
more signalling cost comparing to the F-HMIP registration cost. The F-HMIP protocol is chosen 
as benchmark here because no similar mechanisms are proposed to secure fast handover in 
HMIPv6  networks in my knowledge. Please be noted that it is considered in the simulation that 
security mechanism is enabled for every single handover the MN performs between ARs/ENs. 
Thus, it is the worst case in terms of signalling overhead. However, it might not be necessaiy that 
the keys are established between every previous AR/EN and new AR/EN. Thus, the signalling 
overhead introduced by security mechanism would be less. There are two reasons for the extra 
signalling cost:
- Extra signalling messages. For the handover within one EN domains, the FHK Req./Resp. 
messages are introduced for the EN to generate fast handover keys to be shared between PAR 
and NAR. For the handover across two EN domains, the AAAF server is involved to generate 
fast handover keys to be shared by PEN and NEN. AAA Req./Resp. commands are introduced 
to carry the keying materials/keys. With the security mechanism enabled, it adds more 
signalling overhead to the fast handover registration messages.
- Modification to the fast handover registration messages. The FBU messages are proposed to 
contain more mobility options to carry information that EN/AAAF server need for key 
generation and distribution. However, the modification to the standard registration messages 
does not introduce as much overhead as the extra security signalling messages, such as AAA 
Req.
It is considered in the simulation that the key size is 16 bytes. The signalling cost would be 
slightly different if different key size is chosen. However, the difference would not be noticeable, 
because the signalling overhead is dominated by the AAA messages. AAA solution is not light- 
weighted, because of DIAMETER protocol’s format and the amount of AVPs carried in 
DIAMETER message.
A larger EN size (for instance, 7 ARs in each EN domain) is also investigated in the simulation, 
and similar trends are shown in the results.
The proposed security mechanism does not have too much negative impact on the handover 
latency, as the security signalling are integrated with the mobility signalling. The security 
mechanism does not introduce more round-trip-time delays. More detailed analysis is provided in 
Appendix D.
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Chapter 7
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In the final chapter, I will highlight the work presented in the thesis and demonstrate the impact 
of the work on future design. A few directions for possible future improvements and research 
issues are also listed in section 7.2.
7.1 Conclusions
The focal point of work in the thesis is to address security challenges in HMIPv6  networks and 
to evaluate the impact of security mechanisms on the mobile networks in terms of extra signalling 
cost introduced. The security threat analysis is cairied out based on the proposed architectural 
framework and the corresponding security requirements are drawn. The proposed solutions 
basically aim at mitigate the security risks when the mobile node is roaming within or across 
networks. Handovers can be classified into micro-mobility handover, macro-mobility handover 
and network-level handover. The proposed solutions target at providing security mechanisms for 
network-level handover, micro-mobility handover and fast handovers for both micro-mobility and 
macro-mobility.
For the network-level handover, an enhanced AAA solution for authenticated access control is 
proposed to provide the mobile node authenticated network access. The mechanism also generates 
key to be used between serving and target enhanced nodes across access networks. The session 
key can also be used to secure communication between mobile node and enhanced node in the 
target access network. The proposed procedure is performed before the mobile node connects to 
the target access network, thus, it minimises the negative impact on handover disruption time. In 
the traditional Mobile IP/AAA solution, it usually generally takes an extra round-trip-time to 
authenticate the mobile node with the AAA sever in its home network. The performance of the 
proposed mechanism is evaluated using analytical models, namely random walk and fluid flow. 
The proposed solution is compared with the traditional Mobile IP/AAA solution in terms of 
signalling cost. It has been concluded that the proposed mechanism introduces slightly more 
signalling overhead than the traditional Mobile IP/AAA solution. This is reasonable since the 
proposed security provides functions of distributing keys between neighbouring access networks
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and localizing security credentials in the target access network, which do not exist in the 
traditional Mobile IP/AAA solution. And the proposed solution also has the advantage of 
minimizing extra handover disruption time.
For micro-mobility handover, it is proposed In the thesis an enhanced key management scheme 
for securing handovers within one enhanced node domain. In order to secure the micro-mobility 
registration procedure, handover key needs to be established between enhanced node, access 
router and mobile node, before the handover is performed. Previously, the key generation takes 
place every time the mobile node changes its point of attachment to the network, thus, large 
overhead and extra handover disruption time are introduced due to the frequent distribution of 
key/keying materials. It is proposed in the thesis an enhanced key management scheme to 
generate a bunch of handover keys at one time, when the mobile node first enters an enhanced 
node domain. The efficient key management scheme reduces the negative impact of key 
generation/distribution on micro-mobility handover disruption time. Since, the handover key 
generation does not need to be performed as long as the mobile node remains in the same 
enhanced node domain. The performance of the proposed mechanism is evaluated using fluid 
flow and random walk models. The proposed mechanism is compared with the previous solution 
on the parameter of signalling cost. The results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism 
generates more signalling cost in some scenarios and less signalling cost in others. For instance, if 
the HKS is located in the visiting network domain, the proposed security mechanism generates 
slightly more signalling overhead than the previous mechanism, and if the HKS is located in 
another domain, the proposed security mechanism can result in less signalling overhead, 
depending on the distance between the two domains. There are a few other factors that dominate 
the overall signalling cost, such as enhanced node domain size, the handover key size, etc. The 
impact of these factors is also investigated in the evaluation. The handover keys can be used to 
secure the registration messages, such as BU, etc, but also to protect the important QoS messages, 
such as QoS combined BU, etc.
Fast handover is required in both of micro-mobility and macro-mobility handovers in order to
reduce the handover delay and packet loss rate. To enhance HMIPv6  based networks with fast
handover mechanism, not only fast handover between neighbouring ARs within one enhanced
node domain is required, but also fast handover between neighbouring enhanced nodes is
necessary. Since the macro-mobility handover between enhanced node domains evokes global
registration to the home network which usually cause noticeable delay, the fast handover
mechanism is even more necessary. It is specified in the thesis the details of HMIPv6  and FMIPv6
integration (F-HMIPv6 ), including both of micro and macro mobility handovers. And based on F-
HMIPv6  networks, the security mechanism is proposed to secure the fast handover between
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ARs/enhanced nodes. The fast handover key is established between previous AR/EN and new 
AR/EN, thus, the fast handover registration messages between ARs/ENs can be secured. More 
importantly, the context transfer messages between previous mobility agents and new mobility 
agents, for the purpose of prompting “smooth handover”, can be protected using the fast handover 
keys. One example of the context transfer is the QoS context transfer message between previous 
EN and new EN, to allow the mobile node smooth handover experience with minimal service 
degradation. Performance of the proposed security mechanism is evaluated in terms of the 
signalling cost. The signalling overhead introduced by security mechanism is quantified using the 
analytical model and compared with F-HMIPv6  mobility signalling overhead. The worst case is 
considered in the simulation, which is the scenario security mechanism is enabled for eveiy single 
handover the MN performs between ARs/ENs.
Reduction of signalling load and handover delay associated with IP mobility management is 
one of the significant challenges to most of IP mobility support protocols. Much work has been 
carried out by researchers world widely and also by IETF working groups. As an invisible 
function, security also introduces extra signalling overhead and handover disruption time. And, 
AAA solution is always claimed to be heavy and time-consuming. Thus, the conflict of 
introducing security mechanisms to Mobile IP networks and minimizing the negative impact of 
security is becoming a focal point for future system design. Especially, when MIPv6  or HMIPv6  
is deployed to a large-scale wireless mobile network, such as CDMA 2000, the efforts toward 
reducing the negative impact are expected to be more emphasized because a huge number of 
mobile nodes will be served in the network. The work carried out in the thesis gives particular 
attention on minimizing the negative impact of security mechanisms on the network. And 
innovatively, the signalling overhead introduced by AAA-based security solutions is quantified. It 
provides a good guidance for future security design using AAA infrastructure.
7.2 Future Work
A few directions for possible future work which could improve the work presented in the thesis 
and a couple of interesting research issues are presented In this section.
I . Localized AAA solution
The enhanced AAA solution for handover across access networks is proposed in chapter 4. In this 
solution, the AAAH server distributes the keys/keying materials to the serving and target AAAF 
servers in the visited network, and also to the MN. Thus, the MN shares the secret with the AAAF 
server in the target access network. This process localizes the AAA solution so that the MN does
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not need to traverse the wide internet to the AAA server in its home network in the future. 
However, the concept of shadow registration, as explained in section 4.3.4, requires the local SA 
to be established a priori the possible handover. A hierarchy of AAA servers is usually 
implemented in shadow registration. Not only the AAAF server placed in the EN level needs to 
share SA with MN, but also the local AAA servers (AAAL) collocated with the ARs need to 
establish SA with the MN. The possible future works remain: How to extend the proposed 
mechanism to distribute the SAs from AAAF server to the AAAL servers? And is the dynamic 
distribution of SAs to AAAL servers possible so that the SAs do not need to be distributed to all 
of the AAAL servers at one time? Resolving the two problems would make the proposed solution 
fully compliant with the concept of shadow registration.
2. Dynamic key management scheme
The enhanced key management scheme is proposed in chapter 5, which generates a bunch of 
handover keys to be shared between MN, all of the ARs in one EN domain, and the EN. One 
interesting scenario draws particular attention is: if the enhanced node domain is reconfigured 
with a joining AR, how does the proposed mechanism proceed to establish handover key between 
the new AR and MN? A possible solution would be the combination of the proposed mechanism 
and the previous mechanism. When the MN is about to handover to another AR and discovers that 
it does not share a key with the AR, it sends a handover key request message to the EN, as defined 
in the previous key generation mechanism. The proposed mechanism can be improved by the 
dynamic scheme.
3. Fast handover interworking with context transfer protocols
The proposed mechanism aims to establish keys between neighbouring ARs/ENs to protect the 
fast handover registration messages or/and context transfer signalling. The ‘seamoby’ working 
group in IETF has been working on defining a new protocol which allows state information to be 
transferred between edge mobility devices during fast handover procedure. Examples of state 
information that could be useful to transfer are AAA information, security context, QOS 
properties assigned to the user, etc. An interesting direction for future work would be specify the 
details on inteworking of fast handover context transfer protocol and the proposed fast handover 
key management scheme. And it is also important to evaluate efficiency of the interworking.
4. Kerberos mechanism
Kerberos is an authentication protocol, which allows nodes communicating over a non-secure 
network to prove their identity to one another in a secured manner. It operates at a client-server 
model and it provides mutual authentication which means both the user and the server can verify
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each other's identity. I proposed a Kerberos-based method to secure handovers in HMIPv6  (see 
Appendix F). Although Kerberos protocol [100] is a mutual protocol with many improvements 
and extensions, such as extension proposed in [101], the lack of integration with Mobile IP 
protocols and its heavy signalling load resulted by mutual authentication remain as the obstacles. 
Further work can be carried out on exploring details on Kerberos/Mobile IP integration and 
possible methods of simplifying the procedure to reduce the signalling overhead.
5. DIAMETER implementation
The AAA framework and DIAMETER protocol are used in the proposed solutions. It will be 
useful if the proposed mechanisms are implemented in test bed such as the work done in [1 0 2 ]. 
The guidelines for DIAMETER implementation are specified by IETF in [103]. And there are a 
few existing DIAMETER implementation, such as “openDiameter”, ‘TntelliNefs Accelero 
DIAMETER”, etc. In order to implement the proposed solutions, there are some requirements. 
Firstly, there should be DIAMETER infrastructure with servers supporting the DIAMETER base 
protocol. Secondly, extra AVPs, as defined in each solution, should be supported in the 
DIAMETER client and servers. Thirdly, DIAMETER client should be compatible with Mobile IP 
protocol, which indicates DIAMTER client should be able to convert Mobile IP message into 
DIAMETER message. Lastly, security algorithms, such as key generation algorithm and hashing 
functions, should be supported by DIAMETER servers accordingly.
6 . Integration with QoS
The initial integration of security and QoS is achieved in the thesis, by securing important QoS 
messages explained in Appendix A and E. However, further integration can be investigated, in 
terms of integration of security and QoS signalling, ensuring the delivery of essential security 
messages, etc. It would be also interesting to evaluate the overall signalling overhead introduced 
by security, mobility management and QoS.
7. Contributions to IETF
In Chapter 4 and 6 , new AAA solutions are proposed for securing HMIPv6 /FMIPv6  networks, 
which can be contributed to Mobility Extensions for IPv6  (MEXT) or AAA working groups in 
IETF. In Chapter 5, an enhanced key management scheme for HMIPv6  network is proposed, 
which provides improvement for the mechanism proposed in an internet draft [8 6 ]. In the future, 
new internet drafts can be submitted based on the work presented in this thesis.
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The Combined Mobility and QoS Framework 
for Inter Access Network Handovers
As part of the Mobile VCE Ubiquitous Services Project, a combined mobility and QoS 
framework is proposed in [55]. The combined framework can be applied for handover across 
access networks.
The enhanced nodes located within each access network will communicate with each other 
through a common inter domain signalling protocol to share mobility and QoS information. For 
example, during an inter-access handover, the mobile node will be moving from one access point 
of one network to the access point of another network. Within the current internet architecture, 
this handover will create large delay during the handover. However, with the presence of the 
enlianced nodes as well as the exchange and translation of mobility information between them, the 
handover procedures can be optimised, thus reducing the overall handover delay. The same 
applies with the re-establishment of the quality of service. A mobile node attached to one network 
will have its QoS profile stored with that network. As it moves into the new network (with 
different QoS mechanisms) a fresh profile will need to be created, increasing the overall handover 
delay. However, with the presence and communication of the enhanced nodes the QoS profiles 
can be translated from one network to another eliminating the need to create new profiles 
resulting in faster and more efficient handovers. By using the ENs, I aim to make the two 
networks appear virtually as a single network allowing them to cooperate seamlessly.
Three different phases are proposed in this new mechanism. The Signalling details are shown 
in Figure 1.
1. The initial login
2. The handover preparation
3. The handover execution
Login phase
During the login phase the MN establishes a binding update with the EN, the EN performs 
the functionality of Mobility Anchor Point (MAP) as in Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 providing local
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mobility. The MN is required to have all its sessions served through the EN hence, the EN is 
required to hold the QoS states such as the DiffSei-v code point for each of the MN session 
packets . The EN knowing the Radio Access Technology used in the network (i.e. WLAN, 
WiMAX, UMTS etc), is expected to store the DiffServ code points mapping that the AR/AP will 
use for the established session. During the login phase the EN obtains the mobility update (LCoA) 
and also the unique Home address of the MN for its identification and when a session is 
established, the EN holds the QoS states of each session of the MN. Hence, in the login and 
session establishment phase the EN is expected to obtain these Mobility and QoS context of the 
MN. This information will be transferred to the new network during an inter-access network 
handover.
Handover Preparation Phase
The handover preparation phase forms the core of the proposed mechanism. It’s aimed at 
reducing the handover delay during an IP handover execution by combining mobility and QoS 
signalling. Thus, the handover preparation phase occurs just before the handover execution phase. 
It is assumed that the MN is in the coverage of both the networks, i.e. the two networks are 
overlapping sufficiently for the MN to perform the handover preparation. The overlapping is 
necessary for the MN to receive signal from the target network before it loses coverage from the 
sei-ving network. The required size of the overlap between the coverage of the two networks 
depends on the max speed of the MN. The faster the MNs move a greater overlapping is required 
for the handover to complete. Once the MN is under the coverage of the target network the target 
AR is chosen from the received router advertisement. This router advertisement contains 
information of the target EN the mobile node is required to connect to. Upon receiving that router 
advertisement the MN forwards a handover preparation message to the Serving EN. This message 
also includes a copy of the router advertisement message received from the target AR which 
contains the target EN IP address as shown in Figure 1.
In turn, if not already available, the serving EN collects the QoS context of the MN (step 3 
and 4) and sends a combined Mobility and QoS context transfer binding update (step 5) to the 
target EN. The mobility context will include the binding information of the MN i.e. the home 
address. Moreover, to minimise the packet dropping probability during the inter-access network 
handovers, the EN will establish a temporary tunnel between the serving EN and the target EN as 
shown in Figure 1. This occurs with the combined mobility and QoS binding update. To minimise 
wastage of resources, this temporary tunnel can be set up but not executed until the MN performs 
the handover or is just about to perform a handover. This information can be obtained from the L2 
triggers as the MN starts a L2 handover.
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After receiving the combined mobility and QoS context transfer from the serving EN, the 
target EN processes the information and communicates with the Bandwidth Broker in the target 
network to obtain call admission to the MN’s existing sessions and to calculate the path with the 
right QoS towards the target AR for the MN. Tliis process is shown in steps 6, 7, 8 and 9 in Figure 
1. This ensures that the QoS mapping and state information for the existing sessions from the 
previous access networks are converted into the new access network’s requirements and are setup 
before the actual handover. The mobility tunnel between the serving EN and the target EN is 
established in this phase (step 9). An acknowledgement to the serving EN for this combined 
mobility and QoS update is sent back which is then forwarded to the MN while is still connected 
to the serving access network. This gives the signal for the MN to execute the controlled handover 
to the new access network.
Handover Execution Phase
At the execution of the handover from the serving access router to the new target access 
router, the MN sends the final binding update to the EN with its home address as the unique 
identifier to associate it with the established QoS and Mobility updates. The temporary tunnel set 
up between the serving and target EN forwards all packets to the new EN. These packets are then 
tunnelled to the MN at the target AR. During this time a global binding update it sent by the EN to 
alert the HA and CN of the change in regional address of the MN. Once this update is processed 
the HA forwards the packets directly to the target network and the temporary tunnel between the 
old and new EN expires and is torn down. Using this combined signalling and exploiting the 
cooperative features between the networks, the inter-network handover can be optimised resulting 
in a smooth handover for the MN.
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DIAMETER/MIP Application-AMR and AMA 
Commands
The AAA Working Group in IETF defined the DIAMETER application for Mobile IP, enabling 
the mobility agent to interact with AAA entities. AA-Mobile-Node-Request (AMR) and AA- 
Mobile-Node-Answer (AMA) commands are two of the important commands for 
DlAMETER/MlP integration.
1. AMR command
The AMR command, indicated by the Command-Code field set to 260 and the 'R' bit set in the 
Command Flags field, is sent by an attendant (i.e., the mobility agent), acting as a Diameter client, 
to an AAAF in order to request the authentication and authorization of a MN. The mobility agent 
uses information found in the registration request to construct the following AVPs, to be included 
as part of the AMR:
- Home Address (MlP-Mobile-Node-Address AVP)
- Home Agent Address (M1 P-Home-Agent-Address AVP)
- Mobile Node NAl (User-Name AVP)
- MN-HA Key Request (MlP-Feature-Vector AVP)
- MN-FA Key Request (MlP-Feature-Vector AVP)
- MN-AAA Authentication Extension (MlP-MN-AAA-Auth AVP)
- Foreign Agent Challenge Extension (MIP-FA-Challenge AVP)
- Home Agent NAl (MlP-Home-Agent-Host AVP)
- Home AAA server NAl (Destination-Host AVP [D1AMBASE])
- Home Agent to Foreign Agent SPl (MlP-HA-to-FA-SPl AVP)
If the MN's home address is zero, the FA or HA must not include a MlP-Mobile-Node-Address 
AVP in the AMR. If the HA address is zero or all ones, the MlP-Home-Agent-Address AVP 
must not be present in the AMR.
If a HA is used in a visited network, the AAAF may set the Foreign-Home-Agent-Available 
flag in the MlP-Feature-Vector AVP in the AMR message to indicate that it is willing to assign a 
HA in the visited realm.
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If the MN's home address is all ones, the FA or HA must include a MIP-Mobile-Node-Address 
AVP, set to all ones.
If the MN includes the HA NAl and the home AAA server NAl, the FA must include the MÏP- 
Home- Agent-Host AVP and the Destination-Host AVP in the AMR.
The Format of AMR command is defined in DIAMETER/MIP application. And the complete 
message fields are listed as follows. It should be noted that not all of the AVPs must be present in 
the DIAMETER message. Some of the AVPs may not be present, and there may be more than one 
of certain AVP in one message. The {} AVP is mandatory, and [] AVP is optional.
<AMR> ;: = < Diameter Header: 260, REQ, PXY > < Session-ID > { Auth-Application-Id } { 
User-Name } { Destination-Realm } { Origin-Host} { Origin-Realm } { MIP-Reg-Request} { 
MIP-MN-AAA-Auth } [ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ] [ Destination-Host ] [ Origin-State-Id ] [ MIP- 
Mobile-Node-Address ] [ MIP-Home-Agent-Address ] [ MIP-Feature-Vector ] [ MIP-
Originating-Foreign-AAA ] [ Authorization-Lifetime ] [ Auth-Session-State ] [ MIP-FA-
Challenge ] [ MIP-Candidate-Home-Agent-Host ] [ MIP-Home-Agent-Host ] [ MIP-HA-to-FA- 
SPI ] *[Proxy-Info] * [Route-Record]* [AVP]
II. AMA command
The AMA command, indicated by the Command-Code field set to 260 and the 'R' bit cleared in 
the Command Flags field, is sent by the AAAH in response to the AMR message. The User-Name 
may be included in the AMA if it is present in the AMR. The Result-Code AVP must be included 
in the command, containing one of the values defined by DIAMETER/MIP application.
An AMA message with the Result-Code AVP set to “DIAMETER SUCCESS” must include 
the MIP-Home-Agent-Address AVP, and must include the MIP-Mobile-Node-Address AVP, and 
includes the MIP-Reg-Reply AVP if and only if the Co-Located-Mobile-Node bit was not set in 
the MIP-Feature-Vector AVP. The MIP-Home-Agent-Address AVP contains the HA assigned to 
the MN, while the MIP-Mobile-Node-Address AVP contains the home address that was assigned. 
The AMA message must contain the MlP-FA-to-HA-MSA and MIP-FA-to-MN-MSA if they 
were requested in the AMR. The MIP-MN-to-HA-MSA and MIP-HA-to-MN-MSA AVPs must 
be present if the session keys were requested in the AMR and the Co-Located-Mobile-Node bit 
was set in the MIP-Feature-Vector AVP.
The complete AMA command fields are listed as follows,
<AMA> :: = < Diameter Header: 260, PXY > < Session-Id > { Auth-Application-1 d } { Result- 
Code } {Origin-Host } { Origin-Realm } [ Acct-Multi-Session-Id ] [ User-Name ] [
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Authorization-Lifetime ] [ Auth-Session-State ] [ Error-Message ] [ Error-Reporting-Host ] [ Re- 
Auth-Request-Type ] [ MIP-Feature-Vector ] [ MIP-Reg-Reply ] [ MIP-MN-to-FA-MSA ] [ MIP- 
MN-to-HA-MSA ] [ MIP-FA-to-MN-MSA ] [ MIP-FA-to-HA-MSA ] [ MIP-HA-to-MN-MSA ] [ 
MIP-MSA-Lifetime ] [ MIP-Home-Agent-Address ] [ MIP-Mobile-Node-Address ] *[ MIP- 
Fiiter-Rule] [Origin-State-Id] *[Proxy-Info] *[AVP]
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Table of Parameters
Parameter Description Value
T
K
P
R
9
K,
Yr.v
PC,
Av-l.
Unit transmission costs in a wired link 
Unit transmission costs in a wireless link 
MN’s density
Number o f  rings o f  enhanced node domains in one access network
Residence probability
Perimeter o f  the enhanced node domain
Number o f  CN
Processing cost at network entity X.
Distance between network entity x  and y.
1
2
0.0002 users/m^ 
3 
0.2 
500  
2
=24;
P C ,, =6;
=12;
=6;
/?/'• —12; ' ratgt'ULlP
=12;' '-TarsifdC.V
A i« - l.v =2;
^EN-
^E.V-CN
^EK- =1 *•.I.L1P
A lt.lF-.t/LIH
//-r =20;
A fargd/^L 'L JP '-T ' orgt'tfj.V
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Session key generation cost 
Hashing cost
Encryption/Decryption cost using DBS
the coefficient o f  transmission cost for BU/BA (to HA) from entity 
-vtoy
the coefficient o f transmission cost for BU/BA (to CN) from entity 
X to y
Coefficients: transmission cost o f security signalling in a wireless
and wired link between corresponding entities is  ^ " times o f  k, 
T (previous security mechanism).
Coefficients: transmission cost o f security signalling in a wireless 
and wired link between corresponding entities is  ^  ^ times o f  k,
t  (the proposed security mechanism).
=  0.78
=  0.78
=  0.78
=  1.33
=  1.33
= 1.33
=  1
=  1
=  1
f , ,
s ,, 
s
y , ,
5’
&'
y
S  =-?-A ;
5 \
y
6 ' , 2
ÿ   ^ =6.67:
.V ■. .
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s ' =3.17; 
S " =3.17;
Table I the Values o f Parameters: Chapter 4
Parameter Description Value
N(K)
S
T
HK size
Wa
BW^
Domain size 
AR area
Binding lifetime. Ten, T'ha and Tcn are th e  binding lifetimes for the  
enhanced node, th e  HA and the  CNs, respectively. It is assum ed 
th a t Ten ~ Tha~'^ cn~ T •
Average speed of an MN
Ratio of the  network scale
Average num ber of CNs w hen a MN moves into /ou t of a given 
enhanced node domain
Ratio of an MN's average binding tim e for the  CNs to  its average 
domain residence tim e
Link hops betw een the  first and the second layer nodes in the  
sam e netw ork domain
Coefficient of transm ission cost over w ireless link. The unit 
transm ission cost over a w ireless link is k times of th a t over a 
w ired link
Handover Key Size
Wireless links
Signalling bandw idth consumption generated  by message X 
(BU/BA.BR) from /to  entity Y (EN/HA/CN)
BWbn : BU message to  EN
BA m essage from EN
BWgu: BU m essage to  HA
BWg^ : BA m essage from HA
BWgg : BU message to  CN
BWba'. BA message from CN
BWggi BR m essage from EN
BWgg: BR message from HA
20
10 km^
0.3 hr
5 o r 20 km /hr
0.2 
0.1
0.1
128 bits=16 bytes 
1
72 bytes
55 bytes 
72 bytes
56 bytes 
95 bytes 
72 bytes 
48 bytes 
48 bytes
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BWf
BWgg : BR message from CN
Signalling bandwidth consum ption generated by m essage X 
(HKReq./HKResp./AAAReq./AAAResp.) in previous security 
mechanism
^^HKReq' HKRoq. m essage MN->AR->EN 
HKResp. m essage AR^M N 
^^ HKResp2 - HKResp. message EN->AR 
AAAReq. message EN->HKS 
^^AAARcsp'- AAAResp. m essage HKS->EN
Signalling bandw idth consumption generated by m essage X 
(HKReq./HKResp./AAAReq./AAAResp.) in the  proposed security 
mechanism
BWg%eq- HKReq. m essage MN->AR->EN
BWigggespi- HKRosp. message serving AR-^MN
SWgj^ gespz' HKResp. m essage EN->serving AR
BWgggesp3 - HKResp. m essage EN->other ARs, except for th e  
serving AR
BWgAARcq- AAAReq. m essage EN->HKS 
^^AAAResp- AAAResp. m essage HKS->EN
48 bytes
184 bytes 
104 bytes 
96 bytes 
604 bytes 
248 bytes
192 bytes 
88+20*N{K) bytes 
80+20*N(K) bytes 
72 bytes
604+28*N(K) bytes 
216+48*N{K} bytes
Table II the Values of Parameters; Chapter 5
Parameter Description Value
y The unit transmission cost in a wired link. The unit transmission cost is
the transmission cost for local BU message to enhanced node
M The transmission cost over a wireless link is ni times o f  the cost over a
wired link
S Distance (number o f hops) between enhanced node and HKS
K Distance (number o f hops) between enhanced node and HA
L Average distance (number o f  hops) between enhanced node and CN
C Average number o f  CNs that the MN is communicating with
i. Transmission cost coefficient for mobility signalling from one entity to
another.
2
5 or 15 
5 
1
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Si', local BA sent from enhanced node
Sh'. BU sent to HA
5ft : BA sent from HA
S, : BU sent to CN
S'c'. BA sent from CN
Transm ission cost coefficient for security signalling from one entity  to 
another, in previous security mechanism
Ssi\ : HK Req. m essage MN AR
: HK Resp. message AR MN
5j 21 : HK Req. message AR enhanced node
4 ï22 • HK Resp. message enhanced node -> AR
5^31 : AAA Req. m essage enhanced node -> HKS
5^32 : AAA Resp. m essage HKS enhanced node
Transm ission cost coefficient for security signalling from one entity  to 
another, in proposed security mechanism
HK Req. messageMN AR
Ssi2 - HK Resp. m essage AR MN
5j2i= HK Req. message AR enhanced node
Ssz2 - HK Resp. m essage enhanced node -> serving AR
6 s2n' HK Resp. message enhanced node o ther ARs, except for the  
serving AR
5^ 31= AAA Req. message enhanced node -> HKS 
Ss2 2 ' AAA Resp. m essage HKS enhanced node
0.78
I
0,78
1.33
I
2.56
1.44
2.56 
1.33 
8.39
3.44
2.67
(88+20*N(K))/72
2.67
(80+20*N(K))/72
1
(604+28*N(K))/72
(216+48*N(K}}/72
Table III the Values of Parameters : Chapter 5
Parameter Description Value
n  Number ofCNs communicating w ith the  MN
N EN domains size: num ber of ARs in one EN domain
Unit transmission costs in a wired link
Coefficient of transm ission cost over w ireless link. The unit 
transm ission cost over a w ireless link Is k tim es of th a t over a 
w ired link
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Processing cost for the  location update m essage a t entity a
AR/EN
processing cost for security m essage a t entity a
Distance (number o f  hops) between network entity X and Y
Transmission cost coetTicient for mobility signalling message X in 
HMIPv6 to/from entity a
Transmission cost coefficient for mobility message X in fast 
handover between ARs/ENs
Par = 1 
Pen = 2 
PcN =1 
Pha = 4
Sab =2
Sen=^
= 4
P^MN-AR. =  2
^A R -A R =  5
^A R -E N =  10
^E N -E N =  20
^E N -C N =  20
^E N -H A =  25
^E N -A A A =  10
=  0.778  
S^  ^= l
5#^ =  0.778  
5gy =  1.333
=  1.333  
=  1.333  
=  1.556
s^x Transmission cost coefficient for message X for handovers within
one EN domain, with security mechanism enabled. Message X: 
FBU, FBA, HI, HAck.
9#%, =  2 (MN'^PAR)
=  2.333 (PAR->PEN) 
=  1 .667 (PEN->PAR) 
0#%, =  1.667 (PAR->MN) 
g g f =  1.889  
= 1.333 
s^FBU ~ 2.778  
S^FBA ~ 1.333 
S^Hi ~ 1.556
^SHAck — 1
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^SX > ^ SX
i^a.3
Transmission cost coefficient for message X for handovers across 
EN domains, with security mechanism enabled. Message X; FBU 
(M N ^PA R ), FBU (PAR^PEN), FBA (PAR->MN), FBA 
(PEN->PAR), HI, HAck.
Transmission cost coefficient for FHK Req. (PAR-^EN), FHK 
Resp. (EN->PAR), FHK Resp. (EN->NAR) messages in 
liandovers within one EN domain
Transmission cost coefficient for AAA Req. (PEN-^AAAF), AAA 
Resp. (AAAF->PEN), AAA message (AAAF->NEN) in 
handovers across EN domains
'^sFBu =  3 (MN-^PAR) 
£ " s fb u  =  3.333 (PAR-^PEN) 
 ^SFBA ~  1.667 (PAR“^ MN) 
£ " s fb a  ~  1.667 (PEN->PAR) 
f  sm ~ 1.E89 
'^stiAck ~  1.333 
Si =  2.333
£z =  1.111 
£3 =  1.111
£'i =  5.694 
£ '2  =  4.056 
£ '3  =  5.278
Table IV The value o f parameters; Chapter 6
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Handover Delay Analysis
Handover delay broadly consists of two components [48]: link layer establishment delay and 
signalling delay. In recent implementation of Mobile IPv6 it was found that delay could be as 
large as 3.6 seconds [104], and the delays involved in Mobile IPv6 are illustrated in Figure 1. 
After the Layer-2 handover is completed, the Layer-3 delays involved can be classified to [55]: 
movement detection delay; CoA configuration delay involving Duplicate Address Detection 
(DAD); binding registration delay to relevant mobility agent (i.e., MAP, HA, CN, etc.), and the 
extra signalling delay introduced by security, QoS, etc. To minimise the overall handover delay, 
each of these delay components can be reduced. I aim to minimise the extra signalling delay 
introduced by security mechanisms, by making use of the intelligence of the EN.
Signalling delayL2 handover MN movement New CoA Registration security 
finish detection configuaration update QoS...
movement CoA including registration to extra signalling
detection delay DAD delay HA/CN/mobllity
agent
for security/ 
QoS...
L3 handover delay
Figure 1: Delay components
In order to derive the numerical result, the following assumptions are made:
1) The processing time in each entity is negligible since it takes less than 1 ms [105].
2) All control messages for initial registration and handoff are reliably delivered [53].
3) The average RTT between the MN and the AR is (as shown in Figure 2) which is the 
average RTT to send and receive a message over the wireless link [53].
4) The average RTT between the AR and the EN is Tar-en (as shown in Figure 2), which is the 
average RTT to send and receive a message over the EN domain.
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5) The average RTT between the MN and its home network (HA) is 7% (as shown in Figure 2), 
which is the average RTT to send and receive a message from the home network [106].
6) The average RTT between the MN and the CN is Tj^c (as shown in Figure 2). This delay 
varies as the location of CN is different [53].
7) The average RTT between the EN and the AAAF server is Tgn-aaaf (as shown in Figure 2). 
This delay depends on the location of the AAAF server.
8) The average RTT between the AAAF server and the AAAF server is Taaaf-aaah (as shown in 
Figure 2). This delay depends on the location of AAA servers.
9) The average RTT between ARs is Tnar-par (as shown in Figure 2), which is the delay 
between PAR and NAR [106].
10) The average RTT between ENs is Tnen-pen (as shown in Figure 2), which is the delay 
between PEN and NEN.
Taaaf-aaah
Th
Foreign network
Hom e networkENTar-en
Ten-aaaf
AR
:—  Tnen-pen 
Tnar-par
AAAH
server
AAAF
server IP network
MN AR
EN
Tmc
CN
Figure 2: A simple model for analysis
The total handover delay is analyzed based on the assumptions and the model illustrated in Figure
2. The three mechanisms presented in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are analyzed respectively in the 
following sections.
Handover between access networks (Chapter 4)
- Previous mechanism
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In the previous mechanism, the AAA solution needs to be completed before MN starts the 
registration procedure, so that the MN can be authenticated by the AAAH server and the relevant 
keys can be distributed to secure the following registration procedure. The delay to complete 
AAA process is 7^  +  Tar-en +  Ten-aaaf +  Taaaf-aaah- And the delay caused by the registration 
procedure is Tg + Tar-en +  ?% +  T^c- Thus, the total delay is.
Total Delay— Tg +  Tar—en "b Tg^-aaaf "b Taaaf-aaah "b 7^  "b Tar-en “b Tji +  Tj^c
- Proposed mechanism
In the proposed mechanism, the AAA solution is completed before the MN connects to the new 
access router. Therefore, there is no additional delay caused by AAA solutions. The total delay is 
the delay for the MN to register with the new access network (EN, HA and CN). The delay caused 
by the registration procedure is Tg + Tar-en + + T^c- Thus, the total delay is.
Total Delay=7^ -b Tar-en + Tfi +  ^mc*
The proposed mechanism introduces less delay than the previous mechanism.
Handover within one access network (Chapter 5)
- Previous mechanism
In the previous mechanism, MN needs to perform key request to the AAAF server every single 
time it changes its point of attachment (AR). The key generation/distribution is performed before 
the registration procedure, thus, the handover key can be used to secure the registration signalling. 
Therefore, the total delay is consists of two parts: key genemtion process and registration 
procedure. The delay caused by key generation is Tg +  Tar-en + Ten-aaaf- The delay introduced 
by registration procedure depends on the handover type. If the MN performs handover within one 
EN domain, the MN only registers with the local EN, thus the delay is Tg 4- Tar-en- If the MN 
performs handover across ENs, the MN registers not only with EN, but also with HA and CN. 
Thus, the delay is Tg + Tar-en + Th + T^c- The total delay is,
Total Delay= Tg + Tar-en +  Ten-aaaf +  +  Tar-en (handover within one EN domain)
Total Delays Tg + Tar-en +  Ten-aaaf + Tg + Tar-en + + T^c (handover across EN domains)
- Proposed mechanism
In the proposed mechanism, the key generation is only performed once when the MN first enters a
new EN domain. If the MN performs handover within one EN domain, there is no key generation
procedure involved, thus, the total delay is only caused by registration to local EN:
Total Delay= Tg +  Tar-en (handover within one EN domain)
If the MN performs handover between EN domains, the total delay is resulted by key
generation/distribution and registration procedure (to EN, HA and CN), thus, the total delay is:
Total Delays Tg + Tar-en +  Ten-aaaf +  7^  +  Tar-en +  ?% + 7^c (handover across EN domains)
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It can be concluded that the proposed mechanism introduces less handover delay than the 
previous mechanism, in the scenario of handover within one EN domain. For handover across EN 
domains, the proposed mechanism performs equivalently to the previous mechanism in terms of 
delay.
Fast handover within one access network (Chapter 6)
- Fast handover without security mechanism (Figure 6.3)
For handover within one EN domain, the fast handover is performed between PAR and NAR. 
Thus, the handover delay introduced by fast handover registration is Tg +  Tnar-par + Tg/2. The 
registration delay introduced by HMIPv6 is Tg 4- Tar-en- Therefore, the fast handover delay is,
TYiaX 7^^  4“ Tyiar—par T" , Tj 4* 7^r-enj
Usually, the registration to local EN takes longer than the fast handover registration between PAR 
and NAR.
For handover between EN domains, the fast handover is performed between PEN and NEN. The 
handover delay introduced by fast handover registration is Tg + Tar-en +  Tnen-pen + (Tg + 
Tar-en) T h e  registration delay introduced by HMIPv6 is Tg 4- Tar-en +  7% 4- T^c- Therefore, 
the fast handover delay is,
mciX 7^^  4- Tar—en T Tnen-pen 3  ^ ' Tg 4* Tar-en T 7% 4- 7^gj
Usually, the global registration in HMIPv6 (to HA and CN) takes much longer than the fast 
handover registration between PEN and NEN.
- Fast handover with proposed security mechanism (Figure 6.8)
For handover within one EN domain with proposed security mechanism enabled, the delay is 
Ts +  Tnar-par + ^  + Tar-en- Therefore, the total delay is,
TYKXX 7^^  4" Tjiar—par T 4- Tar—en> Tg 4" Tar-en j 
For handover between EN domains with proposed security mechanism enabled, the delay is 
Tg 4- Tar-en + Tnen-pen + ^  Tgn-aaaf- Therefore, the total delay is,
TYiax 7^^  4- Tar-en “b Tnen-pen 4 ^ b Tgn-aaaf> Tg 4- Tar-en 4" 7% 4- 7^gj
It can be concluded that the security mechanism could possibly increase a little bit more handover 
delay. However, it is possible that the handover delay is equivalent either with or without security 
mechanism enabled, because the HMIPv6 registration could take even longer. For instance, in the 
scenario of handover between EN domains, if AAAF server is located very closely to EN, the
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time consumed for key distribution is negiectable comparing to the time to complete global 
registration.
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Appendix E
The Combined Mobility and QoS 
Mechanism for Handovers between 
Enhanced Nodes
As part of the Mobile VCE Ubiquitous Services Project, a combined mobility and QoS 
mechanism is proposed in [11] for handovers between enhanced nodes.
During a handover between mobility agents the location update needs to be sent to the 
correspondent node (CN) and the home agent. During this, the regional care of address obtained 
from the mobility agent changes and the packets that the CN transmits to the MN need to be 
readdressed to the new regional care of address of the new mobility agent. In the proposed 
architecture the handover will occur between enhanced nodes. Figure 1 shows the signalling for 
an EN handover scenario with combined Mobility and QoS update. During this handover the 
destination address stored in the CN changes and as a result, the path from the CN to the EN 
changes. During the handover period the packets arriving at EN 1 are stored and redirected to EN2 
where the MN is currently connected. In this way the packet loss is minimised along with the 
delay associated with macro-mobility.
A d d re ss  1I
HandoverI
A d d re ss  2
I4i
E nh an ced  N ode 1 E nhanced  N ode 2  G atew ay
S  3
i v  CN
^  P ack et Flow
Q oS com b ined bii iding u p d a te
Locatior U pdate^  A cknow ledgem ent
__ M N's Q oS C ontext
Transfer
R ed irect p ack e ts
1R e-estab lish  Q oS  path
Packet Flow to new 
destination
F igu re  1: In ter  E N s h a n d o v er  s ig n a llin g
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The combined mobility and QoS mechanism consists of tliree phases: the initial login (or 
path setup) phase, the handover preparation phase and the handover execution phase. The 
handover execution phase is explained in the following paragraph.
Handover execution phase
In the case of a handover, if the target AR does not belong to the EN to which the MN is 
attached, then there is EN change. The handover process is more complex as It involves also the 
gateway. As shown in Figure 2, when the new EN receives the handover request and detects that 
the MN is currently attached to different EN, the new EN forwards the message to the old EN 
which carries out the handover process: it configures the source routing and requests the 
reservation to the bandwidth broker (BE). After this first phase, a change of EN is triggered by the 
MN. An EN change message is received by the new EN, which retrieves the MN QoS context 
from the old EN and sets up a path to the current AR. Once this path has been set up, the new EN 
sends a EN change message to the gateway, which sets up a path to the new EN. Once the 
gateway has set up the new path, it requests the BB for resource reservation and DiffServ edge 
configuration. The DiffServ edge configuration occurs in the case the current DiffServ code-point 
has been changed, depending on policy management at the BB and the available resources on the 
segments: gateway - EN and EN -  AR.
MN qurrenlAR
touict advftritsimoni
fjmrKiovm feqwwil
hantSavet reply
change
target AR new  EN BB GW
QoS route corryiutipbm
tettstvtsihn t e q u W
handoreftepty
P
source louikig and me btffy ooohe canltgui attonroute conpputMton
QoS c a text transfef
SN change ACK
f&tùivalhn reply
< 3 -
BP/ c h a n g e«--------
Sti change ACK
sourer ' ^  con/Ha
rcssr/atts^re 
fsserraSen k; 
routing uiattot> 
SNehange
tescrvkhn roguml
fvatira} replyfôSiP
SNchmgaACf
ju^i
s ly
Q oS
r o u t e
computatlof}
source ^  routing artdmrASgy cache 
c o r t f lg u r a t lo n
Figure 2: Signalling for handover execution with EN change
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Appendix F 
Kerberos-based Method to Secure Flandovers 
in HMIPv6
In a kerberos-based system, two servers are involved:
- AS: authentication server
- KDS: key distribution server
H server
(AS)
(3) AAA Req. (4) AAA R esp.
P re -s h a re d
AF server 
(KDS) .
(2) AAA R eq.
(5) AAA R esp.
inhancei 
Node 1
Inhancer 
Node i
(6) Auth R ep.
(7)T i,
Kcsi(Time)
(8) Auth 
Rep.(1) Auth Req.
g e n e ra te d  
by KDS MN
''K
' K,g e n e ra te d  
by A S
Figure 1 Kerberos-based authentication method
As illustrated in Figure I, signalling for kerberos-based method are explained as follows,
(1) Auth Req.: MN sends an Authentication Request message to serving enhanced node 
(enhanced node 1). The message includes NAI (user@realm) and a secret master key
=HM 4C_:S'Æ 4I(A^'/D .........)
(2) AAA Req.: enhanced node 1, as an AAA client, issues an AAA request message, which 
encapsulates the authentication request message, and sends it to AAAF server (also KDS).
(3) AAA Req.: AAAF server, as a proxy AAA server, forwards the AAA request message to 
the MN’s AAAH server, according to realm field in NAI.
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(4) AAA Resp.: the AAAH server (also the AS), generates a session key , which is to be 
used between KDS and MN. The AAAH server also generates a ticket
'^ MN-KDs ^KDs  ^ ^KDs jg ^ key that only KDS holds. The AAAH
server the sends the AAA response message to the AAAF server, including
^KDS [^ A-ZV-zIS ] ^MN-AS [^6 » '^ MN-KDS ]
(5) AAA Resp.: The AAAF server shares a secret ( ) with all of the enhanced nodes in
the network. It is assumed that the number of enhanced nodes is N, therefore, the AAAF 
server generates N tickets.
7T = , Intelligent Node i ' ID, MN 'ID,....... ]
K  Kwhere, is the key shared by enhanced node i and AAAF server; is the session
key generated by the AAAF server and to be shared by enhanced node i and MN.
K KThe AAAF server decrypts using  ^^nd sends AAA response message to the
serving enhanced node. The AAA resp. message includes the following information:
MOüfg / ID , ^
(6) Auth Rep.: enhanced nodel sends an authentication reply message to MN, including the 
information in the AAA resp. message. Upon receiving Auth Rep. message, the MN
decr yp t s u s i ng  ^nd also decrypts node i ID, ygjj^ g
. The MN also stores '^ mn-kds ^nd ^  (^  -  i> 2,... A^ )
(7) If the MN needs access to enhanced node i, it sends Auth req. message to enhanced node i,
including ^  -  U2,.. .iV) current time encrypted with .
(8) Upon receiving Auth req., the enhanced node i retrieves by deciypting 7^  using .
The enhanced node i uses to decrypt time and increase the value of time by one, and 
then re-encrypt it with and sends back to MN in an Auth Rep. message.
193
